Tag Archives: Quash

Absurd and #Fake #498a counter blast to husband’s #RCR quashed by #MPHC

Whether prosecution U/S 498A and S 294 of IPC can be quashed?

Thus, in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] , there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted.

38. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such materials as are indicated in Section 227 CrPC can be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 CrPC the court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 the way in which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhi case (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415 by the larger Bench therein to which the very same question had been referred.”

12. Accordingly, the documents referred to by the applicants with regard to vehicles owned by them can be looked into. Furthermore, the offence under Section 294 of the IPC is not made out as the incident has taken place within the house of the complainant-wife. It appears that the prosecution has been initiated on account of scuffle which has taken place on 8.9.2013. However, in order to drag more offences against the applicants, the allegations with regard to demand of Indica car have been made. Further, the reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Taramani Parakh’s case (supra), wherein the Court in paragraph 11 has observed that if the allegations are absurd and do not make any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process then the proceedings can be quashed. However, the Court has been cautioned from entering into the reliability of the evidence and to discuss about the version and counter version. FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

13. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the case at hand, as discussed above, the allegations are absurd and have been levelled to make the case more grave. Therefore, following the mandate of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the powers under Section 482 CrPC are exercised for quashing the FIR to the extent it relates to the offences under Section 498-A and 294 of the IPC.

 

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Kunaldev Singh Rathore @ Kunal Dev … vs State Of M.P on 2 December, 2016

(02.12.2016 )

  1. 1. Applicants, vide instant application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘CrPC’) seek quashing of FIR bearing Crime No.614/2013 dated 18.12.2013 for commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 294, 498-A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) registered at police Station Kotwali District Bhind (M.P.). Further, the quashing of Criminal Case No.183/2014 has also been sought, which has been registered in furtherance to the said FIR.
  2. 2. The facts leading to filing of instant application are that a marriage was solemnized between the applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 on 21.11.2007 and a son has born out of the wedlock. According to the complaint made by respondent No.2, the present applicants were harassing her since the date of marriage for demand of Indica Car, however, she tolerated the harassment with a hope that one day the applicants will mend their ways and will treat the respondent No.2 properly. Although, the situation did not improve and one day the respondent No.2 was thrown out of the matrimonial home along with her son, whereafter, she started living with her parents at Madho Ganj, Bhind. Respondent No.2 did not have any means to maintain herself and she did not want to burden her parents, an application for maintenance by her and the son was filed, in which the notices were issued, however the applicants did not accept the summons issued by the Court and on 8.9.2013 the applicants are alleged to have visited the house of parents of respondent No.2. During their visit, the applicants pressurized respondent No.2 to withdraw the case filed by her, failing which it was threatened that she will face dire consequences.
  3. 3. Due to the incident dated 8.9.2013 the respondent No.2 submitted a complaint before the police and requested to register the FIR against the applicants. Although, the police did not take any action prompting the respondent No.2 to file complaint case before the concerned Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, who, in turn, instructed police to submit report under Section 156(3) CrPC. The police informed the Magistrate that it is taking cognizance of the matter and will record the FIR for commission of offences punishable underSections 323, 294, 506 and 498-A read with Section 34 of IPC. Consequently, on 18.11.2013, an FIR for the said incident was registered bearing Crime No.614/2013 at police Station City Kotwali District Bhind.
  4. 4. After completion of investigation, the police has filed charge-sheet against all the applicants on 6.2.2014 before the concerned Magistrate for the offences mentioned in the FIR. In order to seek quashing of criminal proceedings, the instant application has been filed.
  5. 5. It has been stated before this Court that in respect to instant case, no other matter has been pending for similar relief. Further, it has been stated that the applicants have preferred instant application rather than invoking the revisional jurisdiction citing the reason that this Court underSection 482 CrPC has wider jurisdiction.
  6. 6. According to learned counsel for the applicants, the plain reading of the content of the FIR does not reveal commission of offences levelled against the applicants. Moreover, the FIR has been lodged in order to defeat the proceedings initiated by the applicant No.1 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. It has also been contended that the respondent No.2 herself has violated the law by siphoning the gold of the present applicants and fleeing away to her parental home. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the applicants placed reliance on the complaint (Annexure P/4) submitted before the police. Accordingly, it is contended that the prosecution has been launched to misuse the criminal justice system and it is a fit case for interference. FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases
  7. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-State has supported the criminal prosecution on the ground that prima facie the allegations levelled against the applicants are made out, therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed. According to learned counsel for respondent No.2, she had already moved application for maintenance and the application under Section 9 of HMA has been filed subsequently by the applicant No.1 which itself shows the intention of the applicants to cause delay in decision of application for maintenance filed by her. As per learned counsel for respondent No.2, the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh vs State of M.P., 2015 (2) JLJ 1 (SC), has held that legitimate prosecution cannot be stifled by resorting to petition underSection 482 CrPC as there has to be a trial conducted to arrive at a conclusion about the participation of accused persons in the crime. Therefore, the application merits no consideration and liable to be dismissed.
  8. 8. I have considered the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and have perused the documents placed on record along with the present application.
  9. 9. The parameters on which the indulgence can be shown for exercising powers available underSection 482 CrPC with respect to matrimonial matters have been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra vs State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 in the following manner : “20. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR are perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names which have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding. 21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that: (SCC p. 698, para 12) “12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their ‘young’ days in chasing their ‘cases’ in different courts.” The view taken by the Judges in that matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.”
  10. 10. In another judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Rajagopal v. Devi Polymers (P) Ltd., (2016) 6 SCC 310, wherein the Hon’ble Court referred to the earlier decision, observed in the following manner :-  “15. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] , this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 695, para 7) “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases
  11. 11. In the context of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the plain reading of the complaint submitted by respondent No.2, which has been reproduced in the FIR dated 18.12.2013, goes to show that the allegations relating to commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC are omnibus and do not refer to any specific act of the applicants. According to the complaint, the respondent No.2 was subjected to cruelty due to non- fulfillment of demand of Indica Car in dowry by the applicants. It is undisputed in the instant case that the marriage was solemnized on 21.11.2007. Although the complaint is silent about the fact as to when she left the matrimonial house. Further, with respect to this allegation, the applicants have brought on record the registration certificate issued by transport department on 10.1.2008 with respect to Indica Car. Moreover, the documents reflecting TATA Sumo in the name of applicant No.2 and other four-wheeler have also been brought on record. On cumulative consideration of these circumstances, it is revealed that the accusations regarding cruelty and harassment for demand of Indica Car are absurd and improbable. At this stage, it is important to note that the documents tantamount to material filed by the applicants in their defence and as per the judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court on consideration of defence material at a preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution, such documents cannot be made basis for taking any decision. But, the Apex Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, (2008) 14 SCC 1, has held as under: “21. We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as Euclid’s formula [vide Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University [(2008) 9 SCC 284 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 887 : JT (2008) 8 SC 621] ]. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778, observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s formula nor as provisions of the statute. 22. Thus, in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] , there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. 38. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such materials as are indicated in Section 227 CrPC can be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 CrPC the court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 the way in which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhi case (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415 by the larger Bench therein to which the very same question had been referred.”
  12. 12. Accordingly, the documents referred to by the applicants with regard to vehicles owned by them can be looked into. Furthermore, the offence under Section 294 of the IPC is not made out as the incident has taken place within the house of the complainant-wife. It appears that the prosecution has been initiated on account of scuffle which has taken place on 8.9.2013. However, in order to drag more offences against the applicants, the allegations with regard to demand of Indica car have been made. Further, the reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Taramani Parakh’s case (supra), wherein the Court in paragraph 11 has observed that if the allegations are absurd and do not make any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process then the proceedings can be quashed. However, the Court has been cautioned from entering into the reliability of the evidence and to discuss about the version and counter version.
  13. 13. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the case at hand, as discussed above, the allegations are absurd and have been levelled to make the case more grave. Therefore, following the mandate of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the powers under Section 482 CrPC are exercised for quashing the FIR to the extent it relates to the offences under Section 498-A and 294 of the IPC.
  14. 14. In this view of the matter, the present application under Section 482 CrPC is partly allowed. Accordingly, the FIR and the consequent proceedings so far as they relate to the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 294 of the IPC are quashed. However, with regard to remaining offences, the proceedings shall continue.
  15. 15. It is made clear that the trial Court shall decide the case without being influenced by the observations made by this Court.

