False & Vexatious 498a and Rape cases on in laws quashed. False 498a also quashed. MP HC

False & Vexatious 498a and Rape cases on in laws quashed. False 498a also quashed. MP HC

Husband files divorce claiming that wife was previously married to some one else and lived with him, hid that fact and remarried the current poor fella. Wife appears one time for the divorce and then promptly files 498a on husband approx 1.5 months later. In that 498a there are NO allegations of rape on in laws, but later wife improvises and also files fake Rape Cases on In laws. Husband also wins the 498a case on merits at Magistrate court. Now All fake cases are quashed by Hon HC. The Hon court sees thru the abuse of process of law.

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

BENCH AT GWALIOR

SINGLE BENCH

Cr.R.No.87/2017

(Manoj Dubey and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. and Anr.)

&

Cr.R.No.447/2017

(Pradumn Dubey and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. and Anr.)

——————————————————————————————–

Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the applicant.

Shri Aditya Singh, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.

Shri Sanjay Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the complainant.

——————————————————————————————-

Present : Hon. Mr. Justice Anand Pathak

ORDER

{Passed on 12th day of May, 2020}

1. Since both the petitions carry same factual tenor and texture and subject matter is also same therefore, both these criminal revision petitions taken into consideration simultaneously and are decided by the common order. For convenience sake, facts of Cr.R.No.87/2017 are taken into consideration.

2. The instant criminal revisions have been preferred by the petitioners/accused against the order dated 10.01.2017 (in Cr.R.No.87/2017) and order dated 06.02.2017 (in Cr.R.No.447/2017) passed in Case No.208/2016 whereby in sum and substance the respective applications of petitioners under Section 227/228 of Cr.P.C. for discharge have been rejected.

3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication are that on 01.05.2014 marriage was solemnized between Pradumn Dubey (son of present petitioners) i.e. petitioner No.1 in Cr.R.No.447/2017 and respondent No.2 Smt. Richa Bhargawa as per Hindu rites and rituals at Guna. It appears that due to some domestic incompatibility, respondent No.2/wife started living at her parental home at Kolaras, District Shivpuri (M.P.) since 24.02.2015. The dispute between the couple could not be resolved, therefore, on alleged grounds of living adulterous life as well as cruelty committed by respondent No.2, then husband-Pradumn Dubey filed a divorce petition against the respondent No.2/wife on 05.04.2016.

4. In his petition, he levelled specific allegations about leading adulterous life and prior to marriage, conceiving from some other male and later on aborted. Husband levelled specific allegation against respondent No.2 of having relationship with one, Ashutosh Pandey. As per allegations, she lived with Ashutosh Pandey at his village Nohrikala as his wife for sometime and after dispute with him, she came back to her parental home and thereafter, marriage with Pradumn Dubey (petitioner No.1 of Cr.R.447/2017) solemnized. Later on, this fact came to the knowledge of husband through call details of her mobile as well as from other source. All details of leading adulterous life by respondent No.-2 have been narrated in divorce petition. Respondent No.2 contested the case and led her part of evidence.

5. After considering the rival submissions and evidence, Principal Judge, Family Court Guna vide judgment dated 06.09.2017 allowed the petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act filed by the petitioner-Pradumn Dubey and decree of divorce was issued and by way of divorce couple declared separate.

6. It is worthwhile to mention the fact that on 05.04.2016 divorce petition was filed and on 05.05.2016 wife caused her appearance in the Court and immediately thereafter, on 15.05.2016 she lodged FIR under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, showing the dates of alleged offence between 01.05.2014 i.e. date of marriage to 12.10.2015, the date from which she started living separately. In the said FIR, there is not even a whisper in respect of allegation of committing attempt to rape and outraging her modesty by her brother-in-law -Rahul Dubey (Petitioner No.2 in Cr.R.447/2017).

