Tag Archives: Quash

Dowry case – FIR quashed !!

#Dowry #498a #Quash
Dowry harassment—When the allegations are shown to be non-specific and not of the degree of seriousness contemplated in law, and when the applicants accused are shown to be living separately coupled with attendant facts and aspects noticed and noted, the alleg mations become too bald to be sustained in law—FIR quashed. : 2017 (2) LRC 465(Guj)

Cash demand to meet crunch not dowry: Court

married woman hands

 

Rebecca Samervel | TNN | Updated: Jun 12, 2017, 02.23 AM IST

MUMBAI: In a recent order, a magistrate court while acquitting a man and his family members of dowry and cruelty charges, has observed that a demand for money on account of financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry.

While dismissing the wife’s case due to lack of evidence, a Borivli magistrate court held, “Even if the accused had demanded an amount of Rs 5 lakh for purchase of household articles, then that does not ipso facto amount to unlawful demand under IPC Section 498 A (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty).” The court also pointed out that the FIR was registered with the Dindoshi police two years after the alleged cruelty first started and the delay was not explained.

The court reasoned that the definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act meant any property or valuable security that should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly, at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage. “The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for ‘dowry’ as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants (accused) as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure,” the court said. The woman lodged a complaint with the cops on March 24, 2015, against her husband and in-laws. The woman said that she married the accused on May 5, 2011 and began to live with her in-laws. She said that she was treated well for a month after the marriage. However, despite giving cash and ornaments at the time of the wedding, the accused started demanding a washing machine, cooler, colour TV and Rs five lakh cash for purchasing a flat. The woman alleged that she told her parents about the harassment. Subsequently her parents handed over Rs 50,000 to her in-laws. She further alleged that on October 12, 2012, her husband and in-laws abused her for the dowry.

The woman said that after she returned to her parents home in March 2013, the husband assured her family about her well-being and took her back home. She said that the assault however continued and on June 24, 2013, she was thrown out of the house.

The defence denied the allegations and said that the delay in lodging the FIR “robbed the genuineness of the prosecution’s case.” The defence submitted that the woman should have approached the cops as soon as she was made to leave her husband’s home and the delay showed that the case was dubious.

source
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/cash-demand-to-meet-crunch-not-dowry-court/articleshow/59100365.cms

A #criminal #case, an #abuse of #process of #law 2 implicate accused after 12 years, quashed by SC !

Husbands often seek good quash cases. While it is nice to have 498a quash cases, it is also necessary to understand how various courts approach a quash and how sometimes one has to go up to Apex court to get results

Here is a good case that discusses the facts of the complaint and also various cornerstone cases, before quashing a criminal case, an abuse of the process of law
////////////////17. In view of the above discussion and facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed by respondent No. 1, in respect of offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC, also stands quashed.//////////

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.953 OF 2015

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 330 of 2015)

Mr. Robert John D’Souza and others… Appellants

Versus

Mr. Stephen V. Gomes and another… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.

  1. This appeal is directed against order dated 9.10.2014, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Petition No. 658 of 2014 whereby said court has dismissed the petition, and declined to quash the Criminal Complaint case No. 357 of 2012, filed by respondent No. 1, against the appellants.
  2. Brief facts of the case are that a Society named – Mukka Welfare Society was constituted on 28.3.1970 for charitable work and social service, registered under Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1970. Appellant No. 1, appellant No. 2 and appellant No. 3 were President, Secretary and Treasurer respectively, while appellant Nos. 4 to 7 were Directors of the Society. Other appellants are their relatives. A piece of land bearing S. No. 239/10 measuring 0.50 acres in Village Suratkal, Taluk Mangalore, was purchased by the Society vide registered sale deed dated 28.1.1978 from one Smt. Kaveri Hengsu. It is alleged by the complainant (respondent No. 1) that appellant Nos. 1 to 7, being members of the Executive and Directors of Mukka Welfare Society, misusing the position, held Board Meetings on 22.9.1995 and 13.10.1995 facilitating the sale of the above mentioned land in favour of their relatives (appellant Nos. 7 to 12). The sale deeds were executed on 16.2.1996. It is further stated that the purchasers (appellant Nos. 7 to 12), executed sale deeds in the same year in favour of the Directors of the Society. It is alleged by the complainant/respondent No.1 that the appellants have fraudulently usurped the property through the sale deeds mentioned above, and thereby committed cheating.

