Tag Archives: P&H HC

498a Dowry case on 11 year old brother Inlaw, married sis Inlaw, 74 year father Inlaw sheer abuse of law. Quashed. P&H HC

Fake case filing wife ropes in 3 in laws without any proper evidence or case against them. The court finds the case a sheer ABUSE of the process of law. Especially the court notes the following ” … Petitioner No.1 is the sister-in-law of the complainant, who got married on 04.02.1989 and has been residing in her matrimonial home since then and therefore, there is not even a remotest possibility that husband of the complainant was used to give beatings to her at the instance of petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2 was born on 12.07.1979 and was 11 years of age in March, 1990 when the complainant alleged that she was given beatings by her husband at the instance of petitioner No.2. Moreover, he had left for Canada in March, 1996 and is residing there since then. Similarly, petitioner No.3 aged 74 years had left for Canada in 1996 and is residing there since then with petitioner No.2. In such an eventuality, it is hard to believe that petitioners had harassed the complainant as alleged in the complaint.It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498- A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the relatives of the husband roped in under this provision, no matter they are bed ridden grand parents of the husband or the relatives living abroad for decades. The case in hand is also of similar nature..”

The sad saga borne out of Honorable COURT’s decree is given below

Punjab and Haryana High Court Dismisses Bail Plea of Man Accused ...

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M No.13517 of 2018

Date of Decision:15.05.2020

Amarjit Kaur and others ….Petitioners

versus

Jaswinder Kaur and another ….Respondents
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR
Present:
Mr. Bhrigu Dutt Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Ish Puneet Singh, Advocate for respondent No.1.
Mr. Davinder Bir Singh, DAG, Punjab.