7. On 23.06.2016, she lodged another FIR vide Crime No.327/2016 at Police Station Guna Kotwali for the offence under Sections 376 and 511 of IPC against all the petitioners for committing the offence of attempt to rape and outraging her modesty. In the said FIR, period of incident shown to be from 05.06.2014 to 28.02.2015. Perusal of FIR indicates the date of event as 05.06.2014 at Haridwar and thereafter, one more incident of attempt to rape by her brother-in-law -Rahul Dubey around one year back from the date of FIR.

8. Investigation carried out and charge-sheet submitted. Trial Court framed the charges against all the petitioners (except petitioner No.2 in Cr.R.No.447/2017) in respect of Sections 498-A, 376/109, 354/109 of IPC and brother-in-law -Rahul Dubey (petitioner No.2 of Cr.R.447/2017) was saddled with Sections 498-A, 376/511 and Section 354 of IPC .

9. Meanwhile, divorce petition filed by the husband-Pradumn Dubey was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 06.09.2017, in which this fact has been considered that respondent No.2 lodged a false FIR to the offence of attempt to rape to exert pressure over the petitioners.

10. Meanwhile on 26.09.2019 during the pendency of present petitions, first FIR lodged against all the petitioners under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act also resulted in acquittal of all the petitioners on merits and the said judgment dated 26.09.2019 is on record.

11. Therefore, through this revision petition, petitioners have challenged the rejection of application for discharge preferred by them under Sections 227/228 of Cr.P.C.. In Cr.R.No.447/2017, petitioners (husband and brother- in-law of respondent No.2-wife) also preferred revision against order dated 06.02.2017 whereby charge has been framed against the petitioners in respect of offence under Sections 498-A, 376/511 and Section 354 of IPC for Rahul Dubey and Section 498-A, 376/109 and 354/109 of IPC against Pradumn Dubey.

12. It is the submissions of counsel for the petitioners that it is factually clear that FIR of leveling allegations of attempt to rape and outrage her modesty are complete abuse of the process of Court and such process cannot be allowed for harassment. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604.

13. It is further submitted that after filing of divorce petition by the husband as counter blast, respondent No.2 lodged FIR under Section 498-A of IPC without mentioning therein any allegations of attempt to rape whereas she filed the said FIR on 15.05.2016 and at that point of time, if subsequent FIR is seen then it is clear that she referred the incident dated 05.06.2014 and the incident is of one year thereafter. Therefore, she could have narrated the said allegations in her first FIR filed under Section 498-A of IPC. It appears that when she realized that she is not getting sufficient material to harass the present petitioners only on the basis of offence under Section 498-A of IPC then she resorted to another FIR including the offence under Sections 376 and 354 of IPC, which is clear abuse of process of law and she cannot be permitted to start litigation at her whims on flimsy pretext and harass the petitioner till eternity. He referred the vagueness made by the prosecutrix in her written complaint, FIR and police statement/statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. He further submits that although this is revision petition but since this Court exercises the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., also then scope of revision is not limited. He relied upon the case of Rajiv Thapar & Ors vs Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (3) SCC 331 to submit that even in revisional jurisdiction if the injustice is caused then same can be taken care of. Here in the present case petitioners are constantly harassed by the wife. FIR is a delayed FIR and an afterthought.

14. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer and prayed for dismissal of petition.

15. Counsel for the complainant also raised the point regarding merits of the case and submits that trial Court would decide the case and allegations prima facie apparently exist and therefore, same needs to be tried through leading evidence.

16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case dairy/documents.

17. In the present case, petitioners have filed the revision petitions in which one is against order of discharge and another is against order of framing charge. Scope of revision is not so limited as tried to be projected by the counsel for respondent because revisional Court can see the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed as well as the regularity of any proceeding of any Court below.

