498a Dowry case on 11 year old brother Inlaw, married sis Inlaw, 74 year father Inlaw sheer abuse of law. Quashed. P&H HC

Fake case filing wife ropes in 3 in laws without any proper evidence or case against them. The court finds the case a sheer ABUSE of the process of law. Especially the court notes the following ” … Petitioner No.1 is the sister-in-law of the complainant, who got married on 04.02.1989 and has been residing in her matrimonial home since then and therefore, there is not even a remotest possibility that husband of the complainant was used to give beatings to her at the instance of petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2 was born on 12.07.1979 and was 11 years of age in March, 1990 when the complainant alleged that she was given beatings by her husband at the instance of petitioner No.2. Moreover, he had left for Canada in March, 1996 and is residing there since then. Similarly, petitioner No.3 aged 74 years had left for Canada in 1996 and is residing there since then with petitioner No.2. In such an eventuality, it is hard to believe that petitioners had harassed the complainant as alleged in the complaint. … It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498- A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the relatives of the husband roped in under this provision, no matter they are bed ridden grand parents of the husband or the relatives living abroad for decades. The case in hand is also of similar nature..”

The sad saga borne out of Honorable COURT’s decree is given below

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M No.13517 of 2018

Date of Decision:15.05.2020

Amarjit Kaur and others ….Petitioners

versus

Jaswinder Kaur and another ….Respondents
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR
Present:
Mr. Bhrigu Dutt Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Ish Puneet Singh, Advocate for respondent No.1.
Mr. Davinder Bir Singh, DAG, Punjab.

---

JAISHREE THAKUR. J

1. This is a petition that has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash Criminal Complaint No.31861/13 dated 06.09.2012 and the summoning order dated 06.12.2016 whereby petitioners herein have been summoned to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506, 120-B IPC and order dated 04.08.2017 declaring the petitioners as proclaimed offenders. Petitioners herein are the father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the respondent No.1 Jaswinder Kaur (hereinafter referred to as the complainant).
2. In brief, the facts are that the abovesaid criminal complaint had been made by the complainant, who got married with Jaswant Singh on 05.08.1989. Jaswant Singh is none other than the real brother of petitioners No.1 and 2 and son of petitioner No.3. In the complaint it was averred that marriage was solemnized lavishly and a sum of `4 lakhs was spent thereon, apart from giving dowry articles, gold ornaments and other luxurious items. The complaint was made against the husband Jaswant Singh, Amarjit Kaur alleged to be second wife of Jaswant Singh, father-in-law Dilbagh Singh, mother-in-law Charan Kaur, brother-in-law Ranjit Singh and the sister-in-law Amarjit Kaur.
3. It was further alleged that soon after the marriage, the accused persons named in the complaint started harassing the complainant on account of not bringing enough dowry and they raised a demand of Maruti 800 car along with an amount of `50,000/-. Though the complainant persuaded the accused persons with regard to inability of her parents to fulfill their demands, in the month of March, 1990, husband of the complainant at the instance of other accused gave her beatings and stated that she would have no place in the house if the demands are not fulfilled. Accused No.4 in the complaint i.e. mother-in-law of the complainant also raised a demand of gold ornament.
4. On 24.07.1993, the complainant gave birth to a girl child namely Manjinder Kaur at Nawanshahar and entire expenses of the delivery were borne by parents of the complainant. It was alleged that after the birth of girl child, the mother-in-law raised a demand of `5 lakhs. The husband and petitioners herein along with mother-in-law taunted the complainant for not giving birth to a male child. In the year 2002, the complainant was turned out of the matrimonial home and at that point of time, her mother-in-law took all gold ornaments and other articles belonged to the complainant. It was further alleged that on 24.01.2008, husband of the complainant at the instance of his family members turned her out of matrimonial home and on 23.02.2008 also left the daughter with the complainant at Jalandhar and threatened her of dire consequences if she made a complaint against him. In this regard, the complainant made a complaint to SSP, Nawanshahr on 15.04.2008 but no action had been taken. In the month of September, 2009, severe blows were given in her stomach by accused No.1 i.e. the husband. She came to know that her husband solemnized a second marriage with one Amarjit Kaur (who was made accused No.2 in the complaint) without taking any divorce from her. She filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and also an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. A complaint was also made by her to the Commissioner of Police on 5.76.2012 but no action had been taken.
5. In support of her complaint, complainant stepped into witness box as CW1 and examined one Balkiat Singh as CW-2 and Piar Kaur as CW3, who reiterated the version of the complaint. She placed on record photographs of her husband with second wife as Ex.C3 to C5 and copies of petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act against her and against his second wife as Ex.C6 and C7 respectively. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jalandhar on appreciation of material placed before it, vide order dated 25.03.2013 summoned the husband to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 and 494 IPC and the mother-in-law under Sections 406, 498-A and 506 IPC whereas the other accused persons were discharged including the petitioners herein.
6. The aforementioned order was challenged by the complainant in revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar who vide order dated 02.02.2015 while noting the fact that there are specific allegations against accused No.3, 5 and 6 i.e. petitioners herein set aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jalandhar and directed to pass appropriate summoning order after re-considering the evidence placed before him.
7. Since the revisional court set aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, the complainant filed a petition before this Court to the extent that since the husband and mother-in-law did not challenge their summoning order, the revisional court gravely erred in setting aside the order in toto. This Court vide order dated 21.08.2015 clarified that the summoning order passed by the trial Court against husband Jaswant Singh and mother-in-law Charan Kaur will not be deemed to have been set aside.
8. The trial Court on reconsideration of the evidence before it passed order dated 06.12.2016 whereby accused Nos.3, 5 and 6 i.e. petitioners herein have also been ordered to be summoned to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506 and 120-B IPC.
9. Pursuant to the summoning order, notice were issued to the petitioners and since they did not put in appearance despite publication, they were declared as proclaimed offenders vide order dated 04.08.2017.
10. Mr. Bhrigu Dutt Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would submit that there is no specific allegation levelled against the petitioners in the complaint and therefore, the Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 25.03.2013 after appreciating the material placed before it gave a finding that no offence is made out against the petitioners herein and only summoned the husband and mother-in-law of the complainant to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 IPC. Even in the revision petition filed by the complainant against the aforementioned order, the revisional court failed to consider the fact that a right had been accrued in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 25.03.2013 passed by the Judicial Magistrate and therefore, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioners before setting aside the said order and gravely erred in remanding the matter back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the evidence. On remand, the trial Court failed to take into consideration that there is no specific allegation levelled against the petitioners in the complaint and in the absence of any specific allegation, a complaint is liable to be dismissed.
11. He further contended that in pursuance to the summoning order dated 06.12.2016, summons issued to the petitioners were never served as the address of the petitioners given in the complaint by the complainant was incorrect as they were not residing at the said address at the relevant point of time. In support of his contention, he relied upon zimni orders dated 22.12.2016, 03.01.2017, 20.01.2017, 08.02.2017, 28.02.2017, 09.03.2017, 01.04.2017 and 24.04.2017 annexed with the petition as Annexure P-7 (colly). On the application moved by the complainant for effecting service upon the petitioners by way of substituted service, the trial Court vide order dated 24.04.2017 ordered the petitioners to be summoned by way publication. The proclamation published in the newspaper would show that petitioners No.2 and 3 were shown to be residents of Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar whereas they were actually residing in Canada since 1996 and the said fact was very well in the knowledge of the complainant. Moreover, petitioner No.1 was residing in her matrimonial home at Roper and therefore, was not aware of the pendency of the proceedings. The proclamation was published on 16.07.2017 and petitioners were required to be appeared before the trial Court on 17.07.2017 i.e. the very next day after the publication made in the newspaper. Even order dated 04.08.2017 declaring the petitioners as proclaimed persons has been passed before the expiry of 30 days of the publication of proclamation on 16.07.2017, which is in violation of the provisions of Section 82 (1) and 82 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
12. Per contra, Mr. Ish Puneet Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-respondent No.1 supported the orders under challenge whereby petitioners have been ordered to be summoned to face trial and declared as proclaimed persons, while contending that the same have been passed on appreciation of material placed before the trial Court. The husband and the mother-in-law did not challenge the order whereby the husband had been ordered to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506, 494 IPC and the mother-in-law under Sections 406, 498-A and 506 IPC. There are specific allegations levelled against the petitioners in para Nos.3, 5 and 6 of the complainant and therefore, they have rightly been summoned to face trial on the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court.
13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book.
14. It is the conceded position on record that in the first round of appreciation of evidence, the trial Court vide order dated 25.03.2013 gave a finding that no offence as levelled in the complaint is made out against the petitioners herein and summoned only husband and the mother-in-law to face trial. The complainant challenged the said order in revision petition and the revisional court remanded the matter to the trial court to pass a fresh order qua petitioners after re-appreciation of evidence. On re-appreciation of evidence, the trial court vide order dated 06.12.2016 summoned the petitioners to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506 and 120-B IPC and in pursuance to summoning order when the petitioners had failed to appear before it, the trial Court vide order dated 04.08.2017 declared them as proclaimed persons.
15. It would be in the interest of justice to see at the first instance whether any offence is made out against the petitioners as per allegations levelled against them in the complaint or not? Because if the complaint fails, as a necessary corollary, all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom would automatically go. The allegations levelled against the petitioners in paras No.3, 5 and 6 of the complaint are reproduced as under:-
    “3.That on showing the incapability to arrange for Maruti 800 car and more dowry articles, in the month of March 1990, the accused No.1 at the instance of respondents No.3 to 6 started giving merciless beatings to the complainant…….
16. That it is also not out of place to mention here that the accused No.1, 3 to 6 used to taunt the complainant for not giving birth to a male child……..
17. That on 24.1.2008 the accused No.1 at the instance of accused No.3 to 6 started beating the complainant and further turned out the complainant from her matrimonial house in bare three clothes………All the dowry articles and shtridhan belonging to the complainant is in custody of accused No.1, 3 to 6 and are using the same for their personal gain since then the complainant is living at the mercy of her brothers and widow mother.”
18. A perusal of the aforementioned would reveal that there are no direct and specific allegations against the petitioners that they had given beatings to the complainant or demanded any dowry article or misappropriated the shrtidhan. The expression used is ‘at the instance of accused No.1’. The complainant has failed to bring on record any evidence to show that she had been physically abused by the petitioners or entrustment of any dowry article.
19. Petitioner No.1 is the sister-in-law of the complainant, who got married on 04.02.1989 and has been residing in her matrimonial home since then and therefore, there is not even a remotest possibility that husband of the complainant was used to give beatings to her at the instance of petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2 was born on 12.07.1979 and was 11 years of age in March, 1990 when the complainant alleged that she was given beatings by her husband at the instance of petitioner No.2. Moreover, he had left for Canada in March, 1996 and is residing there since then. Similarly, petitioner No.3 aged 74 years had left for Canada in 1996 and is residing there since then with petitioner No.2. In such an eventuality, it is hard to believe that petitioners had harassed the complainant as alleged in the complaint.
20. It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498- A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the relatives of the husband roped in under this provision, no matter they are bed ridden grand parents of the husband or the relatives living abroad for decades. The case in hand is also of similar nature. The complainant has failed to make out a prima facie case against the petitioners regarding allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant or demanding dowry from her. The complaint does not disclose specific allegation against the petitioners except casual reference of their names that husband of the complainant gave her beatings at the instance of petitioners. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 quashed the FIR registered against the unmarried sister of the husband on the ground that prima facie case was not attracted against her in the absence of specific allegations.
21. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the case in hand is a sheer abuse of process of law and therefore, is a fit case to exercise the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the complaint No.31861/13 dated 06.12.2016 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the orders dated 06.12.2016 and 04.08.2017 qua petitioners are quashed.
22. The petition is allowed accordingly.
    (JAISHREE THAKUR)