  3. The criminal complaint filed by respondent No. 1 was registered by the 1 st Additional Senior Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mangalore, DK, who, after recording the statement of the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”), summoned the appellants vide order dated 13.4.2012 in respect of offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellants filed Criminal Revision Petition No. 58 of 2012 before the Principal Sessions & District Judge of D.K. District at Mangalore, which was dismissed vide order dated 6.2.2013. Thereafter, the appellants filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court and the same was also dismissed. Hence this appeal through special leave.

  4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the papers on record.

  5. The impugned orders passed by the High Court and the other authorities below are challenged before us mainly on the following grounds: – (i) Respondent No. 1/complainant is not a member of the “Mukka Welfare Society” nor is he in any manner connected with the affairs of the Society, as such he has no locus to file the criminal complaint. (ii) The sale deeds in question were executed in the year 1996, and the criminal complaint is filed malafide by respondent No. 1 after a period of fourteen years, in the year 2010, as such the courts below have erred in law in not taking note of said fact. (iii) The courts below have erred in law in not appreciating that the complaint in question was filed to get personal vendetta by respondent No. 1 against the Directors of the Society. (iv) The courts below further erred in not considering the fact that the complainant/respondent No. 1 had earlier filed a complaint, with same set of facts, before the Deputy Commissioner, Dakshin Kannada, Mangalore, and the same was sent to Police Station Suratkal for investigation, and the Circle Inspector, after investigation, did not find any offence to have been committed by the appellants, as the dispute was purely of civil in nature. (v) Ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC are not made out. (vi) None of the transactions of sale in question is against any bye-law or clause of Memorandum of Association of the Society.

  6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.1, it has been stated that the complainant came to know of the transactions of sale, only in the year 2009, whereafter he complained before the Deputy Commissioner, D.K., as such the issue raised as to delay in filing the complaint is unfounded. It is further stated that the Mukka Welfare Society receives donations from various institutions and general public. The allegation of personal vendetta, pleaded in the appeal by the appellants, has been denied in the counter affidavit. Lastly, defending the orders passed by the courts below, it is stated that the courts below have committed no error of law.

  7. Arguments were advanced by learned counsel for the parties on the above lines pleaded before us. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties what is apparent in the present case is that the complainant is not the member of Mukka Welfare Society. It is also not disputed that the sale deeds in question were executed way back in the year 1996 and the complainant, who is not even member of the Society, raises the issue that the sale deeds were executed for the benefit of the Directors of the Society, after a long gap of more than twelve years. Sale deeds in question are registered, and not declared null and void by any court of law. It is also relevant to mention here that admittedly earlier a complaint was made by the complainant to the Deputy Commissioner in the year 2009, which was got investigated by the police and the result of the investigation was that no offence was found committed by the appellants on the ground that the dispute is of civil in nature.

  8. In view of the above facts, apparent on the record, we are of the view that the High Court and the courts below have committed grave error of law in ignoring the same. Needless to say that to constitute an offence punishable under Section 406 IPC, the essential ingredient is the “entrustment” of the property. The complaint filed by the complainant nowhere discloses that the land in question purchased in the year 1978 was entrusted to the Society for the benefit of others. It is only after entrustment is shown, it can be said that there was criminal breach of trust.

  9. In Ram Narayan Popli v. Central Bureau of Investigation 1, this Court, per majority, has explained “entrustment” in paragraph 363 as under: –“ The term “entrustment” is not necessarily a term of law. It may have different implications in different contexts. In its most general signification all it imports is the handing over possession for some purpose which may not imply the conferring of any proprietary right at all.”

  10. In State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal 2, this Court in paragraph 8 has observed that a mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an entrustment.