18. Therefore, looking to the scope as provided in Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., this Court has sufficient jurisdiction to look into correctness or propriety of any order passed by the Sessions Court. So far as present case is concerned, respondent No.2 lodged the FIR on 23.06.2016 by filing a written complaint. Contents of written complaint and FIR are almost identical. Later on, her police statement was taken on same day i.e. 23.06.2016 then also she repeated the allegations but next day in her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, she made her statement only in one para and the same is reproduced as under for ready reference:-

19. Perusal of the said statement indicates that she referred the role of her brother-in-law-Rahul Dubey but she nowhere refers the role of her husband or her father and mother-in-law (petitioners of Cr.R.No.87/2017). The statement recorded just after one day i.e. 24.06.2016 therefore, it cannot be assumed that by the efflux of time, she forgot the details of incident. She tries to improve upon some contents qua Rahul Dubey which were not earlier lodged in the written complaint, FIR or police statement. Material contradictions and omissions exist in all her statements and contents of her written complaint as well as F.I.R. This shows her intention.

20. This fact has material bearing that after marriage (on 01.05.2014) her brother-in-law- Rahul Dubey started misbehaving with her and first incident is of dated 05.06.2014 one month after the date of marriage. Apparently such allegation comes under the doubt for the reason that if she was so upset by the advances of her brother-in-law then she should have immediately reported her family members, husband as well as father/mother-in-law or to the police. She left her matrimonial home on 24.02.2015 and the said fact reflected in the judgment and decree dated 06.09.2017 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Guna. When she left her matrimonial home within 10 months of her marriage on 24.02.2015 and thereafter, if any advances were made by the brother-in-law -Rahul Dubey then she had one more opportunity to raise her voice and/or to mention the said fact in earlier FIR. The Police Station Kolaras District Shivpuri registered the case vide Crime No.204/2016 against all four petitioners of the instant case for alleged offence under Section 498-A of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act on which trial was conducted before the JMFC Kolaras, District Shivpuri and vide judgment dated 26.09.2019 the said case resulted into acquittal of all the four petitioners/accused.

21. Reference of one compromise deed (Ex.P-3 of the said case) also finds place in judgment of the trial Court in which she accepted the fact that she was not allowed restrained by the petitioner/husband to go to the place of her brother-in-law (thtkth -Akhil) because her husband did not like the idea of going and staying for day’s together at her sister and brother-in-law’s place. In the said compromise deed dated 03.12.2014, she accepted that she wants to live happily with her matrimonial family and she would not be restrained by the family members/petitioners.

22. The facts of misbehavior by Rahul Dubey could have reflected in the settlement deed dated 03.12.2014 because as per the allegations, first incident of misbehavior by brother-in-law -Rahul Dubey was committed on 05.06.2014 at Haridwar therefore, on 03.12.2014, she could have referred this fact in compromise deed and could have ensured her modesty and chastity but same does not find place in the settlement deed or in the judgment dated 26.09.2019 passed by the JMFC, Kolaras. On this ground also, it appears that she filed the instant cases on false pretext just for harassment.

23. Interestingly, first FIR under Section 498-A of IPC was filed by the prosecutrix at Police Station Kolaras on 15.05.2016 and after one month she again filed an FIR with same allegations of dowry demand but with addition of Section 354 and 376 of IPC. Second FIR was filed at Police Station Guna Kotwali, District Guna. This shows the bend of mind and motive of respondent No.2 to keep harassing the petitioners on the pretext or the other. These facts create sufficient doubt about the actual disposition of respondent No.2 and her intention to wreak vengeance. Criminal law cannot be used as a tool for oppression, harassment and embarrassment to the common man. Here respondent No.2 tried to misuse the process of law for extending harassment to the petitioners. She knows that all petitioners are Government Teachers and their entanglement in criminal proceedings would cost them heavily. Therefore, she is enjoying peevish pleasure.

24. When divorce proceedings successfully pursued by the petitioner/husband Pradumn Dubey and when all four petitioners successfully contested the trial of Section 498-A of IPC then again relegating them back for the trial for same offence under Section 498-A of IPC would be travesty of justice because long drawn litigation itself is a type of punishment or at-least harassment to the common man which cannot be permitted in those cases where malice of complainant is apparent on record.