(S.K.Awasthi) Judge.

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#sec154(1) complaint b4 police & inaction essential b4 #Crpc156(3) to magistrate. 156(3) order needs application of Judicial mind. #fake498a #quashed. #KarnatakaHC

After appreciating the facts, the Hon HC concludes that

“….On meaningful reading of the above said paragraphs, it is clear that when the court has to make certain observations, with all certainty that there has to be prior report by the complainant before police u/s.154(1) and if the police have not taken any action, he has approached the higher officers u/s.156(4) and (3) of Cr.PC., before filing the complaint and application u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., Both the above said aspects should be clearly spelt out in the affidavit along with the necessary documents to that effect, shall be filed by the complainant.

….In this particular case, the said procedure appears to have not been followed by the complainant. Also, the learned Magistrate has not looked into this particular aspect. Therefore, in my opinion, the reference order passed by the learned Magistrate u/s.156(3) is bad in law and consequential registration of the FIR also deserves to be quashed….”

 

Karnataka HC

Karnataka High Court
Author: K.N.Phaneendra
                          1


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU

      DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF JUNE, 2018

                      BEFORE

     THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K. N. PHANEENDRA

               CRL.P. NO.2090/2018
BETWEEN

1.   SRI SHAIK LAIQUE AHMED
     S/O S K NAZEER BASHA
     AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
     REP. BY HIS G P A HOLDER
     SRI S K NAZEER BASHA

2.   SRI S K NAZEER BASHA
     S/O SHAIK RAHMATHUMIA SAHEB
     AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS

3.   SMT BEGUM JAN
     W/O S K NAZEER BASHA
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS

     NOS. 1 TO 3 ARE R/AT NO 8,
     AZIZ MULK, 8TH STREET
     THOUSAND LIGHTS CHENNAI - 600 006

4.   SRI FEROZ NAWAZ KHAN
     S/O OF SRI YAKUB NAWAZ KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

5.   SMT KURSHEED BEGUM
     W/O SRI FEROZ NAWAZ KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS

6.   SMT SHANAWAZ BEGUM
     DAUGHTER OF MR HUSSAIN KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
                           2


7.   SMT REHANA BEGUM
     DAUGHTER OF MR HUSSAIN KHAN
     AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS

     NOS. 4 TO 7 ARE R/AT
     NO 38/78, AZIZ MULK, 3RD STREET
     THOUSAND LIGHTS CHENNAI - 600 006

                                   ... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. SHAMANTH NAIK, ADV. FOR
    SRI. SYED KHAMRUDDIN, ADV.)

AND

1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA
     REP. BY SHIVAJINAGAR
     WOMEN POLICE STATION
     EAST ZONE, BANGALORE CITY
     BANGALORE - 560037
     REP. BY SPP
     HIGH COURT BUILDING

2.   SMT SYEDA SALMA SADIYA
     D/O SYED PASHA
     AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
     R/ AT NO 2629, 37TH CROSS
     9TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
     BENGALURU - 560 069           ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. S. RACHAIAH, HCGP FOR R1;
    SRI. J. D. KASHINATH, ADV. FOR
    SRI. MOHAMMED SULTAN BEARY, ADV. FOR R2.)

    THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C
PRAYING TO QUASH THE ALL PROCEEDINGS AND
COMPLAINT IN P.C.R.NO.12622/2017 PENDING BEFORE
THE VI ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU.


     THIS CRL.P COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
                               3



                           ORDER

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader for the first respondent – State and the learned counsel for the second respondent. Perused the records. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022336818858127360

2. The records disclose that the second respondent has filed a private complaint u/s.200 of Cr.PC., registered in PCR No.12622/2017 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 377, 323, 354 and 506 of IPC and also u/ss.3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Magistrate has referred the said complaint for investigation and report exercising power u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., and the matter is still awaiting report from the police.

3. On the basis of the above said reference, the first respondent – police has registered a complaint u/s.156(3) of Cr.P.C., and referred for investigation and report, which proceedings are called in question.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that before referring the matter, the learned Magistrate has not looked into the complaint averments in order to examine as to whether any affidavit is filed by the complainant in consonance with the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported in 2015 (6) SCC 287 between Priyanka Srivatsava and another Vs. State of UP & Others. It is worth to extract paragraphs 26 and 27 of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court which reads thus:

26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under section 154(1) and 164(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR”

On meaningful reading of the above said paragraphs, it is clear that when the court has to make certain observations, with all certainty that there has to be prior report by the complainant before police u/s.154(1) and if the police have not taken any action, he has approached the higher officers u/s.156(4) and (3) of Cr.PC., before filing the complaint and application u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., Both the above said aspects should be clearly spelt out in the affidavit along with the necessary documents to that effect, shall be filed by the complainant.

5. In this particular case, the said procedure appears to have not been followed by the complainant. Also, the learned Magistrate has not looked into this particular aspect. Therefore, in my opinion, the reference order passed by the learned Magistrate u/s.156(3) is bad in law and consequential registration of the FIR also deserves to be quashed. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022336818858127360

Hence, the following:

ORDER

The Petition is allowed. Consequently, the order passed by the VI Addl. CMM, Bengaluru City in PCR No.12622/2017 dated 11.10.2017 referring the complaint for investigation and report u/s.156(3) of Cr.PC., is hereby set aside and the consequential registration of FIR by the first respondent police is hereby quashed. However, the complaint filed by the respondent No.2 is restored on to the file of the learned VI Addl. CMM Bengaluru with a direction that the Magistrate has to go through the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Priyanka Srivatsa’s Case as noted above and follow the procedure as contemplated therein and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Mutual #love & breakup is NOT #cheating. Angry words NOT #intimidation. #Malicious #baseless #ipc406, #ipc417, #ipc420, #ipc506(i) & #Sec4DPact case #quashed. #MadrasHC

An IPS officer is charged with cheating, criminal intimidation and dowry demands. The woman (whose name has been withheld) claims that the IPS officer had a love affair with her, promised to marry her and then changed his mind after he became an IPS. After filing this case, she happily goes and gets married to some one else as well !! She also claims that the IPS office threatened to spoil her career and so criminal intimidation is involved. The Hon HC goes thru a cantena of cases and tears down the fake case

madras hc

Finally the Hon HC decides
“…. /////It is a well established law that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the deception pointed out in the definition of cheating should be at the inception itself. In other words, Dr.Varun Kumar ought to have had a love affair with no intention of marrying the defacto complainant and falsely make her belief that he intended to marry her. It is not the case of the defacto complainant nor is the statement of any of the witnesses that when Dr.Varun Kumar got introduced to defacto complainant, he had a motive of having a love affair without an intention of getting married to her. On the contrary, it is the case of the defacto complainant as well as the witnesses that Dr.Varun Kumar as well as his family members recognised and introduced her as his fiance to their relatives and friends. In the absence of any material to establish that Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of getting married when both had commenced the love affair, it cannot be said that the alleged deception was at the inception itself and hence, the offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 IPC, will not be made out. /////

///////In the present case, the prosecution had charged Dr.Varun Kumar for the offence under Section 506(i) IPC since he had allegedly informed the respondent that he intended to marry a girl of IPS cadre and that if she reveals their affair, he would spoil the reputation of the second respondent/defacto complainant and her family members. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim and mere expression of the words without intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient. In order to constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC, it must be clearly established that the person charged, actually threatened or injured the person with an intention to cause alarm. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is that when the defacto complainant had called Dr.Varun Kumar to speak about her marriage with him, he had allegedly retaliated by saying that he would spoil her reputation. Such an act can only be deemed to be an expression of words without any intention to cause alarm and as such, the offence under Section 506 will not be made out.//////

////Incidentally, there is contradiction in the version of the prosecution case, with regard to the charge for the offence of cheating. While charging the petitioners for the offences under Section 417, it is their case that there was a promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise. However, while charging the petitioner under the DP Act, the case of the prosecution is that the marriage came to be cancelled in view of demand of dowry and the defacto complainant’s non compliance of the demand. If the later version is accepted as such, the offence under Section 417 will also not be made out./////

////26.The present case in hand, is a classic example of a maliciously instituted criminal proceedings and hence this Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be justified in quashing the same, thereby enabling the petitioners herein to refrain from undergoing the ordeal of a criminal trial instituted on baseless charges.////

**
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on :11.12.2017

Dated : 26.06.2018
CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH

Crl.O.P.Nos. 14573 of 2017 &
Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 and 24197 of 2015
1.Dr.Varun Kumar .. Petitioner/A1 in Crl.OP.No.14573/2017

2.V.Kalpana .. Petitioner/A3 in Crl.OP.No.17112/2015

3.R.Veerasekaran .. Petitioner/A2 in Crl.OP.No.24197/2015
Vs.