  11. At this stage we also think it proper to observe that in the present case, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken to be true, the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC for which appellants are summoned, are also not made out. To constitute an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC, apart from entrustment, it is also essential requirement that it should be shown that the accused has acted in the capacity of a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. It is nowhere shown in the complaint that the appellants have acted in any of the above capacities.

  12. As far as offence of cheating is concerned, the same is defined in Section 415 IPC, for which the punishment is provided under Section 420 IPC. Section 415 reads as under:-“ 415. Cheating. – Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation. – A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations……………”

  13. From the above language of the Section, one of the essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is deception, but in the present case, from the contents of the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver the property by deception. What was done, was so reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds.

  14. In Mathavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others 3, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC as follows:-“ 7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

  15. In Suresh v. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava and another 4, criminal prosecution was quashed by the Court in respect offence of cheating noticing that the complaint was filed after a lapse of ten years.

  16. In Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others 5, this Court in paragraphs 25 and 46 has observed as under: –“ 25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP (1964 AC 1254) Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys (1977 AC 1) stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court’s power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. xxx xxx xxx 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”

  17. In view of the above discussion and facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed by respondent No. 1, in respect of offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC, also stands quashed.

………………

……………..J. [Dipak Misra]

……………………………..J. [Prafulla C. Pant]

New Delhi;

July 21, 2015.

1 (2003) 3 SCC 641

2 AIR 1968 SC 700

3 (1988) 1 SCC 692

4 (2005) 3 SCC 670

5 (2007) 12 SCC 1

NOT all Dowry& presents always wid in- laws, relations!! Dowry case agsnt in laws quashed-Supreme court

Supreme court quashes Dowry case against inlaws living separately EVEN though Daughtr-in-law dead

In this unfortunate case a woman, a wife is dead. As in common in many cases, in addition to IPC sec 304B and 498a cases, a case under Sec 6 DP act is also filed by the late wife’s father on 6 people including the husband !! The woman has lived away from the in-laws, still many including a widowed sister of the husband are roped in. This criminal case is quashed by the Hon Supreme court in a well reasoned order, explaining Stridhana and why the uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint prima facie DO NOT establish the offense

…13. Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion of the parents-in- law of the bride or other close relations so as to attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act….”

“……. living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. ..common practice that these (stridhana) articles are sent along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return the same to Syamala Rani….”

“…in our view, continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed….”


REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)

BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS.    ….Appellants

Versus

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP. BY ITS
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P.
HYDERABAD, A.P. & ANR.  …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

  1. Leave granted.
  2. The present appeal assails the order dated 23.07.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No.1778 of 2010, whereby the High Court declined to quash the proceedings against appellants No.1 to 6 in C.C. No. 532 of 2009 under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 pending before Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram.

  3. Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as follows:- First appellant is working as an Engineer in G.E. India Technology Company at Bangalore. Appellants No.2 and 3 are the parents, appellant No.4 is widowed sister and appellants No.5 and 6 are the sisters of appellant No.1. Marriage of first appellant and Syamala Rani was performed at Vizianagaram on 04.05.2007 and after marriage, Syamala Rani was residing at Bangalore with her husband-appellant No.1. Syamala Rani died on 06.09.2008 under suspicious circumstances and a case was registered in FIR No.1492 of 2008 under Sections 304B, 498A IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at H.A.L. Police Station, Bangalore City. On completion of investigation in the said case, chargesheet was filed against the appellants No.1 to 6 and the case was committed to Sessions Court vide committal order dated 29.12.2008 and was taken on file as S.C. No.79 of 2009 in the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Second respondent- father of Syamala Rani filed a private complaint against the appellants under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act alleging that he had paid dowry amount and other articles which were presented as dowry to the appellants on their demand and the same were not returned. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in C.C. No.532 of 2009.