JUDGE

May 15, 2020

Pankaj*

Whether reasoned/speaking Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

IPC 498a Dowry case against in-laws is an ABUSE of process of law, hence quashed ! MP HC

Angry wife files 498a against husband and 4 in laws including brother in law , sister in law etc. Hon MP High Court finds the case against in laws an ABUSE of process of law and quashes the same .

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Ravikant vs Smt. Radhika Kuderiya on 20 May, 2020

Author: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : JABALPUR.
S.B : HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

M.CR.C. NO.10332/2019

Ravikant and others.

Vs.

Smt. Radhika Kuderiya & another.


PRESENT :


Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri Sudhir Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Shri Gulab Singh, Panel Lawyer for the respondent No.2-State.

ORDER

(20.5.2020)

Accused/petitioners have filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (in short ”the Code”) against the order dated 1.12.2018, passed by I Additional Sessions Judge, Bijawar, District Chhatarpur (MP), in Criminal Revision No.01/2018, whereby learned Judge affirmed the order dated 18.12.2017, passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Badamalahra, District Chhatarpur (MP), in Criminal Case No.523/2017, in which learned JMFC took cognizance against the accused/petitioners under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC for short).

2. Briefly stated facts of the case, before the trial Court, are that the marriage of complainant/respondent No.1 was solemnized with accused/petitioner No.1 on 26.4.2014. Accused/petitioner No.2 is father-in-law and accused/petitioner No.3 is mother-in-law, accused/ petitioner No.4 is sister-in-law and accused/ petitioner No.5 is brother-in-law of complainant/ respondent No.1. At the time of marriage, accused/petitioners demanded Rs.5 lacs and one Bollero Jeep as dowry. The parents of complainant/respondent No.1 gave Rs.5 lacs and Bollero Jeep as well as other articles of gold and valuable property to the accused/petitioners at the time of marriage. After the marriage, complainant/respondent No.1 went with accused/petitioners at matrimonial home peacefully. Thereafter, accused/petitioners snatched ornaments from her and they tortured and humiliated her. They used to tell her that they want a beautiful wife or daughter-in-law. Complainant/respondent No.1 became pregnant. Accused/ petitioners did not provide proper medical treatment, therefore, she underwent abortion. After some time, accused/ petitioners again pressurised her for pregnancy, but they told her that accused/petitioner No.4 is issueless, so complainant/respondent No.1 delivered a child. Complainant/respondent No.1 was very weak at that time, but she was pressurised for pregnancy by accused/ petitioners. She again became pregnant, but accused/ petitioners did not provide proper medical treatment to her. Thereafter, her father gave her him Rs.1 lakh so that accused/ petitioners may provide proper medical treatment. Thereafter, she delivered a male child on 13.6.2016. Thereafter, accused/ petitioners pressurised to give her child to her sister-in-law, accused/petitioner No.4, but complainant/respondent No.1 refused to accept this proposal, then accused/petitioners humiliated and tortured her. Thereafter, complainant/respondent No.2 left her matrimonial home and she is residing at her father’s home since 1.6.2017, but accused/petitioners went to snatch her child. Accused/petitioner N.1 initiated a proceeding at Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur. She appeared before Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, but accused/petitioners did not sign the proceeding and proceeding was dismissed. Complainant/respondent No.1 lodged a complaint before Superintendent of Police, Tikamgarh, on 29.8.2017 and 25.9.2017, but they did not initiate any proceeding against the accused/petitioners. Thereafter, she filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Badamalahra, District Chhatarpur. Learned JMFC enquired into the matter and took the statements of complainant/respondent No.1 and other witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code and took cognizance under Section 498-A of IPC against the accused/petitioners. Accused/petitioners filed a Criminal Revision against this order before I Additional Sessions Judge, Bijawar, learned I ASJ Bijawar, dismissed the said revision, then they filed this Misc. Criminal Case.

3: Learned counsel for the accused/petitioners submits that accused/petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case. Accused/petitioners No.2 to 5 are residing separately from accused/petitioner No.1 and they have no nexus with day-to-day family affairs of accused/petitioner No.1. Learned Court below without appreciating the above fact took cognizance against the accused/petitioners No. 2 to 5. There is general allegation against the accused/ petitioners, so no case is made out against the accused/ petitioners under Section 498-A of IPC. Complainant/ respondent No.1 committed cruelty with accused/petitioner No.1 and other accused/petitioners. Complainant/respondent No.1 did not want to reside with accused/petitioner No.1 without any reasonable cause. Complainant/respondent No.1 refused to live with accused/ petitioner No.1 on 30.6.2017. Thereafter, she had gone to her parents house. Thereafter, on 7.3.2018, accused/ petitioners filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge Bijawar. Apart from this, accused/petitioner No.1 initiated a proceeding before the Incharge Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, on 10.7.2017. Complainant/respondent No.1 appeared before the said Addl. Sessions Judge Bijawar and Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, but she refused to reside with accused/ petitioner No.1 and thereafter submitted a false complaint before JMFC Badamalahra. So, it is evident that complainant/respondent No.1 did not want to reside with accused/petitioner No.1 without any reasonable cause and she falsely initiated a criminal proceeding against the accused/ petitioner No.1. Accused/ petitioner No.1 is deprived of love and affection towards his son. He is ready to keep complainant/respondent No.1 with him, so this proceeding is misuse of process of law. Therefore, learned counsel for accused/petitioners prays for setting aside the order of Courts below and quashing the entire proceeding under Complaint Case No.423/2017, pending in the Court of JMFC Badamalahra, under Section 498-A of IPC.