1.State rep. by
The Inspector of Police (ADSP)
Central Crime Branch,
Egmore, Chennai-600008.

2.G.Priyadharshni ..Respondents in all Crl.O.Ps.

COMMON PRAYER : Criminal Original Petitions filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying to call for the records in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and to quash the same.

For Petitioner : Mr.S.Arumuga Raja in Crl.OP. No. 14573 of 2017
Mr.B.Kumar, Sr. Counsel for Mr.A.Jenasenan in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197/ 2015

For Respondent-1 :Mr.C.Iyyappa Raj, APP in all Crl.O.Ps

For Respondent-2 :Mr.R.Sankarasubbu for Mr.V.Sathish in all Crl.OPs

C O M M O N O R D E R

  1. 1. The petitioners herein have been arrayed as accused in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai at the instance of the second respondent’s complaint for offences under Sections 406, 417, 420, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as DP Act), Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 (herein after referred to as TNPHW Act) and Section 66 of Information Technology Act, 2000 (herein after referred to as IT Act). The petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 is the son of the petitioners in Crl.O.P.Nos.24197 & 17112 of 2015. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
  2. 2.The case of the prosecution in short is that the defacto complainant and the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 had known each other since 2007, which developed into a promissory relationship to get married. Both of them, had enrolled themselves in an IAS Training Academy at New Delhi and since the defacto complainant did not clear her preliminary examination, she had stayed back in New Delhi for a period of one year for helping Dr.Varun Kumar to prepare for his main examination. The relationship between the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar was accepted by both their respective family members and it was mutually agreed that the parties will get married in the year 2012. During their stay at New Delhi, the defacto complainant had pledged her jewelleries worth more than Rs.1 lakh to help Dr.Varun Kumar financially for the preparation of his interview. After the interview in the month of April 2011, the attitude of all the petitioners herein changed and they had demanded a sum of Rs.50 lakhs in cash, 2 kgs of gold and a BMW Car for Dr.Varun Kumar on the ground that he was an IPS officer. When the defacto complainant had expressed her inability to meet the dowry demand, their relationship broke and became strained. Dr.Varun Kumar had then deleted the mails sent by his father to the defacto complainant in order to erase all the evidences of their relationships. In view of the dowry demand by all the petitioners herein and the failure to marry her contrary to the promise as well as the cruelty meted out to her, the petitioners herein have been charged for the offences under Sections 406, 417, 420, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 and Section 66 of Information Technology Act, 2000, which proceedings is under challenge in the present petitions.
  3. 3.Heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners (in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197 of 2015), Mr.G.Arumugaraja (in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017) and Mr.C.Iyyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent as well as Mr.R.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the second respondent in all the petitions.
  4. 4.Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the statements of the witnesses and the documents filed upon by the prosecution does not reveal the commission of any offence and as such, the framing of charges against the petitioners itself is liable to be quashed. By relying upon the statement of the witnesses and the documents, the learned Senior counsel submitted that none of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged is made out. In support of his contention, the learned Senior counsel relied on the relevant provisions of the offences for which they have been charged and various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as the High Courts and submitted that there is no legally sustainable charges made out as against the petitioners. He further submitted that the petitioner/Dr.Varun Kumar herein is a top ranking IPS officer and that the criminal complaint has been made as a vendetta for the purpose of damaging his reputation. He would also submit that the petitioner Dr.Varun Kumar as well as the defacto complainant had, during pendency of the investigation/framing of charges, had got married to third persons of their own choices and that it would not be appropriate to proceed with the case.
  5. 5.Mr.G.Arumugaraja, learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.14573 of 2017 had adopted the averments made by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners in Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 & 24197 of 2015.
  6. 6.Mr.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/defacto complainant submitted that all the petitioners herein had willfully deceived and cheated the defacto complainant with a promise to have her married to Dr.Varun Kumar. In view of such a promise, the defacto complainant had also sacrificed her entire career by assisting Dr.Varun Kumar to write his civil services examination and she was also widely introduced to family friends and relatives of both the parties as the fiancee of Dr.Varun Kumar, but had later dropped the marriage proposal. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioners herein had demanded dowry to the tune of Rs.50 lakhs, 2 kgs of gold and one BMW car as a pre-condition for the marriage. In view of the dowry demand as well as for having cheated the defacto complainant, this Court should not entertain the request of the petitioners herein seeking for quashing the charges. The learned counsel also submitted that the subsequent events of the defacto complainant married to some other person will have no bearing in the case and that the trial Court should take its own course for coming to a fair and free conclusion.
  7. 7.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent submitted that the charges have been duly framed based on the statements of various witnesses recorded under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C., as well as certain other material documents. Since the offences have been clearly made out, the proper recourse would be to permit the trial Court to get along with the case and if at all the petitioners are aggrieved, it is always open to them to establish their innocence during the course of trial.
  8. 8.I have given careful considerations to the submissions made by the respective counsels.
  9. 9.It is not in dispute that the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar had a love affair even prior to his clearing of his civil services examination. It is neither the case of the defacto complainant nor the petitioners that Dr.Varun Kumar and the defacto complainant were living together or had involved in physical relationship. The grievance of the defacto complainant is that there was a promise from the petitioners for her marriage with Dr.Varun Kumar, which promise was retracted and a demand of dowry was made as a pre- condition for her marriage with him. Her complaint came to be investigated and the respondents have been charge sheeted for offences under Sections 417 , 204, 506(i) IPC, Section 4 of DP Act r/w.34 of IPC, Section 4 of TNPHW Act and Section 66 of IT Act. By relying upon the respective definitions of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients for constituting these offences are conspicuously absent and as such, the offences are not made out. For the sake of convenience, the relevant provisions of all the offences for which the petitioners have been charged are extracted herein:
    • 417. Punishment for cheating Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
    • 204. Destruction of document to prevent its production as evidence Whoever secretes or destroys any document which he may be lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a Court of Justice, or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public servant, as such, or obligates or renders illegible the whole or any part of such document with the intention of prevention the same from being produced or used as evidence before such Court or public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
    • 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
    • Section 4 of DP Act:[4. Penalty for demanding dowry.If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
      • Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.] Section 4 of TNPHW Act, 1998 reads as follows: penalty for (harassment or woman)-whoever commits or participates in or abets (harassment of woman) in or within the precincts of any educational institution, temple or other place of worship, bus stop, road, railway station, cinema theatre, part, beach, place of festival, public service vehicle or vessel or any other place shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than thousand rupees. Section 4 enjoins penalty for harassment of woman and the words ‘any place’ by a conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act point out that wherever the occurrence takes place it refers to the same and therefore, it applies to the private dwelling house/place.
    • Section 66 of IT Act: If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
  10. 10.Insofar as the offence of cheating is concerned, the case of the prosecution, as evidenced in the charge sheet, is that Dr.Varun Kumar had a love affair with the defacto complainant with a promise to marry her and all the petitioners had assured the defacto complainant about her marriage with Dr.Varun Kumar and subsequently cheated her by not getting him married to her. The core issue that needs to be addressed in order to evaluate as to whether the offence of cheating has been made out or not is as to whether the deception was at the inception itself and consequently whether promising to marry and breaking such a promise would amount to an act of cheating. Section 415 of IPC defines cheating as follows:
    • Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
  11. 11.It is a well established law that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the deception pointed out in the definition of cheating should be at the inception itself. In other words, Dr.Varun Kumar ought to have had a love affair with no intention of marrying the defacto complainant and falsely make her belief that he intended to marry her. It is not the case of the defacto complainant nor is the statement of any of the witnesses that when Dr.Varun Kumar got introduced to defacto complainant, he had a motive of having a love affair without an intention of getting married to her. On the contrary, it is the case of the defacto complainant as well as the witnesses that Dr.Varun Kumar as well as his family members recognised and introduced her as his fiance to their relatives and friends. In the absence of any material to establish that Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of getting married when both had commenced the love affair, it cannot be said that the alleged deception was at the inception itself and hence, the offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 IPC, will not be made out.
  12. 12.Yet another feature to constitute the offence of cheating is that the intention to deceive must be done fraudulently or dishonestly. Even as per the version of the defacto complainant as well as the statements of the witnesses, the defacto complainant and Dr.Varun Kumar were mutually in love with each other and that during that time, Dr.Varun Kumar had no intention of breaking the alleged promise to marry her. While that being the case, the question of dishonest or fraudulent inducement does not arise. In other words, such alleged deception was also not intentional as per the version of all the witnesses.
  13. 13.The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment in G.V.Rao Vs. L.H.V. Prasad and others reported in 2000 (3) SCC 693 had an occasion to render its findings on this aspect, which are extracted below:
    • 4.Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code which provides as under:-
    • “415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
    • Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”
    • 5.The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the defition relates to property, the second part need not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below:-
    • “415………intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”
    • 6.This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property.
    • 7.As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 = 1956 Crl.L.J. 1611 = 1956 SCR 483, a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 = 1954 Cr.L.J. 1806, that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.
    • 8.Thus, so far as second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram and another, (1882) 2 AWN 237, it was held by Mahmood, J.:-
      • “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in s.416 of the Indian Penal Code, which must be read in the light of the preceding, s.415.”
    • 9.In an another old decision in Queen-Empress v. Ramka Kom Sadhu, ILR (1887) 2 Bombay 59, it was held that a prostitute may be charged for cheating under Section 417 if the intercourse was induced by any misrepresentation on her part that she did not suffer from syphilis.
    • 10.In Queen vs. Dabee Singh and others, (1867) Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 55, the Calcutta High Court convicted a person under Section 417 who had brought two girls and palmed them off as women of a much higher caste than they really were and married to two Rajputs after receiving usual bonus. It was further held that the two Rajputs who married the two girls on the faith that they were marrying women of their own caste and status, were fraudulently and dishonestly induced by deception to do a thing (that is to say, to marry women of a caste wholly prohibited to them) which but for the deception practised upon them by the accused, they would have omitted to do. In another case which was almost similar to the one mentioned above, namely, Queen vs. Puddomonie Boistobee, (1866) 5 Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 98, a person was induced to part with his money and to contract marriage under the false impression that the girl he was marrying was a Brahminee. The person who induced the complainant into marrying that girl was held liable for punishment under Section 417 IPC.
  14. 14.Insofar as the case of the prosecution that, the promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise would amount to cheating is concerned, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Cri. Appeal No.351 of 1998 [Abhoy Pradhan V. State of West Bengal] reported in 1999 Cri. L.J.3534 had held that the same would not amount to cheating since there was neither deception nor a creation of a misconceptional facts in the minds of the respondent. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:
    • 15.Now, learned Additional P.P. further drew our attention to Section 90, I.P.C. According to him, the appellant made a false promise to PW 1 that he would marry her and by making such false promise he created a misconception in her mind and as the complainant was under a misconception of fact and also that appellant knew or had reasons to believe at that time that complainant gave such consent in consequence of such misconception it must be held that the consent, if any, given by the complainant, was not at all a consent contemplated under various provisions of the Penal Code. Learned Additional P.P. further contended that such false representation/assurance/promise with knowledge hat the same was false, amounted to a deception within the meaning of Section 415, I.P.C. There-after, learned Additional P.P. further contended hat the aforesaid acts amounted to offences of rape and cheating and the allegations made by the complainant in her complaint as well as in her deposition fulfil all the essential ingredients of the said offences.
    • 16.We find from the complaint as well as from the evidence on record that the appellant sincerely wanted to marry the complainant. When he proposed to marry the complainant, his parents assaulted him and drove him out from their house. From these facts, we are unable to hold that appellant made any false promise/representation/assurance to the complainant with knowledge that such promise /representation/assurance was false in any manner. On the contrary we find that it is the specific case of the complainant as stated by her in her complaint as well as in her deposition that the appellant was all through serious and sincere to marry the complainant. This subsequent failure to marry the complainant does not prove that when he made such promise/ representation/assurance, same were made with knowledge that such promise /assurance/representation were false. Otherwise, the very distinction between ordinary breach of promise/contract and the offence of cheating would disappear. We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that the facts attributed to the appellant do not amount to any attempt to create any false conception of facts in the mind of the complainant or that the appellant at that time had any intention to deceive the complainant. In view of the aforesaid clear admissions made by the complainant in most unambiguous terms in her complaint as well as in her deposition, we are constrained to hold that appellant never practised any deception upon the complainant nor did he make any attempt to create some false conception of facts in a mind of the complainant. This being so, we have absolutely no hesitation in our mind to hold that the appellant neither committed the offence of rape nor any offence of cheating as defined in Sections 375 and 420, I.P.C. Respectively. From subsequent failure of the appellant to marry the complainant we cannot jump to a conclusion that the deception preceded the actual transaction i.e. the alleged intercourse. For the same reason, we cannot jump to the conclusion that the complainant gave her consent under a misconception of fact or that the appellant did such act with knowledge or at least had reasons to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. Therefore, even if the allegations made by the complainant in her complaint and deposition are found to be true, yet they do not make out any offence of rape or cheating and hence, verdict of guilt returned by the trial Court cannot be sustained.
  15. 15.Following the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, a learned Judge of this Court also had taken a similar view in Crl.O.P.No.1273 of 2011 [K.U.Prabhu Raj V. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, AWPS, Tambaram and another reported in 2012 (3) MWN (Cr.) 14], which reads as hereunder:-
    • 16.A cursory perusal of the above provision would make it clear that there are atleast three essential ingredients constituting an offence of cheating which should be made out from the materials available on record. They are as follows:-
    • (1)Deception of any person;
    • (2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person
    • (i)to deliver any property to any person or;
    • (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property, or and (3) Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
    • 17.The learned counsel for the second respondent would further submit that the offence involved in this case falls within the ambit of the third limb of Section 415 I.P.C as enumerated above. According to the learned counsel, but for the promise made by the petitioner, the daughter of the second respondent would have married someone-else and settled down in her life. Thus, according to him, the petitioner has committed a clear offence of cheating. In my considered opinion, it is not so. As has been held by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Abhoy Pradhan v. State of W.B case (cited supra), mere promise to marry and later on withdrawing the said promise will not amount to an offence of cheating at all. On such false promise to marry, the person to whom such promise was made should have done or omitted to do something that he would not done or omitted to do but for the deception. In this case, absolutely, there are no materials available on record to show that because of the promise made by the petitioner, the daughter of the second respondent has done anything or omitted to do something which has the tendency to cause damage or harm to the body or mind or reputation or property of the daughter of the second respondent. In the absence of the same, the entire allegations found in the records, in my considered opinion, would not make out an offence under Section 417 or 420 I.P.C., at all.
    • 18.In G.V.Rao v. L.H.V Prasad and others case, (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should have been inducement, either dishonestly or fraudulently, and because of such inducement, the person induced should have done or omitted to do something which she would not have otherwise done or omitted to do. As I have already stated, in this case, absolutely there is no such material on record to satisfy the above requirement.
  16. 16.In G.V.Rao v. L.H.V Prasad and others case, (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should have been inducement, either dishonestly or fraudulently and because of such inducement, the person induced should have done or omitted to do something which he would not have otherwise done or omitted to do. As I have already stated, there is absolutely no such material on record or relied by the prosecution to satisfy the above requirement. In view of the aforesaid observations, I am of the view that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 417 IPC has not been made out against these petitioners.
  17. 17.Incidentally, there is contradiction in the version of the prosecution case, with regard to the charge for the offence of cheating. While charging the petitioners for the offences under Section 417, it is their case that there was a promise to marry and subsequent withdrawal of the promise. However, while charging the petitioner under the DP Act, the case of the prosecution is that the marriage came to be cancelled in view of demand of dowry and the defacto complainant’s non compliance of the demand. If the later version is accepted as such, the offence under Section 417 will also not be made out.
  18. 18.Insofar as the Section 204 IPC which is the next section in which Dr.Varun Kumar has been charged is concerned, on a plain reading of the section, it is seen that the offence pertains to destruction of electronic evidence for the purpose of preventing its production as an evidence. The case of the prosecution is that when Dr.Varun Kumar had produced the mobile phone, the IMEI numbers of the mobile phones in the call data record and IMEI of the phones submitted by him did not tally. It is not the case of the prosecution that Dr.Varun Kumar had destroyed the electronic evidence which could be produced in the Court of law, which is an essential ingredient to constitute this offence. In the absence of this ingredient, it can only be concluded that the offence under Section 204 IPC is not made out. Consequently, it can only be held that Dr.Varun Kumar has been baselessly charged for the offence under Section 204 IPC. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
  19. 19.With regard to the offence under Section 506(i) IPC is concerned, in order to constitute a criminal intimidation, threat by the accused should be made to cause alarm to any other person or make a person to do an act which he is not legally bound to do and vice versa. Section 503 IPC defines criminal intimidation as follows:
    • 503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