  4. The appellants then preferred a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court to quash the complaint i.e. C.C.No.532 of 2009 contending that the complaint does not disclose an offence and that FIR No.1492 of 2008 was already registered against the appellants at Bangalore city. The High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the petition filed by the appellants holding that the offences alleged in the previous case in S.C.No.79 of 2009 emanating from the FIR No.1492 of 2008 and the subsequent complaint in C.C.No.532 of 2009 are not one and the same as the previous case was registered under Sections 304B and 498A IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, whereas the subsequent case is registered under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act which is independent of the previous case. Being aggrieved, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
  5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the complaint as the previous case was already registered against the appellants in FIR No.1492 of 2008 under Sections 304B and 498A IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the same is pending trial in Sessions Case No.79 of 2009 at Bangalore city and hence the subsequent complaint is not sustainable. It was further submitted that the subsequent complaint C.C.No.532 of 2009 emanates from the same cause of action and the allegations in the complaint do not constitute the alleged offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the complaint is an afterthought for wrecking vengeance on the appellants.
  6. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the complaint case in C.C. No.532 of 2009 under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the previous case i.e. FIR No.1492 of 2008 and the pendency of the said case before the Sessions Court, Bangalore shall not affect the complaint filed under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It was submitted that even after death of Syamala Rani, the appellants threatened the complainant and his family members and the complainant-respondent No.2 had led several mediations with the appellant No.1 for return of dowry amount and other articles which were presented as dowry on demand made by the appellants and inspite of such mediations, the appellants did not return the dowry amount and other articles and hence a prima facie case is made out against the appellants and the High Court rightly declined to quash the proceedings.
  7. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the impugned judgment and material available on record.
  8. Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act lays down that where the dowry is received by any person other than the bride, that person has to transfer the same to the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given and if he fails to do so within three months from the date of the marriage, he shall be punished for violation of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Section 6 reads as under:- 6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs.- (1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman- if the dowry was received before marriage, within [three months] after the date of marriage; or if the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage, within [three months] after the date of its receipts; or if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within [three months] after she has attained the age of eighteen years; and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. [(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by sub- section (1) within the time limit specified therefore, [or as required by Sub-section (3),] he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years or with fine [which shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees] or with both.] (3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section (1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being: [Provided that where such woman dies within seven years of her marriage, otherwise than due to natural causes, such property shall,-if she has no children, be transferred to her parents; or if she has children, be transferred to such children and pending such transfer, be held in trust for such children.]
  9. If the dowry amount or articles of married woman was placed in the custody of his husband or in-laws, they would be deemed to be trustees of the same. The person receiving dowry articles or the person who is dominion over the same, as per Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is bound to return the same within three months after the date of marriage to the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given. If he does not do so, he will be guilty of a dowry offence under this Section. The section further lays down that even after his conviction he must return the dowry to the woman within the time stipulated in the order.
  10. In Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr. (1985) 2 SCC 370, this Court observed as follows:- “20. We are clearly of the opinion that the mere factum of the husband and wife living together does not entitle either of them to commit a breach of criminal law and if one does then he/she will be liable for all the consequences of such breach. Criminal law and matrimonial home are not strangers. Crimes committed in matrimonial home are as much punishable as anywhere else. In the case of stridhan property also, the title of which always remains with the wife though possession of the same may sometimes be with the husband or other members of his family, if the husband or any other member of his family commits such an offence, they will be liable to punishment for the offence of criminal breach of trust under Sections 405 and 406 of the IPC. 21. After all how could any reasonable person expect a newly married woman living in the same house and under the same roof to keep her personal property or belongings like jewellery, clothing etc., under her own lock and key, thus showing a spirit of distrust to the husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could the High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous eyes on the absolute and personal property of his wife merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby reducing the custody to a legal farce. On the other hand, it seems to us that even if the personal property of the wife is jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the same, he is certainly guilty of criminal breach of trust, and there can be no escape from this legal consequence…..”

  11. It is well-settled that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly exercised in rare cases. As has been laid down by this Court in the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors., (1988) 1 SCC 692, that when a prosecution at the initial stage was asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court was as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the offence. It was also for the Court to take into consideration any special feature which appears in a particular case to consider whether it was expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This was so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and therefore, no useful purpose was likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at a preliminary stage.