4: Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No.1 and respondent No.2-State submit that there is prima-facie material which is available on record, therefore, this is not a proper case in which inherent jurisdiction can be invoked and the petition is liable to be dismissed.

5: Heard both the parties and perused the record.

6: This is a case of matrimonial dispute, therefore, it has to be seen as to how to deal with a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings.

7: It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rehatilata Koley AIR 2011 SC 1090 that controverted documents or material of unimpeachable or sterling character may be considered while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is also clear that this is a case of matrimonial dispute.

8: The Apex Court in the case of Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in AIR 2017 S.C. 4019 has held as under:- “This Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupak Gupta and ors. (2015) 3 SCC 424, 426: (AIR 2015 SC (Supp) 684) held as follows: “At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence to find out whether a prima facie case is made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials would lead to conviction or not.”

9: The Apex Court in the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 has held as under:- “In the light of the evidence in the case we find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the defence that respondents 3 to 5 were roped in the case only on the ground of being close relations of respondent No.2, the husband of the deceased. For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and implicationssuch relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.”

10 : The Apex Court in the case of Preeti Gupta & anothers Vs. State of Jharkhand & another reported in AIR 2010 SC 3363 has held as under:- “28. It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society. 29. The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.–Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,`cruelty’ means:- (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 30. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under Section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern.

11 : The Apex Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2014(8) SCC 273 has held as under:- “4. There is phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A of the IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-A IPC is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grand-fathers and grand- mothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested. “Crime in India 2012 Statistics” published by National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs shows arrest of 1,97,762 persons all over India during the year 2012 for offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, 9.4% more than the year 2011. Nearly a quarter of those arrested under this provision in 2012 were women i.e. 47,951 which depicts that mothers and sisters of the husbands were liberally included in their arrest net. Its share is 6% out of the total persons arrested under the crimes committed under Indian Penal Code. It accounts for 4.5% of total crimes committed under different sections of penal code, more than any other crimes excepting theft and hurt. The rate of charge-sheeting in cases under Section 498-A, IPC is as high as 93.6%, while the conviction rate is only 15%, which is lowest across all heads. As many as 3,72,706 cases are pending trial of which on current estimate, nearly 3,17,000 are likely to result in acquittal. 5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and cast scars forever. Law makers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that police has not learnt its lesson; the lesson implicit and embodied in the Cr.P.C. It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasized time and again by Courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.”

12 : The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741 has held as under:- “20. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR are perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names which have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding.

21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that: “

12.There has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their cases in different courts.”

The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the Courts would not encourage such disputes.”

13 : The Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 as held as under:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reporduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or ‘complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.“

14 : In the light of aforesaid legal position. I would proceed to decide this petition.

15 : Accused/petitioners produced the copy of complaint which has been submitted by him before the Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, on 10.7.2017. He alleged in this complaint that complainant/respondent No.1 is living separately without any reasonable cause and also he suspected about her character, thereafter proceeding was registered. Complainant/respondent No.1 appeared before the Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur. She deposed before the Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, that accused/petitioner No.1 has relation with another girl. Accused/petitioner No.1 committed cruelty with her. Accused/petitioners did not provide proper medical treatment at the time of her pregnancy and accused/ petitioner No.3 also committed cruelty with her, so she left her matrimonial home. Her father provided medical treatment. Thereafter, her brother-in-law came at her parental house and she had come with him. Then she lived with accused/petitioner No.1. All other family members had gone to Village. Thereafter, accused/petitioner No.1 committed cruelty with her. Accused/petitioner No.1 did not maintain her properly. She wanted that her mother-in- law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law may appear before the Parivar Paramarsh Kendra. They should take responsibility that complainant/respondent No.1 would be safe in matrimonial home. Thereafter, learned Member of Parivar Paramarsh Kendra found that both the parties are not living with each other, so they may solve the matter through the Court. These documents are uncontroverted documents, so these documents can be considered in this proceedings.

16 : It is evident that complainant/respondent No.1 alleged general allegation about demand of dowry, cruelty and humiliation against all accused/petitioners. Accused/ petitioner No.1 is the husband of complainant/respondent No.1. Complainant/respondent No.1 alleged the act of cruelty against accused/petitioner No.1. She alleged the act of cruelty against the accused/petitioner No.1 before Parivar Paramarsh Kendra Chhatarpur, so act of cruelty will be investigated during the trial. Although, learned counsel for accused/petitioners submits that complainant/ respondent No.1 is residing separately without any reasonable cause, complainant/respondent No.1 has deprived the accused/petitioner No.1 of love and affection of a child. Accused/petitioner No.1 is ready to keep complainant/respondent No.1 with him, so he filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and also initiated a proceeding before Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, but complainant/respondent No.1 refused to life with accused/petitioner No.1 without any reasonable cause and lodged a false complaint, but all these facts will be investigated during the trial. So, it is not a proper case in which inherent jurisdiction can be invoked with regard to accused/petitioner No.1. Accused/petitioner No.1 is the husband of complainant/respondent No.1. Complainant/ respondent No.1 alleged various acts of cruelty against accused/petitioner No.1, so the petition is liable to be dismissed with regard to accused/petitioner No.1.

17 : So far as accused/petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 are concerned, accused/petitioner No.2 is father-in-law, accused/ petitioner No.3 is mother-in-law, accused/ petitioner No.4 is sister-in-law and accused/petitioner No.5 is brother-in-law of complainant/respondent No.1. Complainant/respondent No.1 also stated before the Parivar Paramarsh Kendra, Chhatarpur, that lastly, accused/ petitioner No.5 came to her parents house and he brought her at matrimonial home and she lived with accused/petitioner No.1 and all other family members had gone in another house of village. So, it is evident that lastly respondent No.1 lived with accused/petitioner No.1. During this period, some dispute arose against the accused/petitioner No.1 and complainant/respondent No.1. Thereafter, complainant/respondent No.1 left her matrimonial house and she had gone to her parents house. Complainant/respondent No.1 did not allege any specific incident and act of cruelty against accused/petitioners No. 2 to 5. There are general allegations against accused/ petitioners No. 2 to 5. She did not allege any act of demand of dowry against accused/petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 before the Parivar Paramarsh kendra, Chhatarpur. So, it appears that accused/petitioners No. 2 to 5 have been implicated in malafide manner in this case on account of being family members of accused/petitioner No.1. Therefore, proceeding initiated against accused/petitioners No. 2 to 5 is abuse of process of law, so this is a proper case in which inherent jurisdiction can be invoked with regard to accused/petitioners No. 2 to 5.

18: Accordingly, the M.Cr.C. stands partly allowed. The present petition filed by accused/petitioner No.1 stands dismissed and so far as it relates to accused/petitioners No. 2 & 5, order dated 1.12.2018, passed by I Additional Sessions Judge, Bijawar, District Chhatarpur (MP), in Criminal Revision No.01/2018 and proceeding of Complaint Case No.523/2017, pending in the Court of JMFC for offence under Section under Sections 498-A of IPC, stands quashed.

(RAJENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA) JUDGE A.Praj.

Digitally signed by ASHWANI PRAJAPATI Date: 2020.05.20 15:04:07 +05’30’

Absurd and #Fake #498a counter blast to husband’s #RCR quashed by #MPHC

Whether prosecution U/S 498A and S 294 of IPC can be quashed?

Thus, in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] , there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted.

38. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such materials as are indicated in Section 227 CrPC can be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 CrPC the court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 the way in which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhi case (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415 by the larger Bench therein to which the very same question had been referred.”