  20. 20.In the present case, the prosecution had charged Dr.Varun Kumar for the offence under Section 506(i) IPC since he had allegedly informed the respondent that he intended to marry a girl of IPS cadre and that if she reveals their affair, he would spoil the reputation of the second respondent/defacto complainant and her family members. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim and mere expression of the words without intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient. In order to constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC, it must be clearly established that the person charged, actually threatened or injured the person with an intention to cause alarm. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is that when the defacto complainant had called Dr.Varun Kumar to speak about her marriage with him, he had allegedly retaliated by saying that he would spoil her reputation. Such an act can only be deemed to be an expression of words without any intention to cause alarm and as such, the offence under Section 506 will not be made out.
  21. 21.So far as the offence under Section 4 of DP Act r/w.34 of IPC is concerned, based on the complaint of the defacto complainant, the District Social Welfare Officer (Dowry Prohibition Officer) was called upon to submit a report by conducting an enquiry. Pursuant to the same, the District Social Welfare Officer had conducted a proper enquiry by summoning the petitioners, the defacto complainant as well as other witnesses. Enquiry was conducted on various dates between 24.01.2012 to 21.03.2012. After due consideration of the evidences and proofs, the District Social Welfare Officer, by an order dated 23.04.2012 held that there was no proof recording the demand of dowry and that there would be other reasons for the break in love between Dr.Varun Kumar and the second respondent herein. Though the Investigation Officer had referred to the report of the District Social Welfare Officer, the same was not filed along with the final report. As a matter of fact, when the FIR came to be registered, the provisions of the DP Act was not invoked in view of the negative report of the District Social Welfare Officer. Under Section 8(B)(2)(c) of the DP Act, 1961 and Rules 4 & 5 of the DP Act, it is mandatory for the Dowry Prohibition Officer to collect evidence for the persons committing the offence under the Act. This statutory requirement was not complied with by the prosecution at the time of filing of final report. As such, the statement of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the prosecution has wilfully suppressed the report of the Dowry Prohibition Officer, gains prominence and hence it can only be concluded that had the prosecution taken the report of the Dowry Prohibition Officer into account, the inclusion of the offence under DP Act would have been dropped.
  22. 22.That apart, the statement of the witnesses with regard to the demand of dowry are vague and lacks details with regard to the place and time of the demand. While dealing with such vague allegations in a charge sheet, the Hon’ble High Court in a judgment in Swapnil and others V. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2014 (13) SCC 567 held as follows:
    • 10.The first appellant and second respondent had in fact solemnized their marriage at Arya Samaj Mandir on 16.06.2007 privately, as they were stated to be in love with each other for sometime. Thereafter only, in the presence of the family members, marriage was solemnized on 24.06.2009. It has to be seen that admittedly the second respondent has been living separately since April, 2011. Thereafter, she had lodged a complaint on 07.09.2011 before the very same police station. The same was duly enquired into and it was closed stating that the dispute is actually between the families which are to be otherwise settled in legal proceedings. If there are such differences between families which are to be settled in legal proceedings, how such differences would constitute and give rise to a successful prosecution under Sections 498A or 506 IPC or under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, is the crucial question.
    • 11. The second respondent has been living separately since April, 2011and hence, there is no question of any beating by the appellants as alleged by her. The relationship having got strained ever since April, 2011, even application for restitution of conjugal rights having been withdrawn on 16.04.2012 as the second respondent was not interested to live together, it is difficult to believe that there is still a demand for dowry on 30.04.2012 coupled with criminal intimidation. The allegations are vague and bereft of the details as to the place and the time of the incident. We had called for the records and have gone through the same. The materials before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore are not sufficient to form an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused appellants have committed the offence under the charged Sections. The Additional Sessions Court and the High Court missed these crucial points while considering the petition filed by the appellants under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Cr.PC respectively. The veiled object behind the lame prosecution is apparently to harass the appellants. We are, hence, of the view that the impugned prosecution is wholly unfounded.
    • 12.Therefore, to secure the ends of justice and for preventing abuse of the process of the criminal court, the charges framed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore in Criminal Case No. 10245 of 2012 against the accused appellants are quashed.
  23. 23.The petitioners have also been charged for an offence under Section 4 of TNPHW Act. In order to constitute an offence under Section 4 of the TNPHW Act, the occurrence should be committed in a public place or institution referred to, in the section. In the complaint of the respondent, there is no such mention about harassment in a public place or private domain of Dr.Varun Kumar and none of the witnesses have spoken so. Even as per the definition of harassment under Section 2(a) of the said Act, there is no evidence in any of the statement of the witnesses to the effect that the petitioners had involved themselves in any indecent conduct or act against the respondents. A learned Judge of this Court had an occasion to deal on this issue in a judgment in S.Selva Kumar V. State through the Inspector of Police, AWPS, Keelakarai, Ramanathapuram District and another reported in 2015 (2) MWN Cr. 195 wherein, he had observed as follows:
    • 10. Coming to Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women (amended) Enforcement Act, 2002, this Court is of the view that there is no sufficient material to charge the petitioner under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women (amended) Enforcement Act, 2002. Thus, in the absence of any attracting material, the said offence is also made out.
    • 11. Considering the scope of 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code in Srinivasan Vs. State by Sub Inspector of Police reported in 2009 (4) MLJ (Crl) 1118, in paragraph No.11, this Court has held in the following manner:-
    • 11.In order to attract the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC, the intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the victim. Mere expression of words without any intention to cause alarm would not suffice. To constitute an offence under Section 506 of IPC it must be shown that the person charged actually threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property with an intention to cause alarm.
    • 12. In Rajan Vs. State, rep. By Inspector of police reported in 2008 (2) MWN (Cr.) 258, after taking note of the decision rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, this Court has held in the following manner:-
    • 10. In a similar case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the proceedings in respect of the offence under Section 506(ii) IPC in a case in Usha Bala Vs. State of Punjab (P&H), 2002 (2) C.C.Cases 320 (P & H), that, Empty threats does not prima facie mean that the case under Section 506, IPC is made out against the petitioner. Hence, in face no case is made out against the petitioner.
    • Consequently, FIR No.313, dated 15.07.1999 under Section 406/498-A, IPC of police station, Sadar, Patiala is quashed qua the petitioner only.
    • 11.It is seen even in the instant case, except a vague and bald allegation of criminal intimidation, the defacto complainant has not stated that there was any threat to his life or sought for any police protection. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that even the offence under Section 506(i), I.P.C is not maintainable. In view of the same, it can only be held that inclusion of the offence under Section 4 of TNPHW Act is misconceived.
  24. 24.The last offence for which the petitioners have been charged is one under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2008. In order to constitute an offence under Section 66 of the IT Act, it is mandatory that such a prosecution could be only on a scientific or a cyber crime lab report based on the evidence of Cybercrime Lab of the Forensic Department. In the instant case, the Cybercrime Forensic Department has reported that no hacking tools were used in the laptops. Even the e-mail received from the service providers and the email host indicates that there was no breach of the complainant’s email. However, overlooking the report of the cyber crime lab of the Forensic Department, the petitioners have been charged for an offence under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act 2008 and as such, the inclusion of this provision in the charge sheet is also baseless.
  25. 25.In view of the foregoing observations, it is manifestly clear that none of the offences for which the petitioners have been charged with, has been clearly made out. As pointed out in the enquiry report of the District Social Welfare Officer, there could have been many other reasons for the break of the love affair between Dr.Varun Kumar and defacto complainant and by permitting the trial Court to proceed with the criminal trial against all the petitioners herein would only aggravate the ill feelings among the parties and would certainly cause serious prejudice to the petitioners. In the judgment in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426, the Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the scope for interference of the High Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein illustrative examples were laid down in cases where the High Courts would be justified in interfering and quashing the proceedings. One such illustration enabling the High Court to exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is where a criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Following the aforesaid principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a later judgment in Sunder Babu and others V. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2009 (14) SCC 244 held as follows:
    • 7.Though the scope for interference while exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:
    • 1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
    • 2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code.
    • 3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
    • 4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.
    • 5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
    • 6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
    • 7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
    • Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra).
    • 8.The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
    • 19.The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
    • 20.As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
  26. 26.The present case in hand, is a classic example of a maliciously instituted criminal proceedings and hence this Court exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be justified in quashing the same, thereby enabling the petitioners herein to refrain from undergoing the ordeal of a criminal trial instituted on baseless charges. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1022310662452785153
  27. 27.In the result, the Criminal Original Petitions stands allowed. Consequently, the proceedings in C.C.No.2036 of 2015 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet stands quashed.