JAISHREE THAKUR. J

  1. This is a petition that has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash Criminal Complaint No.31861/13 dated 06.09.2012 and the summoning order dated 06.12.2016 whereby petitioners herein have been summoned to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506, 120-B IPC and order dated 04.08.2017 declaring the petitioners as proclaimed offenders. Petitioners herein are the father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the respondent No.1 Jaswinder Kaur (hereinafter referred to as the complainant).
  2. In brief, the facts are that the abovesaid criminal complaint had been made by the complainant, who got married with Jaswant Singh on 05.08.1989. Jaswant Singh is none other than the real brother of petitioners No.1 and 2 and son of petitioner No.3. In the complaint it was averred that marriage was solemnized lavishly and a sum of `4 lakhs was spent thereon, apart from giving dowry articles, gold ornaments and other luxurious items. The complaint was made against the husband Jaswant Singh, Amarjit Kaur alleged to be second wife of Jaswant Singh, father-in-law Dilbagh Singh, mother-in-law Charan Kaur, brother-in-law Ranjit Singh and the sister-in-law Amarjit Kaur.
  3. It was further alleged that soon after the marriage, the accused persons named in the complaint started harassing the complainant on account of not bringing enough dowry and they raised a demand of Maruti 800 car along with an amount of `50,000/-. Though the complainant persuaded the accused persons with regard to inability of her parents to fulfill their demands, in the month of March, 1990, husband of the complainant at the instance of other accused gave her beatings and stated that she would have no place in the house if the demands are not fulfilled. Accused No.4 in the complaint i.e. mother-in-law of the complainant also raised a demand of gold ornament.
  4. On 24.07.1993, the complainant gave birth to a girl child namely Manjinder Kaur at Nawanshahar and entire expenses of the delivery were borne by parents of the complainant. It was alleged that after the birth of girl child, the mother-in-law raised a demand of `5 lakhs. The husband and petitioners herein along with mother-in-law taunted the complainant for not giving birth to a male child. In the year 2002, the complainant was turned out of the matrimonial home and at that point of time, her mother-in-law took all gold ornaments and other articles belonged to the complainant. It was further alleged that on 24.01.2008, husband of the complainant at the instance of his family members turned her out of matrimonial home and on 23.02.2008 also left the daughter with the complainant at Jalandhar and threatened her of dire consequences if she made a complaint against him. In this regard, the complainant made a complaint to SSP, Nawanshahr on 15.04.2008 but no action had been taken. In the month of September, 2009, severe blows were given in her stomach by accused No.1 i.e. the husband. She came to know that her husband solemnized a second marriage with one Amarjit Kaur (who was made accused No.2 in the complaint) without taking any divorce from her. She filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and also an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. A complaint was also made by her to the Commissioner of Police on 5.76.2012 but no action had been taken.
  5. In support of her complaint, complainant stepped into witness box as CW1 and examined one Balkiat Singh as CW-2 and Piar Kaur as CW3, who reiterated the version of the complaint. She placed on record photographs of her husband with second wife as Ex.C3 to C5 and copies of petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act against her and against his second wife as Ex.C6 and C7 respectively. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jalandhar on appreciation of material placed before it, vide order dated 25.03.2013 summoned the husband to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 and 494 IPC and the mother-in-law under Sections 406, 498-A and 506 IPC whereas the other accused persons were discharged including the petitioners herein.
  6. The aforementioned order was challenged by the complainant in revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar who vide order dated 02.02.2015 while noting the fact that there are specific allegations against accused No.3, 5 and 6 i.e. petitioners herein set aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jalandhar and directed to pass appropriate summoning order after re-considering the evidence placed before him.
  7. Since the revisional court set aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, the complainant filed a petition before this Court to the extent that since the husband and mother-in-law did not challenge their summoning order, the revisional court gravely erred in setting aside the order in toto. This Court vide order dated 21.08.2015 clarified that the summoning order passed by the trial Court against husband Jaswant Singh and mother-in-law Charan Kaur will not be deemed to have been set aside.
  8. The trial Court on reconsideration of the evidence before it passed order dated 06.12.2016 whereby accused Nos.3, 5 and 6 i.e. petitioners herein have also been ordered to be summoned to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506 and 120-B IPC.
  9. Pursuant to the summoning order, notice were issued to the petitioners and since they did not put in appearance despite publication, they were declared as proclaimed offenders vide order dated 04.08.2017.
  10. Mr. Bhrigu Dutt Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would submit that there is no specific allegation levelled against the petitioners in the complaint and therefore, the Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 25.03.2013 after appreciating the material placed before it gave a finding that no offence is made out against the petitioners herein and only summoned the husband and mother-in-law of the complainant to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 IPC. Even in the revision petition filed by the complainant against the aforementioned order, the revisional court failed to consider the fact that a right had been accrued in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 25.03.2013 passed by the Judicial Magistrate and therefore, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioners before setting aside the said order and gravely erred in remanding the matter back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the evidence. On remand, the trial Court failed to take into consideration that there is no specific allegation levelled against the petitioners in the complaint and in the absence of any specific allegation, a complaint is liable to be dismissed.
  11. He further contended that in pursuance to the summoning order dated 06.12.2016, summons issued to the petitioners were never served as the address of the petitioners given in the complaint by the complainant was incorrect as they were not residing at the said address at the relevant point of time. In support of his contention, he relied upon zimni orders dated 22.12.2016, 03.01.2017, 20.01.2017, 08.02.2017, 28.02.2017, 09.03.2017, 01.04.2017 and 24.04.2017 annexed with the petition as Annexure P-7 (colly). On the application moved by the complainant for effecting service upon the petitioners by way of substituted service, the trial Court vide order dated 24.04.2017 ordered the petitioners to be summoned by way publication. The proclamation published in the newspaper would show that petitioners No.2 and 3 were shown to be residents of Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar whereas they were actually residing in Canada since 1996 and the said fact was very well in the knowledge of the complainant. Moreover, petitioner No.1 was residing in her matrimonial home at Roper and therefore, was not aware of the pendency of the proceedings. The proclamation was published on 16.07.2017 and petitioners were required to be appeared before the trial Court on 17.07.2017 i.e. the very next day after the publication made in the newspaper. Even order dated 04.08.2017 declaring the petitioners as proclaimed persons has been passed before the expiry of 30 days of the publication of proclamation on 16.07.2017, which is in violation of the provisions of Section 82 (1) and 82 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
  12. Per contra, Mr. Ish Puneet Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-respondent No.1 supported the orders under challenge whereby petitioners have been ordered to be summoned to face trial and declared as proclaimed persons, while contending that the same have been passed on appreciation of material placed before the trial Court. The husband and the mother-in-law did not challenge the order whereby the husband had been ordered to face trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 506, 494 IPC and the mother-in-law under Sections 406, 498-A and 506 IPC. There are specific allegations levelled against the petitioners in para Nos.3, 5 and 6 of the complainant and therefore, they have rightly been summoned to face trial on the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court.
  13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book.
  14. It is the conceded position on record that in the first round of appreciation of evidence, the trial Court vide order dated 25.03.2013 gave a finding that no offence as levelled in the complaint is made out against the petitioners herein and summoned only husband and the mother-in-law to face trial. The complainant challenged the said order in revision petition and the revisional court remanded the matter to the trial court to pass a fresh order qua petitioners after re-appreciation of evidence. On re-appreciation of evidence, the trial court vide order dated 06.12.2016 summoned the petitioners to face trial under Sections 498-A, 506 and 120-B IPC and in pursuance to summoning order when the petitioners had failed to appear before it, the trial Court vide order dated 04.08.2017 declared them as proclaimed persons.
  15. It would be in the interest of justice to see at the first instance whether any offence is made out against the petitioners as per allegations levelled against them in the complaint or not? Because if the complaint fails, as a necessary corollary, all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom would automatically go. The allegations levelled against the petitioners in paras No.3, 5 and 6 of the complaint are reproduced as under:-
    “3.That on showing the incapability to arrange for Maruti 800 car and more dowry articles, in the month of March 1990, the accused No.1 at the instance of respondents No.3 to 6 started giving merciless beatings to the complainant…….
  16. That it is also not out of place to mention here that the accused No.1, 3 to 6 used to taunt the complainant for not giving birth to a male child……..
  17. That on 24.1.2008 the accused No.1 at the instance of accused No.3 to 6 started beating the complainant and further turned out the complainant from her matrimonial house in bare three clothes………All the dowry articles and shtridhan belonging to the complainant is in custody of accused No.1, 3 to 6 and are using the same for their personal gain since then the complainant is living at the mercy of her brothers and widow mother.”
  18. A perusal of the aforementioned would reveal that there are no direct and specific allegations against the petitioners that they had given beatings to the complainant or demanded any dowry article or misappropriated the shrtidhan. The expression used is ‘at the instance of accused No.1’. The complainant has failed to bring on record any evidence to show that she had been physically abused by the petitioners or entrustment of any dowry article.
  19. Petitioner No.1 is the sister-in-law of the complainant, who got married on 04.02.1989 and has been residing in her matrimonial home since then and therefore, there is not even a remotest possibility that husband of the complainant was used to give beatings to her at the instance of petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2 was born on 12.07.1979 and was 11 years of age in March, 1990 when the complainant alleged that she was given beatings by her husband at the instance of petitioner No.2. Moreover, he had left for Canada in March, 1996 and is residing there since then. Similarly, petitioner No.3 aged 74 years had left for Canada in 1996 and is residing there since then with petitioner No.2. In such an eventuality, it is hard to believe that petitioners had harassed the complainant as alleged in the complaint.
  20. It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498- A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the relatives of the husband roped in under this provision, no matter they are bed ridden grand parents of the husband or the relatives living abroad for decades. The case in hand is also of similar nature. The complainant has failed to make out a prima facie case against the petitioners regarding allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant or demanding dowry from her. The complaint does not disclose specific allegation against the petitioners except casual reference of their names that husband of the complainant gave her beatings at the instance of petitioners. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 quashed the FIR registered against the unmarried sister of the husband on the ground that prima facie case was not attracted against her in the absence of specific allegations.
  21. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the case in hand is a sheer abuse of process of law and therefore, is a fit case to exercise the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the complaint No.31861/13 dated 06.12.2016 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the orders dated 06.12.2016 and 04.08.2017 qua petitioners are quashed.
  22. The petition is allowed accordingly.
    (JAISHREE THAKUR)