12. Accordingly, the documents referred to by the applicants with regard to vehicles owned by them can be looked into. Furthermore, the offence under Section 294 of the IPC is not made out as the incident has taken place within the house of the complainant-wife. It appears that the prosecution has been initiated on account of scuffle which has taken place on 8.9.2013. However, in order to drag more offences against the applicants, the allegations with regard to demand of Indica car have been made. Further, the reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Taramani Parakh’s case (supra), wherein the Court in paragraph 11 has observed that if the allegations are absurd and do not make any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process then the proceedings can be quashed. However, the Court has been cautioned from entering into the reliability of the evidence and to discuss about the version and counter version. FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

13. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the case at hand, as discussed above, the allegations are absurd and have been levelled to make the case more grave. Therefore, following the mandate of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the powers under Section 482 CrPC are exercised for quashing the FIR to the extent it relates to the offences under Section 498-A and 294 of the IPC.

 

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Kunaldev Singh Rathore @ Kunal Dev … vs State Of M.P on 2 December, 2016

(02.12.2016 )

1. 1. Applicants, vide instant application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘CrPC’) seek quashing of FIR bearing Crime No.614/2013 dated 18.12.2013 for commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 294, 498-A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) registered at police Station Kotwali District Bhind (M.P.). Further, the quashing of Criminal Case No.183/2014 has also been sought, which has been registered in furtherance to the said FIR.
2. 2. The facts leading to filing of instant application are that a marriage was solemnized between the applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 on 21.11.2007 and a son has born out of the wedlock. According to the complaint made by respondent No.2, the present applicants were harassing her since the date of marriage for demand of Indica Car, however, she tolerated the harassment with a hope that one day the applicants will mend their ways and will treat the respondent No.2 properly. Although, the situation did not improve and one day the respondent No.2 was thrown out of the matrimonial home along with her son, whereafter, she started living with her parents at Madho Ganj, Bhind. Respondent No.2 did not have any means to maintain herself and she did not want to burden her parents, an application for maintenance by her and the son was filed, in which the notices were issued, however the applicants did not accept the summons issued by the Court and on 8.9.2013 the applicants are alleged to have visited the house of parents of respondent No.2. During their visit, the applicants pressurized respondent No.2 to withdraw the case filed by her, failing which it was threatened that she will face dire consequences.
3. 3. Due to the incident dated 8.9.2013 the respondent No.2 submitted a complaint before the police and requested to register the FIR against the applicants. Although, the police did not take any action prompting the respondent No.2 to file complaint case before the concerned Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, who, in turn, instructed police to submit report under Section 156(3) CrPC. The police informed the Magistrate that it is taking cognizance of the matter and will record the FIR for commission of offences punishable underSections 323, 294, 506 and 498-A read with Section 34 of IPC. Consequently, on 18.11.2013, an FIR for the said incident was registered bearing Crime No.614/2013 at police Station City Kotwali District Bhind.
4. 4. After completion of investigation, the police has filed charge-sheet against all the applicants on 6.2.2014 before the concerned Magistrate for the offences mentioned in the FIR. In order to seek quashing of criminal proceedings, the instant application has been filed.
5. 5. It has been stated before this Court that in respect to instant case, no other matter has been pending for similar relief. Further, it has been stated that the applicants have preferred instant application rather than invoking the revisional jurisdiction citing the reason that this Court underSection 482 CrPC has wider jurisdiction.
6. 6. According to learned counsel for the applicants, the plain reading of the content of the FIR does not reveal commission of offences levelled against the applicants. Moreover, the FIR has been lodged in order to defeat the proceedings initiated by the applicant No.1 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. It has also been contended that the respondent No.2 herself has violated the law by siphoning the gold of the present applicants and fleeing away to her parental home. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the applicants placed reliance on the complaint (Annexure P/4) submitted before the police. Accordingly, it is contended that the prosecution has been launched to misuse the criminal justice system and it is a fit case for interference. FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases
7. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-State has supported the criminal prosecution on the ground that prima facie the allegations levelled against the applicants are made out, therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed. According to learned counsel for respondent No.2, she had already moved application for maintenance and the application under Section 9 of HMA has been filed subsequently by the applicant No.1 which itself shows the intention of the applicants to cause delay in decision of application for maintenance filed by her. As per learned counsel for respondent No.2, the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh vs State of M.P., 2015 (2) JLJ 1 (SC), has held that legitimate prosecution cannot be stifled by resorting to petition underSection 482 CrPC as there has to be a trial conducted to arrive at a conclusion about the participation of accused persons in the crime. Therefore, the application merits no consideration and liable to be dismissed.
8. 8. I have considered the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and have perused the documents placed on record along with the present application.
9. 9. The parameters on which the indulgence can be shown for exercising powers available underSection 482 CrPC with respect to matrimonial matters have been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra vs State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 in the following manner : “20. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR are perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names which have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding. 21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that: (SCC p. 698, para 12) “12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their ‘young’ days in chasing their ‘cases’ in different courts.” The view taken by the Judges in that matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.”
10. 10. In another judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Rajagopal v. Devi Polymers (P) Ltd., (2016) 6 SCC 310, wherein the Hon’ble Court referred to the earlier decision, observed in the following manner :-  “15. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] , this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 695, para 7) “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases
11. 11. In the context of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the plain reading of the complaint submitted by respondent No.2, which has been reproduced in the FIR dated 18.12.2013, goes to show that the allegations relating to commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC are omnibus and do not refer to any specific act of the applicants. According to the complaint, the respondent No.2 was subjected to cruelty due to non- fulfillment of demand of Indica Car in dowry by the applicants. It is undisputed in the instant case that the marriage was solemnized on 21.11.2007. Although the complaint is silent about the fact as to when she left the matrimonial house. Further, with respect to this allegation, the applicants have brought on record the registration certificate issued by transport department on 10.1.2008 with respect to Indica Car. Moreover, the documents reflecting TATA Sumo in the name of applicant No.2 and other four-wheeler have also been brought on record. On cumulative consideration of these circumstances, it is revealed that the accusations regarding cruelty and harassment for demand of Indica Car are absurd and improbable. At this stage, it is important to note that the documents tantamount to material filed by the applicants in their defence and as per the judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court on consideration of defence material at a preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution, such documents cannot be made basis for taking any decision. But, the Apex Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, (2008) 14 SCC 1, has held as under: “21. We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as Euclid’s formula [vide Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University [(2008) 9 SCC 284 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 887 : JT (2008) 8 SC 621] ]. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778, observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s formula nor as provisions of the statute. 22. Thus, in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] , there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. 38. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such materials as are indicated in Section 227 CrPC can be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 CrPC the court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 the way in which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhi case (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415 by the larger Bench therein to which the very same question had been referred.”
12. 12. Accordingly, the documents referred to by the applicants with regard to vehicles owned by them can be looked into. Furthermore, the offence under Section 294 of the IPC is not made out as the incident has taken place within the house of the complainant-wife. It appears that the prosecution has been initiated on account of scuffle which has taken place on 8.9.2013. However, in order to drag more offences against the applicants, the allegations with regard to demand of Indica car have been made. Further, the reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Taramani Parakh’s case (supra), wherein the Court in paragraph 11 has observed that if the allegations are absurd and do not make any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process then the proceedings can be quashed. However, the Court has been cautioned from entering into the reliability of the evidence and to discuss about the version and counter version.
13. 13. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the case at hand, as discussed above, the allegations are absurd and have been levelled to make the case more grave. Therefore, following the mandate of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the powers under Section 482 CrPC are exercised for quashing the FIR to the extent it relates to the offences under Section 498-A and 294 of the IPC.
14. 14. In this view of the matter, the present application under Section 482 CrPC is partly allowed. Accordingly, the FIR and the consequent proceedings so far as they relate to the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 294 of the IPC are quashed. However, with regard to remaining offences, the proceedings shall continue.
15. 15. It is made clear that the trial Court shall decide the case without being influenced by the observations made by this Court.

(S.K.Awasthi) Judge.

#sec154(1) complaint b4 police & inaction essential b4 #Crpc156(3) to magistrate. 156(3) order needs application of Judicial mind. #fake498a #quashed. #KarnatakaHC

After appreciating the facts, the Hon HC concludes that

“….On meaningful reading of the above said paragraphs, it is clear that when the court has to make certain observations, with all certainty that there has to be prior report by the complainant before police u/s.154(1) and if the police have not taken any action, he has approached the higher officers u/s.156(4) and (3) of Cr.PC., before filing the complaint and application u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., Both the above said aspects should be clearly spelt out in the affidavit along with the necessary documents to that effect, shall be filed by the complainant.