26.06.2018 Speaking order

Index:Yes
Internet:Yes
Note:Issue order copy on 06.07.2018

DP

To

1.The XI Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai.

2.The Inspector of Police (ADSP) Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Chennai-600008.

3.The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court.
M.S.RAMESH.J,

DP

Pre-Delivery order made in Crl.O.P.Nos. 14573 of 2017 & Crl.O.P.Nos.17112 and 24197 of 2015 26.06.2018

When HC shall NOT quash a criminal case Parbatbhai Aahir Vs State of Gujarat – Supreme court – cornerstone case

when NOT to quash a criminal case … Parbatbhai Aahir Vs State of Gujarat – Supreme court – cornerstone case

“…… (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1011037375793856512

(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and

(ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.…..”


REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1723 OF 2017
[Arising out of SLP(CRL) No 9549 of 2016]

PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR AND ORS **Appellants

 

VERSUS

 

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. ..Respondents

 

JUDGMENT

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

(1) Leave granted.

 

(2) By its judgment dated 25 November 2016, the High Court of Gujarat dismissed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellants sought the quashing of a First Information Report registered against them on 18 June 2016 with the City ‘C’ Division Police Station, District Jamnagar, Gujarat for offences punishable under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code. The second respondent is the complainant.

(3) In his complaint dated 18 June 2016, the second respondent stated that certain land admeasuring 17 vigha comprised in survey 1408 at Panakhan Gokulnagar in Jamnagar city was his ancestral agricultural land. The land was converted to non-agricultural use on 21 June 1995 and 5 January 2000 pursuant to orders of the District Collector. One hundred and three plots were carved out of the land. Amongst them, plots 45 to 56 admeasuring 32,696 sq.ft. were in the joint names of six brothers and a sister (represented by the complainant). According to the complainant, a broker by the name of Bachhubhai Veljibhai Nanda approached him with Parbatbhai Ahir, the first appellant stating that he desired to purchase the land. On the next day, the first appellant approached the complainant with his partner Hasmukhbhai Patel (the third appellant) to purchase the land. The complainant was requested to provide a photocopy of the lay out plan of the plot, which he did. On the following day the first appellant is alleged to have gone to the house of the complainant with the second and the third appellants at which point in time, parties agreed that the land would be sold at the rate of Rs 4,221 per sq.ft. and a deal was struck for a consideration of Rs.1,13,58,711/- out of which an amount of Rs 11 lakhs was given in cash to the complainant for plot no.56. The complainant’s case is that while the discussion was on, he was requested by the second and the third appellants that since the power of attorney was old and unreadable all the plot holders should give their passport size photographs. Accordingly, a document was reduced to writing by which it was agreed that the sale transaction for plot no.56 would be completed within two months against full payment. According to the complainant, when he demanded the remaining payment for the plot from the second and third appellants, the second appellant provided him seven cheques each in the amount of Rs 6 lakhs in the name of the six brothers (one brother being given two cheques). Thereafter when the complainant followed up for the payment of the remaining amount with the purchasers, the balance was not paid and, on the contrary, the complainant was threatened of a forcible transfer of the land. According to the complainant, when he visited the office of the Sub-registrar about three days before lodging the complaint, it came to his knowledge that a sale deed has been registered not only in respect of the plot in question (which was agreed to be sold) but also in respect of plot nos.45 to 55 on 27 January 2016. It was then that the complainant realised that the purchaser in the sale deed was shown as the fourth appellant, Jayesh Arvindbhai Patel, and the name of the seventh appellant, Jitudan Nankudan Gadhavi, resident of Payalnagar society, Naroda, Ahmedabad was shown as the holder of a power of attorney. The witnesses to the registered sale deed were the fifth appellant, Rabari Hiteshbhai and the sixth appellant, Patel Indravaden Dineshbhai.

(4) The complaint came to be lodged on the complainant having realised that the power of attorney in the name of his siblings had been forged. The complainant stated that neither he nor any of his siblings had given a power of attorney in favour of the seventh appellant. According to the complainant, neither the non-judicial stamp dated 25 January 2016 in the amount of Rs 10,30,000/- nor the judicial stamp dated 27 January 2016 has been purchased by him. In fact, according to the complainant, it was the fourth appellant who had purchased the judicial stamp dated 27 January 2016.

(5) According to the complaint, plots no.45 to 55 admeasuring 30,005 sq.ft. are valued at Rs 12.50 crores. It has been alleged that a conspiracy was hatched by the appellants and by the other co-accused resulting into the transfer of valuable land belonging to the complainant and his siblings, on the basis of forged documents.

(6) The High Court noted that the fourth appellant had moved Special Criminal Application no.4538 of 2016 which had been rejected by the coordinate bench of the High Court on 3 August 2016. While rejecting the earlier application under Section 482, the High Court had observed thus: “19. Primary details revealed the complaint had led this Court examine the papers of the investigation. The evidence so far collected prima facie reveal the involvement of the petitioner.This Court also could notice that it is a case where under the pretext of buying only a particular Plot No.56 from the complainant and his family members, the power of attorney has been forged usurping nearly 10 other plots which value nearly 11 crores and odd by allegedly conniving with each other, and therefore, the payment of Rs 42 lakhs by the cheques to the complainant in relation to one of the plots also would pale into insignificance. This, by no means, even at a prima facie level, can be said to be a civil dispute, given a colour of criminality. It would be in the interest of both the sides for this Court to either, at this stage not to make a roving inquiry or divulge anything which may affect the ongoing investigation. Suffice it to note that, the petition does not deserved to be entertained an the same stands rejected.” Before the High Court, the plea for quashing the First Information Report was advanced on the ground that the appellants had amicably settled the dispute with the complainant. The complainant had also filed an affidavit to that effect.