JUDGE

May 15, 2020

Pankaj*

Whether reasoned/speaking Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

10 CRORES for AB ! Not judicial discretion ! Onerous condition of 10 crores set aside by Supreme court !!

Image result for supreme court of india images

Supreme Court of India

Avinash Arora And Ors. vs State Of U.T. Chandigarh And Anr. on 13 April, 2000

Equivalent citations: 2000 CriLJ 4674, JT 2000 (7) SC 501

Bench: G Pattanaik, U Banerjee

JUDGMENT

  1. Leave granted.
  2. The appellants have been alleged to have committed offence under Sections 420, 406, 468, 467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. On an application being filed under Section 438 of the CrPC, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana granted anticipatory bail, subject to deposit Rs. 10 crores. The appellants did avail of the order by issuing a cheque of Rs. 10 crores from the IFCI ‘No Lien Account’. The earlier order was, however, modified requiring the appellants to deposit Rs. 10 crores from his own account. It is this order which is now being assailed before us. Mr. Jain, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contends that requiring to deposit Rs. 10 crores itself is an unjust order and cannot be held to be proper exercise of discretion by the Court for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438. Ms. Jaiswal, the learned Counsel for the State as well as the learned Counsel appearing for IFCI contend that the Court ought not to have exercised his discretion under Section 438, in view of the nature of accusation. But the Court having done so by requiring the appellants to deposit Rs. 10 crores, the same need not be interfered with. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the Court committed error in passing the conditional order of depositing Rs. 10 crores for grant of anticipatory bail as in our view, this cannot be held to be an exercise of judicial discretion. In that view of the matter, we set aside the impugned direction and remit the matter to the High Court for re-disposal of the petition filed under Section 438 of the CrPC, in accordance with law.
  3. The appeals are disposed of.

Criminal courts cannot mandate surrender of Passport as condition for Bail, Punjab & Haryana HC

 
///But the criminal courts have to take extreme care in imposing such condition. It cannot mechanically, and in every case where an accused has a passport impose a condition for its surrender. Law presumes an accused to be innocent till he is declared guilty. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to all the fundamental rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution. At the same time, interest of the society has also to be protected. The court has to strike a balance between personal liberty of the accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, investigation, rights of the police and the interest of the society. The criminal court has to consider possibility of the accused if released on bail, fleeing justice and thereby thwarting the course of justice which affects the majesty of the law, as also the individual rights of the accused. ///
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Criminal Misc. No. M-42638 of 2018 Date of decision: 09.10.2018 Capt. Anila Bhatia..Petitioner Versus State of Haryana..Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY Present: Mr. R.S. Rai, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Rubina Vermani, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Manish Dadwal, AAG, Haryana for the respondent -State. Mr. Ashit Malik, Advocate for the complainant. *** Daya Chaudhary, J. The petitioner is aggrieved by one condition (d) of the order of bail to the effect that she shall surrender/deposit her passport, if any, with the Police/Court and shall not leave India without prior permission of the trial Court imposed by the Additional Sessions Judg e, Gurugram vide order dated 14.09.2018 while granting anticipatory bail i n case FIR No.614 dated 23.08.2017 registered under Sections 192, 403, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC at Police Station DLF, Sector 29, Gurugram. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits t hat the petitioner is Senior Captain with Air India Airlines and is performing her duties as Pilot. She does not know in advance as to on which flight and to which country, she will have to fly. A self attested copy of flight detail of the petitioner has been annexed as Annexure P-3 wit h the petition to show that sometimes the petitioner has flown from Delhi to Dubail; Delhi to Riyadh; Mumbai to Bangkok and so on. Practicably, it is difficult for the petitioner to approach on each and every day to the trial Court to seek prior permission in a short span of time as the petitione r is given a break of only 2-3 days before flying abroad. Learned counsel further submits that the intervening period of stay in India after returning back and to fly again to a destination is very short and it is very difficult and inconvenient in compliance of the condition mentioned in the bailo rder. Learned counsel also submits that the there is no chance of absconding from the trial and she undertakes to abide by all terms and conditions imposed by the trial Court in the bail order or any condition to be imposed by this Court. It is also the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the challan has not been presented so far and trial may take long time to conclude. A prayer has been made by the petitioner for grant of permanent permission to travel abroad in discharge of her official duties by relaxing impugned condition (d) in the bail order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram on 14.09.2018 by considering the nature of official duties and profession. Learned State counsel has raised a preliminary objection that the present petition is not maintainable as in case the petitioner is aggrieved in any manner, firstly she should have approached the lower Court for modification of the condition. Learned State counsel also submits that no blanket permission can be given as the petitioner is involved in a serious offence and there is no emergency and extraordinary reasons for approaching this Court straightway without availing the appropriate remedy available to her before the lower Court. Heard arguments of learned senior counsel for the p etitioner as well as learned State counsel and have also perused impugned order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, whereby, the petitioner has been released on anticipatory bail with certain conditions. Admittedly, the petitioner is working as Senior Captain in Air India Airlines and facing trial in the FIR as mentioned above, which was registered on the complaint filed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram issued a direction to lodge FIR as it was found to be cognizable offence of misappropriation and cheating against the petitioner being Vice President. The anticipatory bail application filed by the petitioner was allowed with certain conditions, which are as under: –