  12. In the light of the well settled principles, it is to be seen whether the allegations in the complaint in the present case and other materials accompanying the complaint disclose the offence punishable under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Marriage of first respondent and Syamala Rani was solemnized in Vizianagaram on 04.05.2007 and the couple was living in Bangalore. Appellants 2 to 6–the parents and sisters of appellant No.1 were living in Vizianagaram. It is the contention of the appellants that there are no allegations in the complaint that the ‘stridhana articles’ were given to appellants 2 to 6 and that they failed to return the same to Syamala Rani. In paras (3) and (4) of the complaint filed by the second respondent, it is alleged that he paid the dowry amount “to the accused and some ‘stridhana articles’ like double cot and other furniture and utensils required to set up a family”. In the complaint, it is vaguely alleged that even after death of deceased-Syamala Rani, the accused started threatening the complainant and that the accused offered to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards full and final settlement. The relevant averments in the complaint in paragraphs (5) and (6) read as under:- “5. The complainant submits that even after the death of the deceased the accused by keeping the dead body on one side, started threatening the complainant and his family members that if they give any report to the police, they will be killed then and there only and they offered to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards full and final settlement. There the complainant, who was in deep shock at the death of his daughter could not answer anything but gave a report to the police. 6. The complainant submits that he lead several mediations with the accused through his colleagues, whose names are mentioned below for return of the dowry, but the accused did not return the amount and other amounts, given under different heads. A duty cast upon the accused to return those articles and amount, which were presented as dowry on demand made by the accused. The complainant reserves his right to file a fresh complaint against all the accused for return of the dowry.” By reading of the above, it is seen that there are no specific allegations against appellants 2 to 6 that the dowry articles were entrusted to them and that they have not returned the dowry amount and the articles to Syamala Rani. Equally, there are no allegations that those dowry articles were kept in Vizianagaram and used by appellants 2 to 6 who were separately living away from the couple in Bangalore. Even though complainant has alleged that the dowry amount was paid at the house of the accused at Gajapathinagaram, there are no specific allegations of entrustment of the dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6.
    13. Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion of the parents-in- law of the bride or other close relations so as to attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of ‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into consideration the common practice that these articles are sent along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view, continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
  13. The impugned order in Criminal Petition No.1778 of 2010 is set aside qua the appellants 2 to 6 and the appeal is partly allowed.

CJI. (T.S. THAKUR)

J. (A.K. SIKRI)

J. (R. BANUMATHI)

New Delhi;

January 19, 2016

IF UR wife makes completely false & reckless accusations on you, use this to file defamation on her !

Delhi HC refuses to quash 498a *wife*’s defamation case.

* marriage on 26.11.2001
* female child was born on 04.09.2002.
* Thereafter, certain differences arose between parties
* wife left husband on April, 2008
* she took along with her their minor daughter who was only five years old at that time
* this wife files 498a and other cases on the husband
* during the course of the trial on one of these cases the husband states

a) wife had illicit relation with one Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma for which reason she left husband
b) wife is is a money digger who is instituting false and frivolous complaints in order to extort some good amount of money from her in laws as well as using her daughter as a pawn for this purpose;
c) Wife ran away with all her belongings including items not belonging to her;
d) Wife marries for money and troubles her in-laws at the time of Divorce/break-up for marriage;
e) Wife is a characterless person who has/had many relationships;
f) wife blackmailed and pressurized the husband to marry her; and
g) wife is introducing Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma as the father of the child.

Stating that these above are defamatory in nature, Wife files a defamation on the husband. Magistrate accepts wife’s case and issues summons ! So husband goes for quash at Delhi HC.

Husband’s arguments ( to quash the defamation) are
* Pleadings in civil proceedings as well as statement under S 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be made basis of complaint for defamation
* wife has not identified any specific allegations/imputations made by husband and co against her constituting an offence of defamation
* The police officer, who investigated the complaint of wife and witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the police, cannot be made co-accused in a defamation complaint !!
* it is apparent from the conduct of wife that she is only interested in implicating the husband and co in false criminal cases by filing false complaints and this amounts to an abuse of the process of Court.