(7) On behalf of the prosecution, the Public Prosecutor opposed the application for quashing on two grounds. First – the appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Second, the appellants had criminal antecedents, the details of which are contained in the following chart submitted before the High Court:

.. 1 Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur P.1
.. a. City “A” Division Jamnagar CR No 1-251/2010

 

.. 2 Ramde Bhikha Nanadaniya P.2
.. a. City “A”Division Jamnagar
.. b. City “A” Division Jamnagar CR No.1-105/2016
.. c. City “A” Division Jamnagar CR No.1-251/2010

 

.. 3 Hasmukh Hansrajbhai Patel P.3
.. a. Gandhinagar M-Case No.1/2014
.. b. City “A” Division Jamnagar CR No.1-105/2016

 

.. 4 Indravadan Dineshbhai Patel P.6
.. a. City “A: Division Jamnagar CR No.1-105/2016

 

.. 5 Jitendra Somabhai Modi P.7
.. a. City “A” Division Jamnagar CR No.1-105/2016
.. b. Odhav Police Station CR No.I-180/2015

 

.. 6 Vishnu @ Toto Rabari
.. a. Gandhinagar M-Case No.1/2014
.. b. City “A: Division Jamnagar CR No.I-105/2016

The High Court observed that it had been given “a fair idea” about the modus operandi adopted by the appellants for grabbing the land, in the course of which they had opened bogus bank accounts. The High Court held that the case involves extortion, forgery and conspiracy and all the appellants have acted as a team. Hence, in the view of the High Court, it was not in the interest of society at large to accept the settlement and quash the FIR. The High Court held that the charges are of a serious nature and the activities of the appellants render them a potential threat to society. On this ground, the prayer to quash the First Information Report has been rejected.

(8) On behalf of the appellants, reliance has been placed on the decisions rendered by this Court in Gian Singh v State of Punjab1 and in Narinder Singh v State of Punjab2. Learned counsel submitted that the dispute between the complainant and the appellants arose from a transaction for the sale of land. It was urged that the dispute is essentially of a civil nature and since parties have agreed to an amicable settlement, the proper course for the High Court would have been to quash the FIR in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 1 (2012) 10 SCC 303 2 (2014) 6 SCC 466

(9) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the state has supported the judgment of the High Court. Learned counsel emphasised the circumstances which weighed with the High Court, including (i) the seriousness of the allegations; (ii) the conduct of the appellants who were absconding; and (iii) the criminal antecedents of the appellants. Hence, it was urged that the appellants were not entitled to the relief of quashing the FIR merely because they had entered into a settlement with the complainant.

(10) Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh (supra) a bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which the High Court should consider in determining as to whether to quash an FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The considerations which must weigh with the High Court are:

  “61 …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

(11) In Narinder Singh (supra), Dr Justice A K Sikri, speaking for a bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the state to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrence. In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised:

“29.7…Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation.

It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits…” This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in quashing the First Information Report:

“33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail.

However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz., “respectable persons have been trying for a compromise up till now, which could not be finalized”. This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings…”

(12) In State of Maharashtra v Vikram Anantrai Doshi3, a bench of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and the principles 3 (2014) 15 SCC 29 which must govern in deciding whether a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained Letters of Credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet involved offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the court was not dealing with a simple case where “the accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere”. The court held that the manner in which Letters of Credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: “… availing of money from a nationalized bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the chargesheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly of civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation.” The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was hence set aside by this Court.

(13) The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v Maninder Singh4 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: “…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved.”

(14) In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley5, the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a 4 (2016) 1 SCC 389 5 (2016)1 SCC 376 woman “who was following the command of her husband” and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: “… Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…” “…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…”

(15) The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :

(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and

(ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1011037375793856512

(16) Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing the First Information Report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the FIR would subserve or secure the ends of justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that the appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The second is that the appellants have criminal antecedents, reflected in the chart which has been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. The High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been followed by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels of land and noted that in the past as well, they were alleged to have been connected with such nefarious activities by opening bogus bank accounts. It was in this view of the matter that the High Court observed that in a case involving extortion, forgery and conspiracy where all the appellants were acting as a team, it was not in the interest of society to quash the FIR on the ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. We agree with the view of the High Court. The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents, utilization of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crime. In these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick/status/1011037375793856512

(17) We do not, for the above reasons, find any merit in the appeal. The Criminal Appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed.

****…………………………………CJI [DIPAK MISRA]

****…………………………………..J [A M KHANWILKAR]

****…………………………………J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi;

October 04, 2017

Second #FAKE #498a filed on same Fake grounds at a different police station! #Quashed !! Anup Agrawal vs The State Of #Madhya #Pradesh on 16 #April, #2018

Notes

Soon after marriage wife demands LAKHS and LAKHS of money from her newly wed husband !! The Husband is unable to provide the same !! So she refuses to join matrimonial home. Wife then goes on to file #FAKE #498a at #Indore PS. The Indore police arrange for counseling sessions and the woman agrees that there were “differences” between the couple (NOT dowry cruelty !! ) and they agree to part ways !

Still the woman files a SECOND fake 498a from a different Police station. Husband tries to impress on the second PS that the case in the same grounds the first cace (which was closed) . Still the second PD file a charge sheet !

So the husband and co run to MH HC and seek quash. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

The Hon MP HC sees the ABUSE of process of law and quashes the entire 498a case !!


Anup Agrawal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2018

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Anup Agrawal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2018

M.Cr.C.No10858/2017 (Anup Agrawal & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors..)

High Court of Madhya Pradesh: Bench at Indore

Single Bench: Hon’ble Shri Justice S.K. Awasthi

M.Cr.C. No. 10858/2017

Anup Agrawal & Ors.

vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.


Shri Anup Agrawal, present in person.

Mrs. Mamta Shandilya, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondent No.1/State.

Shri Vinod Kuma Bhavsar, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/complainant.


ORDER

(Passed on April 2018 )