“(a) that, the applicants-accused shall join the investigation as and when required by the investigating officer and shall attend the same in accordance with the conditions of the bond;

(b) that, the applicants-accused shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which they are accused or suspected of the commission of which they are suspected;

(c) that, the applicants-accused shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer or tamper with evidence; and

(d) that, the applicants-accused shall surrender/deposit their passport, if any, with the police/court and shall not leave India without prior permission of the trial Court.”

The petitioner is aggrieved by impugned condition (d), whereby, she has been directed to surrender/deposit her passport and not to leave India without the prior permission of the tri al Court. Section 437 of the Code deals with power of the Court to grant bail in non-bailable offences. Under Section 437(3) of the Code, while releasing a person accused, the Court shall impose certain conditions, which are as under: –

“(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this chapter,

(b) That such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and

(c) that such person shall not directly or indirect ly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence. and may also impose, in the interest of justice, su ch other conditions as it considers necessary.”

Even in the case of non bailable offences other than falling under sub sec.(3) of Section 437, the court or Magistrate may in its/his discretion impose conditions while granting bail to the person accused or suspected of commission of such offence.” Sub sec.(3) of Section 437 of the Code requires the Magistrate or Court to impose conditions while granting bail to the petitioner. While granting bail, the Court has to ensure that the accused or person suspected of commission of the offence is available for investigation, enquiry and trial. To ensure that, the Court may impose certain conditions on such person while releasing him/her on bail. In non bailable offences falling outside the scope of sub sec.(3) of Sec. 437 of the Code, the power to impose condition is discretionary. When a person is made to surrender his passport, it curtails his right of movement beyond the country. Article 21 of the Constitution of India says : “ No person shall be deprived of his life or person al liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The expression “personal liberty” is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of a person. The Supreme Court, in Satwant Singh v. Asst. Passport Officer [(1967) 3 SCR 525] held that “personal liberty” guaranteed under Artic le 21 Crl. M.C. No.1734 of 2011 encompassed a right of locomotion, of the right to travel abroad. Every person living in India has a fundamental right to travel, even outside India. Refusal by the Government to issue a passport without a valid law prescribing reasonable restrict ions was held to be an arbitrary exercise of the executive power infringing the equality clause of the Constitution. After the decision in Satwant Singh’s case the Parliament passed the Passport Act, 1967 regulating conditions for the grant and refusal of passport and providing grounds for impounding passport. Even after passing of the said Act, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] the Supreme Court held that the right to travel abroad is not only encompassed in the right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, but that right could only be denied if the procedural law which governed its excuse is fair. The preamble to the Act says that it is, “to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents, to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and other persons and for matters incidental ancillary thereto.” Section 10(3 ) of the Act empowers the passport authority to “impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel document” in the circumstances stated therein. Thus, power to impound a passport is given to the passport authority under the Act. The Supreme Court in Suresh Nanda’s case (supra) was not considering the power of criminal court to direct a person accused or suspected of commission of a non cognizable offence while he is released on bail to surrender his passport in court to ensure his presence at the investigation, enquiry or trial of the case. Instead, the Supreme Court was only considering the scope and ambit of Section 104 of the Code which said; “ Any court may, it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it” under the code. The power under Section 104 of the Code could be exercised only with respect to a document produced before the court and not, regarding a document not produced before it. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, the word “impound” is given the meaning, “to place in the custody of the law”. Per Oxford Dictionary the word means “to take legal or formal possession of”. In Suresh Nanda’s case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the distinction between “seizing” and “impounding” and held that impounding is of the document which is seized. It was held that after enactment of the Act which is a special Act, a passport seized (by the CBI in that case) could be impounded only under Sec.10(3) of the Act and that so far as Sec. 104 of the Code is concerned to the extent it related to documents coming under Sec. 10 (3) of the Act, the maxim, ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’ applied. In that case the officials of th e CBI conducted a search and seized the passport of appellant. That document was retained by the CBI. Appellant moved the court of Special Judge to release the passport. The Special Judge allowed the application. That order was set aside by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court on the principle above stated. Suresh Nanda was not a case of the criminal court imposing a condition while granting bail in a non bailable offence to surrender the passport. The Supreme Court was not considering the power of criminal court in view of Sec. 10(3) of the Act, to impose a condition to surrender the passport while granting bail in a non bailable offence. Instead, that question was left o pen as is clear from the observation in paragraph 20 (o f Suresh Nanda’s case) that : “We, however, make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merit of the case and are not deciding whether the passport can be impounded as condition for the grant of bail.” The Chhattisgarh High Court in Pushpal Swarnkar v. State of Chhattisgarh 2009(1) KLD 825 (Chh.) only made reference to the observations in paragraph 15 of the decision in Suresh Nanda regarding the power of criminal court to impound the passport under Sec. 104 of the Code which observation, I stated above is made in an entirely different context. Pushpal Swarnkar’s case did not consider, in view of the observation in paragraph 20 of Suresh Nanda quoted above whether the criminal court can, while releasing a person accused or suspected of commission of a non bailable offence to impose a condition to surrender the passport. The decision in Jose Peter v. Vijayakumar 2009(3) KLT 96 also cannot help petitioner in his contention. There, the question considered and decided was only whether a civil court, in execution of a decree could, invoking Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure impound passport of a judgment debtor on the ground that he is likely to leave the country. The question was answered in the negative. Even after enactment of the Act, in view of Article 21 of the Constitution as explained in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) the right to travel abroad is encompassed in the right to personal liberty which cannot be deprived except in accordance with the procedure established by the law. The right to travel abroad can be deprived by following procedure established by the law. Sec. 437(3) of the Code requires and enables the criminal court while releasing a person accused or suspected of commission of a non bailable offence by imposing a condition that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under chapter XXXIII of the Code. Even in the matter of non bailable offences not falling within sub sec.