Wife argues that
* Any averment made in judicial records containing defamatory statements, amounts to publication as the judicial records are public documents.
* the husband and co tried to malign wife as a person seeking huge settlement and defame her
* Fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is not applicable to the present proceedings as it is solely based upon the proposition of good faith, which cannot be decided at a preliminary stage
* he opinion given by the IO in the closure reports without any substantive proof on record are not the acts done in official capacity and may have an effect of tarnishing the image of respondent No.1 before the public.

Hon Delhi HC analyses what is defamation, how are the powers of quash to be exercised at what stage should quash be used and refuses to quash the husband’s case

Though this case is a temporary victory for the wife, this case has some good reasoning and analysis of defamation that can be used by the husband when he is on the offensive

Generally a quash is a tough route, and is to be used sparingly, however this husband may be able to win the case in front of the magistrate or on appeal as the wife seems to have roped in the police IO and others who were witnesses !!

Husbands who wish to go on the offensive are requested to read this case in detail and understand the relevant portions

This may also help the husbands on what to state and what NOT to state in their rebuttals / arguments

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
*******************************************************************************
CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
*******************************************************************************

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 13th March, 2015
Date of Decision: 01st May, 2015

CRL.M.C. 447/2013

BIKRAMJIT AHLUWALIA & ORS. ….. Petitioners
Through: Mr. Y.P. Narula, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Aniruddha Choudhury, Mr.Abhay Narula & Mr.Ujas Kumar, Advs.

versus

SIMRAN AHLUWALIA & ANR. ….. Respondents
Through: Ms.Anu Narula, Adv.

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V.P.VAISH

JUDGMENT

1. By way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) the petitioners seek quashing of the criminal complaint case No. 49 of 2012 filed by respondent No.1 in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06 (East), Karkardooma Court, Shahdara, Delhi alleging offences under Section 499 read with Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) alongwith quashing of the summons issued pursuant thereto.

2. Succinctly stating the facts of the present case as emerging from the petition are that marriage between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 was solemnized on 26.11.2001 as per Hindu rites, customs and ceremonies. Out of the said wedlock a female child was born on 04.09.2002. Thereafter, certain differences arose between the said parties and respondent No.1 left petitioner No.3 in April, 2008. At that time, she took along with her their minor daughter who was only five years old. Since then, there have been continuous inter se disputes between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 which are pending adjudication before various courts. During the course of the said proceedings, pleadings were filed by the petitioners which were taken to be defamatory by respondent No.1 and accordingly a criminal complaint was filed.

3. On the basis of the said complaint case No. 49/2012, the petitioners received summons on 01.02.2013 from the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi under Sections 500/34 IPC.

4. It is against the said complaint case and the summons received by the petitioners that the petitioners have filed the present petition.

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the complaint is not maintainable as the respondent No.1 has not specified the averments in the pleadings on the basis of which she is resting her claim for defamation. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate committed an error in law in taking cognizance of the complaint for defamation on the basis of records of pending civil proceedings and on the basis of statements recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., during the course of investigation of criminal complaints filed by the respondent No.1. Pleadings filed by the petitioner in the civil proceedings as well as the statement made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be made the basis of the complaint for defamation. Respondent No.1 has not identified any specific allegations/imputations made by the petitioners against her constituting an offence of defamation of respondent No.1 in public. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the inferences drawn by respondent No.1 on the basis of circumstances and statements made during litigation between the parties cannot be considered defamatory under Sections 499/500 IPC. The police officer, who investigated the complaint of respondent No.1 and witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the police, cannot be made co-accused in a defamation complaint. Admittedly, respondent No.1 is litigating with the petitioners and the averments made by the petitioners in civil proceedings, which are under adjudication, cannot be made the subject matter of a complaint for defamation. Even if it is presumed that the statements made by the petitioners are defamatory in nature, they would be covered by the fifth exception to Section 499 IPC.