25. Even otherwise on merits, no allegations of attributes of Section 376 or 354 of IPC existed or reiterated by the complainant in her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. qua other petitioners because allegations are only against Rahul Dubey but since the mens rea or ill-motive is apparent which is being established by the documents available on record, therefore, this Court cannot sit with blind eyes to allow the continuation of the abuse of process of law. Interestingly, her case suffers from delay and latches also because she could not explain delay and factual inconsistency in her complaint and statements.

26. In the case of Sh. Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr. 1996 (9) SCC 766 the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the scope of Section 227 of Cr.P.C. which is reproduced as under:- “15.But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work-load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself.”

27. In the cumulative analysis and going through the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar (Supra) and in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that it is case where interference would advance the cause of justice therefore, this Court intends to allow both the revisions filed by the petitioners.

28. Even otherwise, this Court does not find any ground to proceed further in the litigation and trial Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 227/228 of Cr.P.C. for discharge as well as erred in framing charge as per impugned order dated 10.01.2017 (in Cr.R.No.87/2017) and order dated 06.02.2017 (in Cr.R.No.447/2017) and both the impugned orders are hereby set-aside and no case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.

29. Resultantly, petitioners are discharged from the clutches of charges under Sections 498-A and 376/109, 354/109 of IPC and petitioner Rahul Dubey for the offence under Sections 498-A, 376/511 and Section 354 of IPC. They are set free.

30. E-copy/Certified copy, whichever is available, of this order be provided to the petitioners and E-copy of this order be sent to the trial Court concerned for compliance. It is made clear that E-copy of this order shall be treated as certified copy for practical purposes in respect of this order.

31. Both the revision petitions stand allowed and disposed of accordingly.

Ashish* (Anand Pathak)

Judge

ASHISH

CHAURASIA

2020.05.12

18:38:05

-07’00’

Girl who had #Sex & #Lived for 4 years with a #married man of same village, cannot cry #rape later !!

Whether girl maintaining sexual relation with married person can claim that she was raped on promise of marriage?

Thus, from the statement of the prosecutrix and her parents it is found that the prosecutrix and accused were in love and having relationship for the last four years. During this period the prosecutrix had physical relations with the accused. She lived with the accused in his house openly for long time.

9. Prosecutrix and accused are residents of same village. Accused was living with his wife and children in his house. Prosecutrix in cross-examination para 14 admitted that she had visited the house of accused and met his mother and wife also. The statement of prosecutrix that the accused had introduced his wife to her as maid servant, does not inspire confidence. It is not possible that in the same village, where prosecutrix and accused are living since birth, prosecutrix could not get information of the fact that the accused was a married person having children. During four years ofrelationship, it is not stated by the prosecution witnesses when prosecutrix or her parents asked the accused or his parents for marriage of prosecutrix with the accused. There is not even a whisper that they approached the respondent or his family members for marrying the prosecutrix. If prosecutrix was having relationship with the accused on promise of marriage, then it would be natural for her to make demand of performance of marriage within reasonable time. For four years not making any demand for marriage is not natural. Thus the conduct of the prosecutrix creates doubt on her evidence.

10. The finding of the trial Court in the present case is correct that the prosecutrix was aware that the respondent was already married person. It is not proved that accused had concealed the fact of his marriage from prosecutrix. The prosecutrix made sexual relations with the respondent/accused knowingly that he was a married person. It is not believable that the accused gave a false promise to marry her and persuaded her to make sexual relationship with him. It is also not proved that consent of prosecutrix has been obtained by misrepresentation and misconception of facts. Prosecutrix is a major woman, competent to giveconsent as per her will. For the offence of rape, it is necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was committed against her will or without her consent.