….In this particular case, the said procedure appears to have not been followed by the complainant. Also, the learned Magistrate has not looked into this particular aspect. Therefore, in my opinion, the reference order passed by the learned Magistrate u/s.156(3) is bad in law and consequential registration of the FIR also deserves to be quashed….”

 

Karnataka High Court

Sri. Shaik Laique Ahmed vs State Of Karnataka on 20 June, 2018

Author: K.N.Phaneendra

                          1


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU

      DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF JUNE, 2018

                      BEFORE

     THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K. N. PHANEENDRA

               CRL.P. NO.2090/2018
BETWEEN

1.   SRI SHAIK LAIQUE AHMED
     S/O S K NAZEER BASHA
     AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
     REP. BY HIS G P A HOLDER
     SRI S K NAZEER BASHA

2.   SRI S K NAZEER BASHA
     S/O SHAIK RAHMATHUMIA SAHEB
     AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS

3.   SMT BEGUM JAN
     W/O S K NAZEER BASHA
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS

     NOS. 1 TO 3 ARE R/AT NO 8,
     AZIZ MULK, 8TH STREET
     THOUSAND LIGHTS CHENNAI - 600 006

4.   SRI FEROZ NAWAZ KHAN
     S/O OF SRI YAKUB NAWAZ KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

5.   SMT KURSHEED BEGUM
     W/O SRI FEROZ NAWAZ KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS

6.   SMT SHANAWAZ BEGUM
     DAUGHTER OF MR HUSSAIN KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
                           2


7.   SMT REHANA BEGUM
     DAUGHTER OF MR HUSSAIN KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS

     NOS. 4 TO 7 ARE R/AT
     NO 38/78, AZIZ MULK, 3RD STREET
     THOUSAND LIGHTS CHENNAI - 600 006

                                   ... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. SHAMANTH NAIK, ADV. FOR
    SRI. SYED KHAMRUDDIN, ADV.)

AND

1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA
     REP. BY SHIVAJINAGAR
     WOMEN POLICE STATION
     EAST ZONE, BANGALORE CITY
     BANGALORE - 560037
     REP. BY SPP
     HIGH COURT BUILDING

2.   SMT SYEDA SALMA SADIYA
     D/O SYED PASHA
     AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
     R/ AT NO 2629, 37TH CROSS
     9TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
     BENGALURU - 560 069           ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. S. RACHAIAH, HCGP FOR R1;
    SRI. J. D. KASHINATH, ADV. FOR
    SRI. MOHAMMED SULTAN BEARY, ADV. FOR R2.)

    THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C
PRAYING TO QUASH THE ALL PROCEEDINGS AND
COMPLAINT IN P.C.R.NO.12622/2017 PENDING BEFORE
THE VI ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU.


     THIS CRL.P COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
                               3



                           ORDER

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader for the first respondent – State and the learned counsel for the second respondent. Perused the records. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022336818858127360

2. The records disclose that the second respondent has filed a private complaint u/s.200 of Cr.PC., registered in PCR No.12622/2017 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 377, 323, 354 and 506 of IPC and also u/ss.3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Magistrate has referred the said complaint for investigation and report exercising power u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., and the matter is still awaiting report from the police.

3. On the basis of the above said reference, the first respondent – police has registered a complaint u/s.156(3) of Cr.P.C., and referred for investigation and report, which proceedings are called in question.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that before referring the matter, the learned Magistrate has not looked into the complaint averments in order to examine as to whether any affidavit is filed by the complainant in consonance with the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported in 2015 (6) SCC 287 between Priyanka Srivatsava and another Vs. State of UP & Others. It is worth to extract paragraphs 26 and 27 of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court which reads thus:

“26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under section 154(1) and 164(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR”

On meaningful reading of the above said paragraphs, it is clear that when the court has to make certain observations, with all certainty that there has to be prior report by the complainant before police u/s.154(1) and if the police have not taken any action, he has approached the higher officers u/s.156(4) and (3) of Cr.PC., before filing the complaint and application u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., Both the above said aspects should be clearly spelt out in the affidavit along with the necessary documents to that effect, shall be filed by the complainant.

5. In this particular case, the said procedure appears to have not been followed by the complainant. Also, the learned Magistrate has not looked into this particular aspect. Therefore, in my opinion, the reference order passed by the learned Magistrate u/s.156(3) is bad in law and consequential registration of the FIR also deserves to be quashed. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022336818858127360

Hence, the following:

ORDER

The Petition is allowed. Consequently, the order passed by the VI Addl. CMM, Bengaluru City in PCR No.12622/2017 dated 11.10.2017 referring the complaint for investigation and report u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., is hereby set aside and the consequential registration of FIR by the first respondent police is hereby quashed. However, the complaint filed by the respondent No.2 is restored on to the file of the learned VI Addl. CMM Bengaluru with a direction that the Magistrate has to go through the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Priyanka Srivatsa’s Case as noted above and follow the procedure as contemplated therein and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Mutual #love & breakup is NOT #cheating. Angry words NOT #intimidation. #Malicious #baseless #ipc406, #ipc417, #ipc420, #ipc506(i) & #Sec4DPact case #quashed. #MadrasHC

An IPS officer is charged with cheating, criminal intimidation and dowry demands. The woman (whose name has been withheld) claims that the IPS officer had a love affair with her, promised to marry her and then changed his mind after he became an IPS. After filing this case, she happily goes and gets married to some one else as well !! She also claims that the IPS office threatened to spoil her career and so criminal intimidation is involved. The Hon HC goes thru a cantena of cases and tears down the fake case

Finally the Hon HC decides
“…. /////It is a well established law that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the deception pointed out in the definition of cheating should be at the inception itself. In other words, Dr.Varun Kumar ought to have had a love affair with no intention of marrying the defacto complainant and falsely make her belief that he intended to marry her. It is not the case of the defacto complainant nor is the statement of any of the witnesses that when Dr.Varun Kumar got introduced to defacto complainant, he had a motive of having a love affair without an intention of getting married to her. On the contrary, it is the case of the defacto complainant as well as the witnesses that Dr.Varun Kumar as well as his family members recognised and introduced her as his fiance to their relatives and friends. In the absence of any material to establish that Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of getting married when both had commenced the love affair, it cannot be said that the alleged deception was at the inception itself and hence, the offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 IPC, will not be made out. /////

///////In the present case, the prosecution had charged Dr.Varun Kumar for the offence under Section 506(i) IPC since he had allegedly informed the respondent that he intended to marry a girl of IPS cadre and that if she reveals their affair, he would spoil the reputation of the second respondent/defacto complainant and her family members. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim and mere expression of the words without intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient. In order to constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC, it must be clearly established that the person charged, actually threatened or injured the person with an intention to cause alarm. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is that when the defacto complainant had called Dr.Varun Kumar to speak about her marriage with him, he had allegedly retaliated by saying that he would spoil her reputation. Such an act can only be deemed to be an expression of words without any intention to cause alarm and as such, the offence under Section 506 will not be made out.//////

////Incidentally, there is contradiction in the version of the prosecution case, with regard to the charge for the offence of cheating. While charging the petitioners for the offences under Section 417, it is their case that there was a promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise. However, while charging the petitioner under the DP Act, the case of the prosecution is that the marriage came to be cancelled in view of demand of dowry and the defacto complainant’s non compliance of the demand. If the later version is accepted as such, the offence under Section 417 will also not be made out./////

////26.The present case in hand, is a classic example of a maliciously instituted criminal proceedings and hence this Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be justified in quashing the same, thereby enabling the petitioners herein to refrain from undergoing the ordeal of a criminal trial instituted on baseless charges.////

**
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on :11.12.2017

Dated : 26.06.2018
CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH

Crl.O.P.Nos. 14573 of 2017 &
Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 and 24197 of 2015
1.Dr.Varun Kumar .. Petitioner/A1 in Crl.OP.No.14573/2017

2.V.Kalpana .. Petitioner/A3 in Crl.OP.No.17112/2015

3.R.Veerasekaran .. Petitioner/A2 in Crl.OP.No.24197/2015
Vs.

1.State rep. by
The Inspector of Police (ADSP)
Central Crime Branch,
Egmore, Chennai-600008.

2.G.Priyadharshni ..Respondents in all Crl.O.Ps.

COMMON PRAYER : Criminal Original Petitions filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying to call for the records in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and to quash the same.