(3) of Sec. 437 of the Code, the Magistrate or court has the discretionary power to impose condition while granting bail. The person to whom bail is granted has to execute a bond in Form No.45 given in the second schedule of the Code. The relevant provision of the bond in Form No.45 states. ”…… and required to give security for any attendance before such officer or court on condition that I shall attend such officer or court on every day on which any investigation or trial is held with regard to such charge, and in case of my making default therein……” The function of the criminal court under Sec. 437 of the Code is not merely to impose a condition in the bond that the person accused or suspected of commission of a non bailable offence and to whom bail is granted attended before the officer or court. The court has to ensure that the condition is complied. The court has to enforce it. The court has to ensure that the accused who is released on bail and who has a passport does not flee from justice. The “majesty of the law is affected when a wrong doer escapes its mighty clutches-whether arising out of a voluntary or involuntary situation.” The court has to preserve the majesty of the law. That could be done, in the case of a person holding a valid passport by directing him to surrender the same in court. That the passport authority may, if proceeding in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India impound or cause to be impounded or revoked such document under Sec.10( 3)(e) of the Act does not deprive the power and duty of the criminal court to enforce its order by appropriate direction. The Supreme Court in Hazarilal Gupta v.Rameswar Prasad and another [AIR 1972 SC 484] has held that sections 496, 497 and 498 of the (old) Code are not exhaustive of powers of the court in regard to terms and conditions of bail particularly when the High Court dealt with cases of that type, it was within the power of court to direct surrender of passport and that if the appellant (in that case) wanted to retain the passport the court might not have granted him bail. Viewed in that line, I am to hold that it is within the power of the criminal court while releasing a person accused or suspected of commission of a non bailable offence on bail under Sec. 437 of the Code to impose a condition that such person shall surrender his passport in court. The power granted by the Code under Sec. 437 of the Code to impose conditions including restriction on movement while granting bail in non bailable offence can be taken as procedure established by law as stated in Article 21 of the Constitution. In that view, with great respect I disagree with the view expressed in Pushpal Swarnkar’s case. But the criminal courts have to take extreme care in imposing such condition. It cannot mechanically, and in every case where an accused has a passport impose a condition for its surrender. Law presumes an accused to be innocent till he is declared guilty. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to all the fundamental rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution. At the same time, interest of the society has also to be protected. The court has to strike a balance between personal liberty of the accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, investigation, rights of the police and the interest of the society. The criminal court has to consider possibility of the accused if released on bail, fleeing justice and thereby thwarting the course of justice which affects the majesty of the law, as also the individual rights of the accused. The court has to consider antecedents of the person accused or suspected of commission of the offence, nature of the offence he is said to have committed, necessity for his presence for investigation, duration of investigation and such other relevant factors. The court has to decide whether notwithstanding the personal liberty of the accused, interest of justice required that his right of movement should be restricted during the pendency of the case by directing him to surrender his passport. If necessary, it is open to the criminal court direct the accused to execute bond in case he has to go abroad for any purpose, for appropriate amount with sureties undertaking to appear before the Investigating Officer or court as the case may be as and when required to do so. These are though not exhaustive, some of the matters to be borne in mind by the court while deciding whether there should be a condition to surrender the passport or when there is a request to release the passport already surrendered in court. Section 10(3)(e) of the Passport Act specifically deals with impounding of passport whereas Section 104 Cr.P.C., allows the Court to impound the document to produce before the Court. The Passport Act overrides the provision of Cr.P.C., for the purpose of impounding passport. In the present case in hand, the order directing to surrender the passport indefinitely amounts to impounding of the passport itself. In the present case, while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner, a condition has been imposed to surrender his passport before the trial Court. The petitioner is working a Pilot in Air India Airlines and her nature of duties are such that she is to fly aeroplane and as per duty roster assigned to her, she is to fly abroad on certain occasions where she is not aware about the next program as only a short notice is there during which it is very difficult for the petitioner to take prior permission and to have the the passport in case, the same is deposited. No doubt, as per Section 102(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, the power of police officer is there to seize certa in property. The police may have the power to seize a passport under Section 10 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code but it does not have the power to impound the same. Impounding of a passport can only be done by the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967. There is a difference between seizing of a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his/her possession. Thus, seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, the said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts to impounding of the property or document. In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanath a Aiyar (2 nd Edition), the word “impound” has been defined to mean “to take possession of a document or thing for being held in custody in accordance with law”. Thus, the word “impounding” really means retention of possession of a good or a document which has been seized. Hence, while the police may have power to seize a passport under Section 102 Criminal Procedure Code if it is permissible within the authority given under Section 102 of Criminal Proce dure Code, it does not have power to retain or impound the same, because that can only be done by the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. Hence, if the police seizes a passport (which it has power to do under Section 102 Criminal Procedure Code), thereafter the police must send it along with a letter to the passport authority clearly stating that the seized passport deserves to be impounded for one of the reasons mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. It is thereafter the passport authority to decide whether to impound the passport or not. Since impounding of a passport has civil consequences, the passport authority must give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before impounding his passport. It is well settled that (without?) any opportunity of hearing to a party vide State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269, The trial Court cannot impound a passport. No doubt, Section 104 Criminal Procedure Code states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it but this provision will only enable the Court to impound any document or thing other than a passport as impounding a “passport” is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. It is a settled law that the special law prevails over the general law. The Passports Act is a special law while the Criminal Procedure Code is a general law. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Criminal Procedure Code though it can impound any other document or thing. For the reasons recorded here-in-above and law discussed, the present petition is allowed and impugned condition (d) of order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram is set aside. However, the petitioner is at liberty to move a specific application for release of his passport within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. In case, such an application is moved, the trial Court is directed to consider the application and return the passport forthwith without any delay. It is also directed that the petitioner shall furnish an undertaking in writing before the trial Court in case, long stay is there other than the normal course of her duties prior permission would be taken from the trial Court. 09.10.2018 (DAYA CHAUDHARY) JUDGE