  1. The applicants filed instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘The code’) seeking quashment of FIR bearing Crime No. 14/2017 dated 06/01/2017 for commission of offence under Sections 498(A) and 323/34 of the IPC registered at Police-Station-Lasudiya, Distric-Indore and charge-sheet dated 27/06/2017 filed in respect of the aforesaid FIR. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick
  2. 2. The necessary facts leading to filing of the instant petition are that the marriage of applicant No.1-Anup Agrawal was solemnized with respondent No.2-Trupti Agrawal on 24/04/2014 as per Hindu rituals and customs. Respondent No. 2 made a complaint against the applicants alleging that in the marriage her parents had given ornaments, household articles and cash of Rs.3.50 Lacs to the applicants. However, after the marriage, all the accused persons started to harass the respondent No. 2 alleging that her parents had given nothing in the marriage and they demanded money from her. At the time of Diwali festival in the year 2014 the applicants beat her and she was thrown out of her matrimonial home. On the basis of aforesaid allegations an FIR for commission of offence under Sections 498(A) and 323/34 was registered against the applicants at Police-Station Lasudiya and after completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed. In the month of June 2015, the applicant was transferred to Ahemdabad but the respondent No.2 refuse to accompanied him, since she did not want to give her job in the ICICI Bank, Indore. Applicant No.1 tried to relocate back to Indore. Respondent No.2 informed the applicant No.1-in the mid-August 2014 first time that she owed a debt liability of approximately Rs.25 Lacs against Indore Development Authority flat situated in Anandvan (Highrise), Scheme No. 140 and she is paying an EMI of approximately Rs.25,000/- towards the said loan from July 2015. On 01/12/2015, respondent No.2 asked the applicant No.1 to help her for Rs. 6,54,080/- to enable her to get possession of the aforesaid flat, however, due to a shortage of funds the applicant No.1 was unable to help the respondent No.2 to pay the same and because of this respondent No.2 got furious with the applicant No.1 and refused to come back to the matrimonial home. Applicant No.1 applied for new job and he got his new assignment at Pune but respondent No.2 refused to come to Pune saying that she cannot stay in relationship with a person, who cannot arrange money for her when she needs it. On 20/12/2016, a family meeting was arranged in Neemuch to resolve the said issued. But respondent No.2 did not turn up on the aforesaid date. Thereafter, applicants made several attempts for reconciliation but they have not received any response from respondent No.2. On 27/09/2016, at the house of family friend of the applicant a family meeting was arranged, in which respondent No.2 alongwith her father and other relatives were present in an extremely aggressive manner and threatened that they would implicate the applicants in false case under the Domestic Violence and Dowry Prohibition Act in order to harass and humiliate the applicants and tarnish their reputation. They abused applicant Nos. 2 & 4 and attempted to assault the applicant No.1. In this regard applicant No.4 lodged a complaint against the said intimidation and threatening in the Police-Station at Neemuch. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick
  3. 3. On 01/12/2016, respondent No.2 filed a complaint against the applicants at the Mahila Thana, Indore alleging that the she was treated with cruelty by the applicants in order to extract the dowry from her parents. There upon the applicants were summoned by the Mahila Thana, Indore. Whereupon the police recorded the statement of the applicants and respondent No.2 . During counseling proceedings and respondent No.2 could not substantiate her case against the applicants and then she sought some time to think and to provide evidence of her allegations against the applicants. On 18/12/2016, another counseling session was conducted, in which they came to the conclusion that the differences have arisen between them and respondent No.2 was agreed to file a petition for dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 with the condition that she wanted back of her belongings that may be lying at the house of applicant No.1. On 18/12/2016, the respondent No.2 collected her remaining belongings under the supervision of the SHO, Mahila Thana from their rented housed situated at Nipaniya, Indore and the Police-Station Mahila Thana filed a closure report before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class.
  4. 4. On 06/01/2017, the respondent No.2 again made a false complaint against the applicants with identical facts at Police-Station-Lasudiya, Indore, where FIR bearing Crime No. 14/2017 got registered for the offence under Sections 498(A) and 323/34 of the IPC against the applicants. Then the applicant No.1 tried in every possible manner to bring to the notice of the Police-Station-Lasudiya, Indore that the said FIR had been registered on the basis of a false and malicious complaint and that the said issues between the parties stood resolved, with the written consent of the respondent No.2, during the previous proceedings in the Mahila Thana, Indore, in December 2016. However, no heed was paid to the requests of the applicant No.1 and charge-sheet was filed against the applicants before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore. The aforesaid charge-sheet is completely malafide and illegal and there is no ground for prosecution of the applicants are available. Only vague and omnibus allegations has been made in the complaint, which are totally false and concocted, therefore, FIR bearing Crime No. 14/2017 dated 06/01/2017 for commission of offence under Sections 498(A) and 323/34 of the IPC registered at Police-Station-Lasudiya, Distric-Indore and charge-sheet dated 27/06/2017 filed in respect of the aforesaid FIR is liable to be quashed. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick
  5. 5. Per contra learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has supported the criminal prosecution on the ground that prima facie the allegations levelled against the applicants are made out, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
  6. 6. I have considered the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and have perused the documents placed on record along with the present application.
  7. 7. The parameters on which the indulgence can be shown for exercising powers available under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with respect to matrimonial matters have been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 in the following manner: ” 20. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR are perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names which have been included in the FIR but mere M.Cr.C.No10858/2017 casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specifically if it happens soon after the wedding.
  8. 8. In another judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Rajagopal Vs. Devi Polymers (P) Ltd; (2016) 6 SCC 310, wherein the Hon’ble Court referred to the earlier decision, observed in the following manner:- “15. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, 1988 SCC (Cri) 234}, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 695, para 7) “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick
  9. 9. However, it has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and anotdher, AIR 2013 SC 506 that the power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as the case may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be no reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of legal proceedings. Thus, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of charge against the accused.
  10. 10. It has been held in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, that where a criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with male fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, extraordinary or inherrent powers reserved to the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash the first information report.
  11. 11. In the context of the law laid down by the Apex Court , the plain reading of the FIR lodged by the respondent No.2, goes to show that the allegations relating to commission of offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the IPC are omnibus and do not refer to any specific act of the applicants. Although she has made an allegation that on 27/04/2014, when they had gone to Shimla (H.P.) for their honeymoon, the applicant No.1-taunted her alleging that her father has not given anything in the dowry and on Diwali festival of the year 2014, the applicants beat her with respect to demand of dowry, but she has not made any complaint regarding these incidents till 2016, which clearly indicates that all these allegations are vague and false. https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick
  12. 12. On 18/12/2016, at Mahila Thana Indore respondent No.2 made the following statement, which reads as under:- ” I, Trupti W/o Anup Agrawal, give this undertaking today i.e. on 18/12/2016 after counseling at Mahila Thana, Indore both of us husband and wife thinks that our thoughts does not match and it is not possible for us to live together any more. I wants to return my belongings from my husband and he is agreed to return the same. We will transfer our belongings with mutual understanding and we will file a divorce petition before the Court with mutual consent.”
  13. 13. The reproduced portion makes it clear that after counseling sessions both the parties came to the conclusion that the differences have arisen between them, therefore, they cannot be live together and respondent No.2 was agreed to file a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the context of the aforesaid understanding which has been arises between the parties, Mahila Thana Indore filed a closure report of the matter on 13/12/2016.
  14. 14. However, on 06/01/2017, the respondent lodged FIR at Police-Station Lasudiya for the same ground by suppressing the proceedings of Mahila Thana, Indore. In the FIR lodged at Police-Station-Lasudiya she alleged that even after 2-3 counseling sessions, the applicants persisted for their demand of dowry, which is absolutely contrary to the proceedings held at Mahila Thana, Indore. From the proceeding of Mahila Thana, Indore, it is transpired that after 2-3 days of the marriage respondent No.2 stayed with her husband-Anup Agrawal and sister-in-law-Alka Agrawal at Indore. Applicant No.1-Anup Agrawal due to his transfer left to Ahemdabad and then to Pune alone for the reasons that respondent No.2 was working at ICICIU Bank, Indore and she did not go with him. From the impugned FIR, it is clear that respondent No.2 is living separately since 23/11/2015 and she has not interested to live with her husband, therefore, it is difficult to believed that the applicants subjected her to cruelty on the pretext of demand of dowry. From the statement of the respondent No.2 given before the Mahila Thana, Indore, it is apparent that applicant Nos. 2 & 4 never lived with her, therefore, it cannot be accepted that they made any demand of dowry with the respondent No.2 and ill treated her with regard to the fulfillment of their demand. After counseling at Mahila Thana, Indore respondent No.2 and applicant No.1-Anup Agrawal, agreed that they will file a petition for divorce in writing and the parties were rided for court proceedings for the reason that the respondent No.2 does not want to live with applicant No.1 anymore. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent No.2 has already filed a divorce petition against applicant No.1 at family Court, Indore. While Mahila Thana, Indore has filed a closure report on the complaint filed by respondent No.2, then registration of FIR against the applicants for the same ground at Police-Station Lasudiya is nothing but a sheer abuse of the process of law.
  15. 15. Under these circumstances, the present application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is allowed. Consequently, FIR bearing Crime No. 14/2017 dated 06/01/2017 for commission of offence under Sections 498(A) and 323/34 of the IPC registered at Police-Station-Lasudiya, Distric-Indore and charge-sheet dated 27/06/2017 filed in respect of the aforesaid FIR are hereby quashed.

Certified copy as per rules.

(S.K. Awasthi) Judge

skt Digitally signed by Santosh Kumar Tiwari Date: 2018.04.17 10:30:08 +05’30’

Anup Agrawal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2018
— Read on indiankanoon.org/doc/193260203/