For Petitioner : Mr.S.Arumuga Raja in Crl.OP. No. 14573 of 2017
Mr.B.Kumar, Sr. Counsel for Mr.A.Jenasenan in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197/ 2015

For Respondent-1 :Mr.C.Iyyappa Raj, APP in all Crl.O.Ps

For Respondent-2 :Mr.R.Sankarasubbu for Mr.V.Sathish in all Crl.OPs

C O M M O N O R D E R

1. 1. The petitioners herein have been arrayed as accused in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai at the instance of the second respondent’s complaint for offences under Sections 406, 417, 420, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as DP Act), Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 (herein after referred to as TNPHW Act) and Section 66 of Information Technology Act, 2000 (herein after referred to as IT Act). The petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 is the son of the petitioners in Crl.O.P.Nos.24197 & 17112 of 2015. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
2. 2.The case of the prosecution in short is that the defacto complainant and the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 had known each other since 2007, which developed into a promissory relationship to get married. Both of them, had enrolled themselves in an IAS Training Academy at New Delhi and since the defacto complainant did not clear her preliminary examination, she had stayed back in New Delhi for a period of one year for helping Dr.Varun Kumar to prepare for his main examination. The relationship between the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar was accepted by both their respective family members and it was mutually agreed that the parties will get married in the year 2012. During their stay at New Delhi, the defacto complainant had pledged her jewelleries worth more than Rs.1 lakh to help Dr.Varun Kumar financially for the preparation of his interview. After the interview in the month of April 2011, the attitude of all the petitioners herein changed and they had demanded a sum of Rs.50 lakhs in cash, 2 kgs of gold and a BMW Car for Dr.Varun Kumar on the ground that he was an IPS officer. When the defacto complainant had expressed her inability to meet the dowry demand, their relationship broke and became strained. Dr.Varun Kumar had then deleted the mails sent by his father to the defacto complainant in order to erase all the evidences of their relationships. In view of the dowry demand by all the petitioners herein and the failure to marry her contrary to the promise as well as the cruelty meted out to her, the petitioners herein have been charged for the offences under Sections 406, 417, 420, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 and Section 66 of Information Technology Act, 2000, which proceedings is under challenge in the present petitions.
3. 3.Heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners (in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197 of 2015), Mr.G.Arumugaraja (in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017) and Mr.C.Iyyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent as well as Mr.R.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the second respondent in all the petitions.
4. 4.Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the statements of the witnesses and the documents filed upon by the prosecution does not reveal the commission of any offence and as such, the framing of charges against the petitioners itself is liable to be quashed. By relying upon the statement of the witnesses and the documents, the learned Senior counsel submitted that none of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged is made out. In support of his contention, the learned Senior counsel relied on the relevant provisions of the offences for which they have been charged and various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as the High Courts and submitted that there is no legally sustainable charges made out as against the petitioners. He further submitted that the petitioner/Dr.Varun Kumar herein is a top ranking IPS officer and that the criminal complaint has been made as a vendetta for the purpose of damaging his reputation. He would also submit that the petitioner Dr.Varun Kumar as well as the defacto complainant had, during pendency of the investigation/framing of charges, had got married to third persons of their own choices and that it would not be appropriate to proceed with the case.
5. 5.Mr.G.Arumugaraja, learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 had adopted the averments made by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197 of 2015.
6. 6.Mr.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/defacto complainant submitted that all the petitioners herein had willfully deceived and cheated the defacto complainant with a promise to have her married to Dr.Varun Kumar. In view of such a promise, the defacto complainant had also sacrificed her entire career by assisting Dr.Varun Kumar to write his civil services examination and she was also widely introduced to family friends and relatives of both the parties as the fiancee of Dr.Varun Kumar, but had later dropped the marriage proposal. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioners herein had demanded dowry to the tune of Rs.50 lakhs, 2 kgs of gold and one BMW car as a pre-condition for the marriage. In view of the dowry demand as well as for having cheated the defacto complainant, this Court should not entertain the request of the petitioners herein seeking for quashing the charges. The learned counsel also submitted that the subsequent events of the defacto complainant married to some other person will have no bearing in the case and that the trial Court should take its own course for coming to a fair and free conclusion.
7. 7.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent submitted that the charges have been duly framed based on the statements of various witnesses recorded under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C., as well as certain other material documents. Since the offences have been clearly made out, the proper recourse would be to permit the trial Court to get along with the case and if at all the petitioners are aggrieved, it is always open to them to establish their innocence during the course of trial.
8. 8.I have given careful considerations to the submissions made by the respective counsels.
9. 9.It is not in dispute that the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar had a love affair even prior to his clearing of his civil services examination. It is neither the case of the defacto complainant nor the petitioners that Dr.Varun Kumar and the defacto complainant were living together or had involved in physical relationship. The grievance of the defacto complainant is that there was a promise from the petitioners for her marriage with Dr.Varun Kumar, which promise was retracted and a demand of dowry was made as a pre- condition for her marriage with him. Her complaint came to be investigated and the respondents have been charge sheeted for offences under Sections 417 , 204, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of DP Act r/w.34 of IPC, Section 4 of TNPHW Act and Section 66 of IT Act. By relying upon the respective definitions of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients for constituting these offences are conspicuously absent and as such, the offences are not made out. For the sake of convenience, the relevant provisions of all the offences for which the petitioners have been charged are extracted herein:
   • 417. Punishment for cheating Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
   • 204. Destruction of document to prevent its production as evidence Whoever secretes or destroys any document which he may be lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a Court of Justice, or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public servant, as such, or obligates or renders illegible the whole or any part of such document with the intention of prevention the same from being produced or used as evidence before such Court or public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
   • 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
   • Section 4 of DP Act:[4. Penalty for demanding dowry.If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
     • Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.] Section 4 of TNPHW Act, 1998 reads as follows: penalty for (harassment or woman)-whoever commits or participates in or abets (harassment of woman) in or within the precincts of any educational institution, temple or other place of worship, bus stop, road, railway station, cinema theatre, part, beach, place of festival, public service vehicle or vessel or any other place shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than thousand rupees. Section 4 enjoins penalty for harassment of woman and the words ‘any place’ by a conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act point out that wherever the occurrence takes place it refers to the same and therefore, it applies to the private dwelling house/place.
   • Section 66 of IT Act: If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
10. 10.Insofar as the offence of cheating is concerned, the case of the prosecution, as evidenced in the charge sheet, is that Dr.Varun Kumar had a love affair with the defacto complainant with a promise to marry her and all the petitioners had assured the defacto complainant about her marriage with Dr.Varun Kumar and subsequently cheated her by not getting him married to her. The core issue that needs to be addressed in order to evaluate as to whether the offence of cheating has been made out or not is as to whether the deception was at the inception itself and consequently whether promising to marry and breaking such a promise would amount to an act of cheating. Section 415 of IPC defines cheating as follows:
    • Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
11. 11.It is a well established law that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the deception pointed out in the definition of cheating should be at the inception itself. In other words, Dr.Varun Kumar ought to have had a love affair with no intention of marrying the defacto complainant and falsely make her belief that he intended to marry her. It is not the case of the defacto complainant nor is the statement of any of the witnesses that when Dr.Varun Kumar got introduced to defacto complainant, he had a motive of having a love affair without an intention of getting married to her. On the contrary, it is the case of the defacto complainant as well as the witnesses that Dr.Varun Kumar as well as his family members recognised and introduced her as his fiance to their relatives and friends. In the absence of any material to establish that Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of getting married when both had commenced the love affair, it cannot be said that the alleged deception was at the inception itself and hence, the offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 IPC, will not be made out.
12. 12.Yet another feature to constitute the offence of cheating is that the intention to deceive must be done fraudulently or dishonestly. Even as per the version of the defacto complainant as well as the statements of the witnesses, the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar were mutually in love with each other and that during that time, Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of breaking the alleged promise to marry her. While that being the case, the question of dishonest or fraudulent inducement does not arise. In other words, such alleged deception was also not intentional as per the version of all the witnesses.
13. 13.The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment in G.V.Rao Vs. L.H.V. Prasad and others reported in 2000 (3) SCC 693 had an occasion to render its findings on this aspect, which are extracted below:
    • 4.Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code which provides as under:-
    • “415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
    • Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”