Criminal courts cannot mandate surrender of Passport as condition for Bail, Punjab & Haryana HC

Wife’s second 498a fails as courts dismiss her case !! Australian Husband and Indian #498a !

2nd dowry complaint filed after 1st compromised &acquitted. All courts incl HC dismiss 2nd complaint!

A woman files a 498a etc on her husband. Husband returns from Australia and at that trial she turns hostile (probably there is a compromise ) !! Then once again she files a second 498a on the same husband on same grounds. All courts dismisse the second case as the accused have already been tried and acquitted !! Wife goes on appeal upto P & H HC who also dismiss her application !!

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In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

Crl. Misc. No. M-11357 of 2016 (O&M)

Date of Decision: 08.7.2016

Davinder Kaur                                                                   ……Petitioner

Versus

Nishan Singh and others                                                    ….Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANITA CHAUDHRY

Present:        Mr. B.S.Jatana, Advocate for the petitioner.


ANITA CHAUDHRY, J(ORAL)

CRM-19880-2016

Heard.

Application is allowed and Annexures P-11 to P-15 are taken on record.

CRM-M-11357-2016

This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside the order dated 3.7.2014 passed by SDJM, Sardulgarh vide which the complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 498-A, 406, 34 IPC was dismissed. The order was maintained and the revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Aggrieved by both the orders, the complainant has filed this petition. She has also assailed the order dated 17.12.2015 vide which the application for additional evidence had been dismissed.

The backdrop of the case is necessary. The petitioner was married to respondent No. 1 on 3.4.2005. A child was born to them.

Disputes arose between the couple. Allegations were levelled that the husband and his family were greedy and were not satisfied with the dowry and started making demands. It was urged that on 18.9.2007 demand of ` 5,00,000/- was made on the pretext that Nishan Singh was to go to Australia. When the complainant expressed her inability she was beaten up and an attempt was made to set her ablaze by sprinkling kerosene oil. She immediately informed her father telephonically. FIR No. 129 dated 22.11.2009 was registered under Section 498-A, 406 IPC at P.S. Sardulgarh. During the pendency of the case Nishan Singh went to Australia. He returned to India in March 2009. Challan was presented and the trial commenced. The complainant did not support the prosecution story at the trial and turned hostile. The trial ended in acquittal.

Later a complaint on the same allegations was filed against Nishan Singh, his mother and Balwinder Singh. The allegations levelled in the FIR were reiterated. The trial Court recorded preliminary evidence and refused to summon the accused and dismissed the complaint on 3.7.2014. Aggrieved with the order a revision was filed. An application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. was also filed for placing some additional material namely copy of the petition, copy of the judgment in the petition filed under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act and the order passed in the complaint filed under the Domestic Violence Act.

Copy of the FIR No. 55 dated 1.4.2010 P.S. City Dhuri registered under Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC is available on record. The Revisional Court dismissed the application as well as the revision. The Revisional Court elaborately dealt with the evidence in para 8 of its judgment. It was also noted that there were no details as to the dowry articles that were given and no proof regarding purchase of the articles had been given and once the accused had faced the trial and were acquitted they could not be summoned to face the trial on similar grounds.

Counsel for the petitioner counsel refers to ‘Smt. Rashmi Kumar vesus Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1999(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 43’ and urges that after the compromise same demands and harassment started and therefore the complaint had to be filed and at the preliminary stage the Court was only to see whether prima facie case was made out for proceeding further and there was ample material before the Court and they should have acted on the evidence that was led before it.

The petitioner had placed on record the FIR that was registered in 2007 as well as the statements made by the complainant.

A perusal of the complaint shows that the complainant had made the same allegations in the FIR in 2007 and the accused were acquitted as the complainant failed to support her own version. Both the Courts below had noted that there was no details to support her contention that any dowry was given.

I find no infirmity in the findings recorded by the Courts below. Petition is dismissed.

(ANITA CHAUDHRY) JUDGE

July 08, 2016

Gurpreet

I CAN’T live with a low paid Inspector says wife. Husband gets divorce, wife gets 10K p.m. ! P&H HC

A wife leaves her husband and files false cases on him. She files complaints with his superiors etc. The Husband says that the wife deserted him because he was just an Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) Even the couple’s son who is taken away by the mother, joins the father and testifies in favor of the father. Wife makes various allegations against the husband but the court observes that there is NOT an iota of evidence supporting these allegations. So, the decree of divorce granted in favor of the husband by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, is confirmed by the Hon HC. However considering the salary of the husband and the cost of living, wife gets 10 K maintenance per month !!