7. It was lastly contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that from the allegations made in complaint and keeping in view the conduct of respondent No.1, it is apparent that respondent No.1 is only interested in implicating the petitioners in false criminal cases by filing false complaints and the said conduct of respondent No.1 amounts to an abuse of the process of Court.

8. In supports of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon a catena of judgments which include, ‘Raminder Kaur Bedi v. Jatinder Singh Bedi’, 1989 (16) DRJ 154; ‘S.P. Satsangi v. Krishna Kumar Satsangi’, II (2007) DMC 425; ‘Alli Rani Joseph Mathew v. P. Arun Kumar’, 2013 (1) CTC 661; ‘Gopi R. Mallya v. Smt. Pushpa’, 1997 Kar LJ 216 ; ‘Geetha v. A.K. Dhamodharan’, CDJ 2011 MHC 3809; ‘Re: P. Ramaswami Mudaliar’, (1938) 1 MLJ 810; ‘M.P. Singh Sahni v. State’, Crl.M.C. No. 3779 of 2003 decided on 30.05.2013; ‘Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd & Ors.’, AIR 2006 SC 2780 and ‘Shatrughan Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi & Ors.’, (1996) 6 SCC 263.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that the present petition is not maintainable on the face of it as the trial court is seized with the matter and has taken cognizance on the basis of pre-summoning evidence led by respondent No.1. The trial court summoned the petitioners only after being prima facie convinced by the act of defamation by the petitioners. The sole purpose of the petitioners is to malign and defame the image of respondent No.1 before the courts by averting that she has demanded huge sum of money for settlement. The petitioners have always made highly defamatory false statements. In the present petition also the petitioners tried to do the same thing by showing that respondent No.1 has demanded huge sum for settlement of dispute. The petitioners have kept this court in dark by not filing the entire documents on record with the present petition which are relied upon by respondent No.1 before the trial court on the basis of which trial court established a prima facie case against the accused persons. The chain of circumstances established by the respondent No.1 in her complaint clearly show the common intention shared by the petitioners and other accused persons in connivance with each other to defame and malign respondent No.1?s character.

10. It was further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that pleadings filed by the petitioners in civil proceedings, can be quoted out of context and used for filing a complaint for defamation. Any averment made in judicial records containing defamatory statements, amounts to publication as the judicial records are public documents. Fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is not applicable to the present proceedings as it is solely based upon the proposition of good faith, which cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined after completion of trial. This Court while exercising its inherent powers cannot quash the complaint only on the basis that the trial will not result in conviction of the accused persons. The opinion given by the IO in the closure reports without any substantive proof on record are not the acts done in official capacity and may have an effect of tarnishing the image of respondent No.1 before the public.

11. It was also contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that despite the defamatory allegations made by the petitioners and other accused persons against respondent No.1, the trial court has ordered to file supplementary chargesheet against the petitioners after finding the truth in the protest petition of the respondent No.1 in FIR No. 273/2010 under sections 498A/406/34 IPC.

12. It was lastly submitted by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. has already been served on the petitioners and the trial in the complaint case has already commenced. The petitioners did not challenge the notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.

13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the material on record.

14. At the outset it may be mentioned that the petitioners have not filed copy of the summoning order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi.

15. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to reproduce relevant provisions of Section 499 IPC which read as under:

“499. Defamation.–Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1-3 Explanation 4.–No imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

xxx xxx xxx Fifth Exception. – Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and other concerned – It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

xxx xxx xxx”

16. To constitute “defamation” under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with intention of harming or with a knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made.

In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged.

17. Ingredients of Section 499 IPC were discussed by this Court in “Standard Chartered Bank v. Vinay Kumar Sood”, 2010 CrlLJ 1277 wherein it was observed as under:-

“7. For an offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC, three essential ingredients are required to be fulfilled:-
(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;
(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations.
(iii) The said imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.”

18. Further, as per Explanation 4 to the aforementioned Section, no imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, in the estimation of others or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

19. The fifth exception to the said Section provides immunity to an imputation expressed in good faith regarding the merits of any case decided by a Court of justice or to the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent in any such case. So far as the protection under fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is concerned it states that accusations preferred in good faith against a person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusations will not amount to defamation. Good faith of the person making accusations is therefore an essential condition of exemption from liability for defamation under this Exception.