 

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, JABALPUR

Misc. Criminal Case No.22431 of 2015
State of Madhya Pradesh
Vs
Gulab Chand Kahar
Present : Hon. Shri Justice S.K.Gangele
Hon. Shri Justice Anurag Shrivastava

O R D E R

(8.3.2017)

1. 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 14.05.2015, passed by Special Sessions Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1988, Anuppur, in Special Case No.66/2013, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 506(Part-2) of IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, this petition for grant of leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of Cr.P.C., has been preferred by State.
2. 2. The case of prosecution in brief is that on 10.8.2013 the prosecutrix lodged a report in police station Ajak, Anuppur stating that about four years ago when prosecutrix was sitting in the backyard of her house, the respondent/accused came there and forcefully took her to nearby field and committed rape on her without her consent. She tried to make a hue and cry, but was silenced by the accused by threatening her and also by making her believe that he would marry her. Even after this incident, he had sexual relations with her on more than one occasion for last four years on the pretext of marriage. Some days before lodging of report, when prosecutrix repeatedly made demand for marriage, the respondent denied to marry her. Prosecutrix came to know that the respondent was already married and had children. Thereafter, the prosecutrix lodged the complaint before police as stated above.
3. 3. On complaint of prosecutrix a FIR Ex.P-1 has been recorded and an offence under section 376(2)(n), 506(Part-2) of IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been registered against the respondent and after usual investigation a charge-sheet has been filed in the Court. The trial Court framed the charges under section 376(2)(n), 506(Part-2) of IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the respondent, he abjured guilt. After recording of evidence the trial Court passed the impugned judgment and acquitted the respondent on the ground that the prosecutrix is a consenting party and no offence has been found proved beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent.
4. 4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner/State that from the statement of prosecutrix, it is proved that the accused had committed rape and thereafter had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on several occasions during last four years on the false pretext of marriage. The respondent/accused was already married having children. The consent of the prosecutrix was obtained on false representation and promise. Therefore the trial Court had wrongly acquitted the accused treating the prosecutrix as consenting party. The findings of the trial Court are erroneous, arrived at on wrong appreciation of evidence and liable to be set aside. Thus, the leave to appeal may be granted.
5. 5. Considering the arguments of learned counsel for State and on perusal of record, it appears that the main allegation against the accused is that he obtained the consent of prosecutrix on false representation that he intends to marry her. Therefore, this aspect of case whether the prosecutrix has made relations with the accused on her free will or whether her consent was obtained on false representation has to be considered.
6. 6. In the case of Deelip Singh Vs. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 88] Hon’ble Apex Court while defining the consent under section 90 of IPC in para 12 and 14 observed that : “Section 90 IPC, though, does not define “consent”, but describes what is not consent. It says that a consent is not such a consent as is intended by IPC (Sections 375 and 376 IPC in this case) if it is given under a misconception of fact. A misrepresentation as regards the intention of the person seeking consent i.e. the accused, could give rise to the misconception of fact. The consent given pursuant to a false representation that the accused intends to marry, could be regarded as consent given under misconception of fact. But a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to “misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90 IPC.”
7. 7. The prosecutrix lodged the report after four years of the first instance of alleged rape. From the statement of prosecutrix P.W.1 and eye witness P.W.5, it appears that on the same day, when accused committed rape on prosecutrix first time, this fact was brought into the notice of mother of prosecutrix, but no report of this incident had been lodged to police. Prosecutrix (P.W.1) in her statement admits that she had relations with the accused/respondent for the last four years, because the accused had made a promise to marry her. The parents of the prosecutrix P.W.6 (mother) and P.W.11 (father) also admitted this fact and stated that they knew that the prosecutrix and accused had sexual relations. Prosecutrix (P.W.1) in cross-examination para 14 has admitted that her relationship with the accused was known to everybody in the village and when village community objected to it and outcasted her, she had started living with the accused.
8. 8. Thus, from the statement of the prosecutrix and her parents it is found that the prosecutrix and accused were in love and having relationship for the last four years. During this period the prosecutrix had physical relations with the accused. She lived with the accused in his house openly for long time.
9. 9. Prosecutrix and accused are residents of same village. Accused was living with his wife and children in his house. Prosecutrix in cross-examination para 14 admitted that she had visited the house of accused and met his mother and wife also. The statement of prosecutrix that the accused had introduced his wife to her as maid servant, does not inspire confidence. It is not possible that in the same village, where prosecutrix and accused are living since birth, prosecutrix could not get information of the fact that the accused was a married person having children. During four years of relationship, it is not stated by the prosecution witnesses when prosecutrix or her parents asked the accused or his parents for marriage of prosecutrix with the accused. There is not even a whisper that they approached the respondent or his family members for marrying the prosecutrix. If prosecutrix was having relationship with the accused on promise of marriage, then it would be natural for her to make demand of performance of marriage within reasonable time. For four years not making any demand for marriage is not natural. Thus the conduct of the prosecutrix creates doubt on her evidence.
10. 10. The finding of the trial Court in the present case is correct that the prosecutrix was aware that the respondent was already married person.It is not proved that accused had concealed the fact of his marriage from prosecutrix. The prosecutrix made sexual relations with the respondent/accused knowingly that he was a married person. It is not believable that the accused gave a false promise to marry her and persuaded her to make sexual relationship with him. It is also not proved that consent of prosecutrix has been obtained by misrepresentation and misconception of facts. Prosecutrix is a major woman, competent to give consent as per her will. For the offence of rape, it is necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was committed against her will or without her consent.
11. 11. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly held the respondent not guilty of the alleged offence of rape. Thus there is no substance in this appeal.
12. 12. Consequently, the prayer for leave to appeal is dismissed.