This maintenance is in spite of the Hon court clearly stating the fact of desertion by the wife as follows “….Appellant-Kavita RW1 in her cross-examination has specifically deposed that she does not want to live with her husband. This statement coupled with the admitted fact that the appellant had left her matrimonial home on 31.7.2002, clearly proves the animus of desertion on her part…..”

The Husband argues that “…There is no justification for enhancement of the maintenance/alimony to 10,000/- per month. The appellant has to maintain himself, his aged mother and an unmarried son. He also has to provide financial support to his younger sister, who is a widow, along with her three minor children. ….” But the court refuses to accept that argument and dismisses his petition against enhancement of maintenance


FAO Nos. M-66 of 2008 (O&M) and M-361 of 2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH

FAO No. M- 66 of 2008 (O&M)
Date of Decision: Feb. 26,2016
Kavita ……………………………………… Appellant
Versus
Krishan Kumar ……………………….. Respondent

AND

FAO No. M-361 of 2013
Krishan Kumar ………………………….. Appellant
Versus
Kavita ……………………………………. Respondent

Coram:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIVE BHALLA
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE LISA GILL

Present: Mr. G.C.Shahpuri, Advocate
for the appellant (in FAO No. M-66 of 2008)
for the respondent (in FAO No. M-361 of 2013)

Mr. D.K.Singla, Advocate
for the respondent (in FAO No. M-66 of 2008)
for the appellant (in FAO No.M-361 of 2013)


LISA GILL, J.

This judgment shall dispose of FAO No.M-66 of 2008 (Kavita v. Krishan Kumar) and FAO No.M-361 of 2013 (Krishan Kumar v. Kavita), which arise out of a matrimonial dispute between the parties.

FAO No.M-66 of 2008 has been preferred by Kavita being aggrieved of the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby the petition filed by the respondent-husband Krishan Kumar under Section 13-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has been allowed thereby dissolving the marriage between the parties.

FAO No.M-361 of 2013 has been preferred by Krishan Kumar challenging the order dated 18.9.2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby maintenance under Section 25 of the Act has been enhanced from 3,000/- per month to 10,000/- per month.

The facts as revealed in the petition filed by Krishan Kumar under Section 13-A of the Act for dissolution of marriage are that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 13.9.1984 at Yamuna Nagar according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. Two children were born out of this wedlock. It was averred in the petition that his wife Kavita started taunting and harassing him some time after their marriage on account of his perceived poverty while asserting that she belongs to a rich family. She did not treat his old parents with due respect, refused to cook food and at times would serve half baked food or deliberately put extra chillies in it. It was further alleged that Kavita deserted the matrimonial home on 31.7.2002 without informing him or any other family member. She did not return home despite repeated requests and on the contrary made false allegations that Krishan was having extra marital relations. The appellant Kavita allegedly lodged false and frivolous complaints against Krishan Kumar. In this situation, a petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion was preferred by Krishan Kumar.

The appellant-wife, Kavita, while admitting the factum of marriage between the parties and birth of two sons denied all allegations of cruelty and desertion. It was asserted that the petition for divorce was filed by the husband as a counter-blast to an application filed by the appellant under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance, which was allowed. The husband was stated to be a haughty policeman who was cruel and indifferent towards her because of his illegitimate relations with other women. While denying that she left the matrimonial home on 31.7.2002 it is averred that it was the husband who deserted her as well as their two minor sons to fend for themselves without any rhyme or reason. Therefore, the husband should not be permitted to derive any benefit on account of his own wrong and the petition seeking divorce should be dismissed.

The following issues were framed by the trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties:-

1.Whether the petitioner is entitled to dissolution of marriage and decree of divorce on the ground that he has been treated with cruelty as alleged? OPP

2.Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground that he had been deserted by the respondent? OPR

3.Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present petition and is not maintainable in the present form? OPP

4.Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his own act and conduct? OPP

5.Relief.

Evidence was adduced by the parties. The respondent-husband deposed as PW1 and examined Deepak Kumar PW2, his son, and Brahm Pal, his brother, and produced documentary evidence. The appellant appeared as RW1 and adduced her evidence. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence on record directed dissolution of marriage between the parties on the ground of cruelty and desertion on the part of the wife.

Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has grossly erred while passing the impugned judgment and decree, especially keeping in view the fact that since the marriage of the parties in the year 1984 there was no trouble upto the year 2002. It is submitted that it is opposed to all probability that the couple would have continued living together without any evidence of discord during all these years and suddenly parted ways in the year 2002 on the ground of cruelty meted out by the appellant since the inception of their marriage. It is urged that the appellant was forced to leave her matrimonial home because of illicit relations developed by the respondent-husband with one Sarabjit Kaur. It is, thus, apparent that the appellant was forced to leave her matrimonial home on account of the acts of the respondent-husband. There is nothing on record to prove cruelty or desertion on the part of the appellant, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree should be set aside.

Per contra learned counsel for the respondent with reference to the evidence on record supports the impugned judgment and decree and prays for upholding the same. It is submitted that desertion on the part of the appellant is apparent on record. She has categorically stated that she does not want to live with her husband who is working as an Assistant Sub Inspector with the Haryana Police. The appellant had withdrawn from her husband’s society without any reasonable or sufficient cause. She had been giving frivolous and false complaints to the police authorities against the respondent. The appellant wife miserably failed to prove adulterous relations of the husband as alleged. therefore, cruelty and desertion is clearly proved on the appellant’s part. He, thus, prays for upholding the impugned judgment and decree.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings and evidence on record.