    • 5.The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the defition relates to property, the second part need not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below:-
    • “415………intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”
    • 6.This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property.
    • 7.As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 = 1956 Crl.L.J. 1611 = 1956 SCR 483, a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 = 1954 Cr.L.J. 1806, that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.
    • 8.Thus, so far as second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram and another, (1882) 2 AWN 237, it was held by Mahmood, J.:-
      • “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in s.416 of the Indian Penal Code, which must be read in the light of the preceding, s.415.”
    • 9.In an another old decision in Queen-Empress v. Ramka Kom Sadhu, ILR (1887) 2 Bombay 59, it was held that a prostitute may be charged for cheating under Section 417 if the intercourse was induced by any misrepresentation on her part that she did not suffer from syphilis.
    • 10.In Queen vs. Dabee Singh and others, (1867) Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 55, the Calcutta High Court convicted a person under Section 417 who had brought two girls and palmed them off as women of a much higher caste than they really were and married to two Rajputs after receiving usual bonus. It was further held that the two Rajputs who married the two girls on the faith that they were marrying women of their own caste and status, were fraudulently and dishonestly induced by deception to do a thing (that is to say, to marry women of a caste wholly prohibited to them) which but for the deception practised upon them by the accused, they would have omitted to do. In another case which was almost similar to the one mentioned above, namely, Queen vs. Puddomonie Boistobee, (1866) 5 Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 98, a person was induced to part with his money and to contract marriage under the false impression that the girl he was marrying was a Brahminee. The person who induced the complainant into marrying that girl was held liable for punishment under Section 417 IPC.
14. 14.Insofar as the case of the prosecution that, the promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise would amount to cheating is concerned, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Cri. Appeal No.351 of 1998 [Abhoy Pradhan V. State of West Bengal] reported in 1999 Cri. L.J.3534 had held that the same would not amount to cheating since there was neither deception nor a creation of a misconceptional facts in the minds of the respondent. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:
    • 15.Now, learned Additional P.P. further drew our attention to Section 90, I.P.C. According to him, the appellant made a false promise to PW 1 that he would marry her and by making such false promise he created a misconception in her mind and as the complainant was under a misconception of fact and also that appellant knew or had reasons to believe at that time that complainant gave such consent in consequence of such misconception it must be held that the consent, if any, given by the complainant, was not at all a consent contemplated under various provisions of the Penal Code. Learned Additional P.P. further contended that such false representation/assurance/promise with knowledge hat the same was false, amounted to a deception within the meaning of Section 415, I.P.C. There-after, learned Additional P.P. further contended hat the aforesaid acts amounted to offences of rape and cheating and the allegations made by the complainant in her complaint as well as in her deposition fulfil all the essential ingredients of the said offences.
    • 16.We find from the complaint as well as from the evidence on record that the appellant sincerely wanted to marry the complainant. When he proposed to marry the complainant, his parents assaulted him and drove him out from their house. From these facts, we are unable to hold that appellant made any false promise/representation/assurance to the complainant with knowledge that such promise /representation/assurance was false in any manner. On the contrary we find that it is the specific case of the complainant as stated by her in her complaint as well as in her deposition that the appellant was all through serious and sincere to marry the complainant. This subsequent failure to marry the complainant does not prove that when he made such promise/ representation/assurance, same were made with knowledge that such promise /assurance/representation were false. Otherwise, the very distinction between ordinary breach of promise/contract and the offence of cheating would disappear. We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that the facts attributed to the appellant do not amount to any attempt to create any false conception of facts in the mind of the complainant or that the appellant at that time had any intention to deceive the complainant. In view of the aforesaid clear admissions made by the complainant in most unambiguous terms in her complaint as well as in her deposition, we are constrained to hold that appellant never practised any deception upon the complainant nor did he make any attempt to create some false conception of facts in a mind of the complainant. This being so, we have absolutely no hesitation in our mind to hold that the appellant neither committed the offence of rape nor any offence of cheating as defined in Sections 375 and 420, I.P.C. Respectively. From subsequent failure of the appellant to marry the complainant we cannot jump to a conclusion that the deception preceded the actual transaction i.e. the alleged intercourse. For the same reason, we cannot jump to the conclusion that the complainant gave her consent under a misconception of fact or that the appellant did such act with knowledge or at least had reasons to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. Therefore, even if the allegations made by the complainant in her complaint and deposition are found to be true, yet they do not make out any offence of rape or cheating and hence, verdict of guilt returned by the trial Court cannot be sustained.
15. 15.Following the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, a learned Judge of this Court also had taken a similar view in Crl.O.P.No.1273 of 2011 [K.U.Prabhu Raj V. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, AWPS, Tambaram and another reported in 2012 (3) MWN (Cr.) 14], which reads as hereunder:-
    • 16.A cursory perusal of the above provision would make it clear that there are atleast three essential ingredients constituting an offence of cheating which should be made out from the materials available on record. They are as follows:-
    • (1)Deception of any person;
    • (2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person
    • (i)to deliver any property to any person or;
    • (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property, or and (3) Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
    • 17.The learned counsel for the second respondent would further submit that the offence involved in this case falls within the ambit of the third limb of Section 415 I.P.C as enumerated above. According to the learned counsel, but for the promise made by the petitioner, the daughter of the second respondent would have married someone-else and settled down in her life. Thus, according to him, the petitioner has committed a clear offence of cheating. In my considered opinion, it is not so. As has been held by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Abhoy Pradhan v. State of W.B case (cited supra), mere promise to marry and later on withdrawing the said promise will not amount to an offence of cheating at all. On such false promise to marry, the person to whom such promise was made should have done or omitted to do something that he would not done or omitted to do but for the deception. In this case, absolutely, there are no materials available on record to show that because of the promise made by the petitioner, the daughter of the second respondent has done anything or omitted to do something which has the tendency to cause damage or harm to the body or mind or reputation or property of the daughter of the second respondent. In the absence of the same, the entire allegations found in the records, in my considered opinion, would not make out an offence under Section 417 or 420 I.P.C., at all.
    • 18.In G.V.Rao v. L.H.V Prasad and others case, (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should have been inducement, either dishonestly or fraudulently, and because of such inducement, the person induced should have done or omitted to do something which she would not have otherwise done or omitted to do. As I have already stated, in this case, absolutely there is no such material on record to satisfy the above requirement.
16. 16.In G.V.Rao v. L.H.V Prasad and others case, (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should have been inducement, either dishonestly or fraudulently and because of such inducement, the person induced should have done or omitted to do something which he would not have otherwise done or omitted to do. As I have already stated, there is absolutely no such material on record or relied by the prosecution to satisfy the above requirement. In view of the aforesaid observations, I am of the view that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 417 IPC has not been made out against these petitioners.
17. 17.Incidentally, there is contradiction in the version of the prosecution case, with regard to the charge for the offence of cheating. While charging the petitioners for the offences under Section 417, it is their case that there was a promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise. However, while charging the petitioner under the DP Act, the case of the prosecution is that the marriage came to be cancelled in view of demand of dowry and the defacto complainant’s non compliance of the demand. If the later version is accepted as such, the offence under Section 417 will also not be made out.
18. 18.Insofar as the Section 204 IPC which is the next section in which Dr.Varun Kumar has been charged is concerned, on a plain reading of the section, it is seen that the offence pertains to destruction of electronic evidence for the purpose of preventing its production as an evidence. The case of the prosecution is that when Dr.Varun Kumar had produced the mobile phone, the IMEI numbers of the mobile phones in the call data record and IMEI of the phones submitted by him did not tally. It is not the case of the prosecution that Dr.Varun Kumar had destroyed the electronic evidence which could be produced in the Court of law, which is an essential ingredient to constitute this offence. In the absence of this ingredient, it can only be concluded that the offence under Section 204 IPC is not made out. Consequently, it can only be held that Dr.Varun Kumar has been baselessly charged for the offence under Section 204 IPC. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
19. 19.With regard to the offence under Section 506(i) IPC is concerned, in order to constitute a criminal intimidation, threat by the accused should be made to cause alarm to any other person or make a person to do an act which he is not legally bound to do and vice versa. Section 503 IPC defines criminal intimidation as follows:
    • 503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
20. 20.In the present case, the prosecution had charged Dr.Varun Kumar for the offence under Section 506(i) IPC since he had allegedly informed the respondent that he intended to marry a girl of IPS cadre and that if she reveals their affair, he would spoil the reputation of the second respondent/defacto complainant and her family members. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim and mere expression of the words without intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient. In order to constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC, it must be clearly established that the person charged, actually threatened or injured the person with an intention to cause alarm. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is that when the defacto complainant had called Dr.Varun Kumar to speak about her marriage with him, he had allegedly retaliated by saying that he would spoil her reputation. Such an act can only be deemed to be an expression of words without any intention to cause alarm and as such, the offence under Section 506 will not be made out.