(S.K.GANGELE) (ANURAG SHRIVASTAVA)

JUDGE JUDGE

28-year-old acquitted of false rape charges 18 months later… #FakeRape #YouthLost #Defamation

‘Mom forced me to frame papa on rape charge’ – Times of India

Mom forced me to frame papa on rape charge’

NEW DELHI: Fact can, indeed, turn out to be stranger than fiction. Check out this real-life story.

A man was sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment by a lower court for raping his daughter. The high court found holes in the prosecution story and acquitted him.

The case moved to the Supreme Court and the apex court said such a crime couldn’t go unpunished, awarding the accused a life term.

And now the daughter, on whose complaint the father is in prison, has confessed in a sworn affidavit that her dad was innocent.

She said she had framed him at the instance of her mother whose relationship with her father was strained. This bizarre casesenior lawyers say they’ve not heard of a more weird twist to a casehas raised several questions.

What happens to the punishment given by the SC now that its very basis has been dissolved? Will the daughter and the mother now be punished for misleading the court and tormenting the man?

How common is abuse of the law in shocking cases like rape and dowry? How rigorous is police investigation into such complaints? The story is that of Asha Ram, about whose alleged crime an anguished Supreme Court had expressed outrage, saying he had destroyed “one of the most sacred relations”.

Only last week it had awarded him a life term, setting aside a Himachal Pradesh high court judgment which had disbelieved the prosecution story and had acquitted him.

Wife may get away lightly

In the West, perjury, that is, lying on oath before a court, is considered a serious crime. Millionaire author Jeffrey Archer was punished with a jail term of one year and a fine of 1,75,000 pounds in the UK.

But it is doubtful if Asha Ram’s wife, accused by her own daughter in an affidavit of forcing her to level rape charges against her father, will face as stiff a penalty as Archer, because in India the punishment is not severe.
— Read on m.timesofindia.com/india/Mom-forced-me-to-frame-papa-on-rape-charge/amp_articleshow/1307752.cms

Father forces daughter to file rape on Lover – husband and his sister !!

A great father who did NOT like his future daughter in law is said to have forced / coerced his daughter to file a false rape case on her own lover husband as the father did NOT approve of their Arya Samaj marriage. Not only did they file a rape case on the poor fella, they also added abetment on his sister !!. Now both accused are acquitted by the courts ! of course there is NO punishment for the father or the false rape case filing girl !!