It is admitted that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 13.9.1984 and two children were born out of this wedlock. One of the sons of the parties i.e. Deepak Kumar PW2 is residing with the respondent-husband.

A perusal of the record reveals that leaving of the matrimonial home on 31.7.2002 is admitted by the appellant though it is sought to be explained on the ground that it is due to the conduct of the respondent, namely, his illicit relations with one Sarabjit Kaur, that the appellant was forced to leave the matrimonial home. The name, parentage or address of said Sarabjit Kaur was not mentioned in the written statement though her name is mentioned in the cross-examination of the appellant RW1. The appellant has failed to lead any evidence to prove illicit relations of the respondent with the said Sarabjit Kaur or any other woman. All allegations of illicit relations made by the respondent remained unsubstantiated.

PW2 Deepak Kumar, the elder son of the parties, has deposed in favour of his father. Prior to the year 2004 he was living with his mother and younger brother. He has denied allegations of ill-treatment or physical abuse of the appellant at the hands of his father. Deepak Kumar affirms that the parties had separated in the year 2002. He denied that his parents were having normal relations. Averment of the appellant that her elder son Deepak Kumar had left her and joined his father due to greed of a motor-bike or mobile or that he was involved in a theft case in which the respondent helped Deepak Kumar is not substantiated by any evidence on record. Deepak Kumar PW2 has specifically denied that he was involved in a theft case. There is no evidence to show his involvement in such a case.

It is categorically asserted by the respondent- husband that the appellant had left the matrimonial house along with his two sons on 31.7.2002 and they could be located after about a period of one and a half month thereto. The appellant had reported his wife and children to be missing as is apparent from Ex.P2. Various complaints were submitted by the appellant against him. Filing of such complaints is admitted by the appellant. The appellant has admitted that she filed various complaints against the respondent before his superior officers also. The allegations of demand of dowry by the respondent or his family members are not supported by an iota of evidence on record. The appellant’s own testimony to the effect that there was no one in her parental family, thus the demand for dowry raised by her husband and in-laws could not be fulfilled, falsifies her stand for the simple reason that the question of demand of dowry does not arise in such a situation. Furthermore, the appellant categorically states that she was never beaten by the respondent on account of non fulfillment of demand of dowry. The argument on behalf of the appellant that no effort was made by the husband to resettle her along with the children or that there was a reasonable and sufficient cause for withdrawing from the matrimonial home is not borne out from the record. Appellant-Kavita RW1 in her cross-examination has specifically deposed that she does not want to live with her husband. This statement coupled with the admitted fact that the appellant had left her matrimonial home on 31.7.2002, clearly proves the animus of desertion on her part. There is nothing on record to prove that she was turned out of her matrimonial home. The parties have been living separately since the year 2002. The appellant has failed to prove any reason or cause much less sufficient or a reasonable cause to have withdrawn from the company of the respondent husband. Thus, the respondent-husband is entitled to a decree of divorce and we find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment dated 17.12.2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula.

Krishan Kumar-appellant in FAO No.M-361 of 2013 is aggrieved by the enhancement of maintenance from 3,000/- to 10,000/- awarded to the respondent- wife vide order dated 18.9.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Panchkula. Maintenance at the rate of 3,000/- per month was awarded to Smt. Kavita under Section 25 of the Act vide order dated 15.4.2008 after marriage between the parties was dissolved on 17.12.2007. An application was moved by Kavita for enhancement of this amount to 15,000/- as Krishan Kumar’s salary had increased to 24,782/- per month from 13,668/- per month. Furthermore, expenses incurred by her had also increased. Learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, while taking into account the fact that the gross salary of the husband was 36,475/- per month as per the salary slip placed on record, awarded a sum of 10,000/- per month from the date of filing of the application.

Learned counsel for the appellant-Krishan Kumar submits that the maintenance pendente-lite under Section 24 of the Act was fixed at 4,000/- per month in FAO No. M-66 of 2008. There is no justification for enhancement of the maintenance/alimony to 10,000/- per month. The appellant has to maintain himself, his aged mother and an unmarried son. He also has to provide financial support to his younger sister, who is a widow, along with her three minor children. Such an enhancement could not have been made once permanent alimony and maintenance was fixed vide order dated 15.4.2008.

Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, on the other hand, submits that keeping in view the salary drawn by the appellant and the expenses which are incurred by the respondent-wife, the amount of 10,000/- is not a princely amount which calls for any reduction in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the file, we do not find any infirmity in the grant of 10,000/- per month to the respondent- wife under Section 25 of the Act. Section 25(2) of the Act specifically provides that, “If the Court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub- section (1), it may at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just.” Therefore, the argument in respect to maintainability of the petition is rejected being untenable. It is apparent that the husband was getting a salary of 13,668/- per month when maintenance at the rate of Rs.3000/- per month was fixed. Admittedly the gross salary of the husband was 36,475/- in August 2013 and cost of living has increased as well, thus the learned trial Court has committed no error in increasing the amount to be paid to the wife to 10,000/-. Learned counsel for the appellant-husband is unable to point out any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment and decree calling for a reduction in the amount awarded.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, both the FAO Nos. M-66 of 2008 (O&M) and M-361 of 2013 [ 13 ] appeals i.e. FAO No. M-66 of 2008 and FAO No. M-361 of 2013 are dismissed with no order as to costs.

( RAJIVE BHALLA ) ( LISA GILL )
JUDGE JUDGE

Feb. 26, 2016

rupi