20. It is a settled law that to decide whether the imputations amount to defamation, a court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 IPC triable by the Magistrate. In ‘Shatrughna Prasad Sinha vs. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi and Ors.’ (1996) 6 SCC 263 the Apex Court was of the view that:

“13….. It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the definition of ‘defamation’ under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500, IPC.”

It is also an established principle of law that the burden to prove that a case falls within the exceptions to section 499 IPC is on the party who contends it to exist.

21. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the allegations of defamation raised by respondent No.1 against the petitioners were made on the basis of the imputations made by the petitioners in the civil proceedings and the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 273/2010 under Sections 498A/406 IPC registered at P.S. Preet Vihar, Delhi. Respondent No.1 has filed the complaint before the trial court in view of the following defamatory statements made by the petitioners and other co-accused:

a) Illicit relation of respondent No.1 with Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma for which reason the complainant left the company of her husband;
b) Respondent No.1 is a money digger who is instituting false and frivolous complaints in order to extort some good amount of money from her in laws as well as using her daughter as a pawn for this purpose;
c) Respondent No.1 ran away with all her belongings including items not belonging to her;
d) Respondent No.1 marries for money and troubles her in-laws at the time of Divorce/break-up for marriage;
e) Respondent No.1 is a characterless person who has/had many relationships;
f) Respondent No.1 blackmailed and pressurized the accused No.2 to marry her; and
g) Respondent No.1 is introducing Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma as the father of the child.

22. The law is also well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, F.I.R. or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, the law is equally settled that where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the F.I.R. or complaint may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the leading case of “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.’, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 certain guidelines were issued for the exercise of these powers by the Courts. In guideline number 3 it was laid down that where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused, the Court may quash the F.I.R. as well as the investigations. A note of caution was added by observing that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It was held that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. Similarly, in “Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill’, (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059 and “Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi”, (1999) 3 SCC 259, the Hon?ble Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. A note of caution was added that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful.

23. Even at the time of summoning, the Magistrate is not required to conduct a minute analysis of the evidence produced by the complainant. All that is required to be seen is whether the Magistrate has applied his mind and found sufficient reason to proceed against the accused persons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta and Ors.”, (2015) 3 SCC 424, held as under: –

“8. …..At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not.”

24. Further, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine. The inherent powers of the High Court under the said Section are meant to act in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. The scope of the inherent powers of the High Court vested with it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been settled by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. In ‘Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors.’, 2007 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court reiterated the scope and powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. while stating that:

“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”

25. From the perusal of the records and the complaint of respondent No. 1 it is observed that the averments made by the petitioner do prima facie appear to be defamatory and injurious to the image of respondent No. 1. The said imputations are directed towards the character of the said respondent. Thus, at this stage this Court is not convinced with the arguments of the petitioner that not even a prima facie case is established against the petitioners for the offence alleged.

26. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alleged defamatory statements made by the accused persons in the pleadings of previous civil proceedings and statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant case. This contention does not find favour with this court. The pleadings form a part of the judicial records and form a part of public documents. Anything stated in such pleadings, therefore, amount to the publication of the defamatory statements. Further the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections 499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162 Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only “qualified privilege” and not “absolute privilege”.

27. The other point for consideration in the present case is whether such statements are covered by the exceptions provided under Section 499 IPC. In the opinion of this court the question whether or not such statements are covered under the said exceptions or whether such statements have been made in good faith or not cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined at the time of hearing and not under a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In ‘Balraj Khanna and Ors v. Moti Ram’, AIR 1971 SC 1389 the Apex Court in this regard was of the view that:

“30. …It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499, I.P.C, as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint.”

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is devoid of any merit, same deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed.

Crl. M.A. No.1432/2013 and 8899/2013

The applications are dismissed as infructuous.

(VED PRAKASH VAISH)

JUDGE

MAY 01st, 2015

hs