21. 21.So far as the offence under Section 4 of DP Act r/w.34 of IPC is concerned, based on the complaint of the defacto complainant, the District Social Welfare Officer (Dowry Prohibition Officer) was called upon to submit a report by conducting an enquiry. Pursuant to the same, the District Social Welfare Officer had conducted a proper enquiry by summoning the petitioners, the defacto complainant as well as other witnesses. Enquiry was conducted on various dates between 24.01.2012 to 21.03.2012. After due consideration of the evidences and proofs, the District Social Welfare Officer, by an order dated 23.04.2012 held that there was no proof recording the demand of dowry and that there would be other reasons for the break in love between Dr.Varun Kumar and the second respondent herein. Though the Investigation Officer had referred to the report of the District Social Welfare Officer, the same was not filed along with the final report. As a matter of fact, when the FIR came to be registered, the provisions of the DP Act was not invoked in view of the negative report of the District Social Welfare Officer. Under Section 8(B)(2)(c) of the DP Act, 1961 and Rules 4 & 5 of the DP Act, it is mandatory for the Dowry Prohibition Officer to collect evidence for the persons committing the offence under the Act. This statutory requirement was not complied with by the prosecution at the time of filing of final report. As such, the statement of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the prosecution has wilfully suppressed the report of the Dowry Prohibition Officer, gains prominence and hence it can only be concluded that had the prosecution taken the report of the Dowry Prohibition Officer into account, the inclusion of the offence under DP Act would have been dropped.
22. 22.That apart, the statement of the witnesses with regard to the demand of dowry are vague and lacks details with regard to the place and time of the demand. While dealing with such vague allegations in a charge sheet, the Hon’ble High Court in a judgment in Swapnil and others V. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2014 (13) SCC 567 held as follows:
    • 10.The first appellant and second respondent had in fact solemnized their marriage at Arya Samaj Mandir on 16.06.2007 privately, as they were stated to be in love with each other for sometime. Thereafter only, in the presence of the family members, marriage was solemnized on 24.06.2009. It has to be seen that admittedly the second respondent has been living separately since April, 2011. Thereafter, she had lodged a complaint on 07.09.2011 before the very same police station. The same was duly enquired into and it was closed stating that the dispute is actually between the families which are to be otherwise settled in legal proceedings. If there are such differences between families which are to be settled in legal proceedings, how such differences would constitute and give rise to a successful prosecution under Sections 498A or 506 IPC or under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, is the crucial question.
    • 11. The second respondent has been living separately since April, 2011and hence, there is no question of any beating by the appellants as alleged by her. The relationship having got strained ever since April, 2011, even application for restitution of conjugal rights having been withdrawn on 16.04.2012 as the second respondent was not interested to live together, it is difficult to believe that there is still a demand for dowry on 30.04.2012 coupled with criminal intimidation. The allegations are vague and bereft of the details as to the place and the time of the incident. We had called for the records and have gone through the same. The materials before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore are not sufficient to form an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused appellants have committed the offence under the charged Sections. The Additional Sessions Court and the High Court missed these crucial points while considering the petition filed by the appellants under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Cr.PC respectively. The veiled object behind the lame prosecution is apparently to harass the appellants. We are, hence, of the view that the impugned prosecution is wholly unfounded.
    • 12.Therefore, to secure the ends of justice and for preventing abuse of the process of the criminal court, the charges framed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore in Criminal Case No. 10245 of 2012 against the accused appellants are quashed.
23. 23.The petitioners have also been charged for an offence under Section 4 of TNPHW Act. In order to constitute an offence under Section 4 of the TNPHW Act, the occurrence should be committed in a public place or institution referred to, in the section. In the complaint of the respondent, there is no such mention about harassment in a public place or private domain of Dr.Varun Kumar and none of the witnesses have spoken so. Even as per the definition of harassment under Section 2(a) of the said Act, there is no evidence in any of the statement of the witnesses to the effect that the petitioners had involved themselves in any indecent conduct or act against the respondents. A learned Judge of this Court had an occasion to deal on this issue in a judgment in S.Selva Kumar V. State through the Inspector of Police, AWPS, Keelakarai, Ramanathapuram District and another reported in 2015 (2) MWN Cr. 195 wherein, he had observed as follows:
    • 10. Coming to Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women (amended) Enforcement Act, 2002, this Court is of the view that there is no sufficient material to charge the petitioner under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women (amended) Enforcement Act, 2002. Thus, in the absence of any attracting material, the said offence is also made out.
    • 11. Considering the scope of 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code in Srinivasan Vs. State by Sub Inspector of Police reported in 2009 (4) MLJ (Crl) 1118, in paragraph No.11, this Court has held in the following manner:-
    • 11.In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim. Mere expression of words without any intention to cause alarm would not suffice. To constitute an offence under Section 506 of IPC it must be shown that the person charged actually threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property with an intention to cause alarm.
    • 12. In Rajan Vs. State, rep. By Inspector of police reported in 2008 (2) MWN (Cr.) 258, after taking note of the decision rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, this Court has held in the following manner:-
    • 10. In a similar case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the proceedings in respect of the offence under Section 506(ii) IPC in a case in Usha Bala Vs. State of Punjab (P&H), 2002 (2) C.C.Cases 320 (P & H), that, Empty threats does not prima facie mean that the case under Section 506, IPC is made out against the petitioner. Hence, in face no case is made out against the petitioner.
    • Consequently, FIR No.313, dated 15.07.1999 under Section 406/498-A, IPC of police station, Sadar, Patiala is quashed qua the petitioner only.
    • 11.It is seen even in the instant case, except a vague and bald allegation of criminal intimidation, the defacto complainant has not stated that there was any threat to his life or sought for any police protection. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that even the offence under Section 506(i), I.P.C is not maintainable. In view of the same, it can only be held that inclusion of the offence under Section 4 of TNPHW Act is misconceived.
24. 24.The last offence for which the petitioners have been charged is one under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2008. In order to constitute an offence under Section 66 of the IT Act, it is mandatory that such a prosecution could be only on a scientific or a cyber crime lab report based on the evidence of Cybercrime Lab of the Forensic Department. In the instant case, the Cybercrime Forensic Department has reported that no hacking tools were used in the laptops. Even the e-mail received from the service providers and the email host indicates that there was no breach of the complainant’s email. However, overlooking the report of the cyber crime lab of the Forensic Department, the petitioners have been charged for an offence under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act 2008 and as such, the inclusion of this provision in the charge sheet is also baseless.
25. 25.In view of the foregoing observations, it is manifestly clear that none of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged with, has been clearly made out. As pointed out in the enquiry report of the District Social Welfare Officer, there could have been many other reasons for the break of the love affair between Dr.Varun Kumar and defacto complainant and by permitting the trial Court to proceed with the criminal trial against all the petitioners herein would only aggravate the ill feelings among the parties and would certainly cause serious prejudice to the petitioners. In the judgment in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426, the Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the scope for interference of the High Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein illustrative examples were laid down in cases where the High Courts would be justified in interfering and quashing the proceedings. One such illustration enabling the High Court to exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is where a criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Following the aforesaid principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a later judgment in Sunder Babu and others V. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2009 (14) SCC 244 held as follows:
    • 7.Though the scope for interference while exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:
    • 1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
    • 2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code.
    • 3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
    • 4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.
    • 5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
    • 6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
    • 7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
    • Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra).
    • 8.The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
    • 19.The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
    • 20.As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
26. 26.The present case in hand, is a classic example of a maliciously instituted criminal proceedings and hence this Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be justified in quashing the same, thereby enabling the petitioners herein to refrain from undergoing the ordeal of a criminal trial instituted on baseless charges. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
    
27. 27.In the result, the Criminal Original Petitions stands allowed. Consequently, the proceedings in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet stands quashed.

26.06.2018 Speaking order

Index:Yes
Internet:Yes
Note:Issue order copy on 06.07.2018

DP

To

1.The XI Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai.

2.The Inspector of Police (ADSP) Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Chennai-600008.

3.The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court.
M.S.RAMESH.J,

DP

Pre-Delivery order made in Crl.O.P.Nos. 14573 of 2017 & Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 and 24197 of 2015 26.06.2018