Tag Archives: false DV

Brother, father inlaw asking to have relations! DV case 13 yrs after marriage & 3 yrs after husband’s death! P&H HC quash

Sad tale of how Domestic violence act is rampantly misused and seven people including 4 women are harassed to for one woman’s greed !!

A woman has filed a false domestic violence case on her mother-in-law, father- in-law, three married sisters-in-law and their husbands. This is 13 years after the marriage and 3 years after the death of the husband. Accused, married sisters-in-law along with their husbands were residing separately (complainant was living at Chandigarh while accused 1 to 6 were living in various districts of Haryana !!) . The complainant pleads that she had been denied a right in the property (which is a civil matter not connected to any violence). The Trial court takes the case and also issues notice to distant relatives asking them to appear

The relatives approach P & H HC and seek a quash

The Hon P & H HC notes and orders as follows “….9. In the present complaint, the complainant had implead the in-laws and the distant relatives. The trial Court had summoned all the respondents without even waiting for the report of the Protection Officer. The trial Court should have applied its mind and should have examined the contents of the complaint before issuing notice to the distant relatives who were residing separately. There was no averment in the complaint that they had at any point of time lived together. The complaint had been filed three years after the death of the husband of the complainant. No specific instance of domestic violence had been mentioned. As regards the share in the property there is a civil remedy and can not be gone into in these proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. There is also the bar of limitation in the present fact situation. I have no hesitation in holding that continuation of the proceedings under the Act against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of law. 10. Therefore, the petition is allowed and the aforementioned complaint as well as the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed….”


In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

Crl. Misc. No. M-24081 of 2015

Date of Decision: 23.05.2016

Rajbala and others ……Petitioners

Versus

Seema Gupta …..Respondent

CORAM : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANITA CHAUDHRY

Present: Mr. Anshul Mangla, Advocate for the petitioners.

Mr. Vivek Khatri, Advocate for the respondent.


ANITA CHAUDHRY, J(ORAL)

 

  1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal complaint bearing No. RBT-03-2 dated 6.6.2003 filed under Section 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Annexure P-1) and the order dated 6.6.2013 and all the consequent proceedings arising out of the same.
  2. The petitioners have been summoned in the complaint filed under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘Act’ for short). The petitioners are the relatives of the husband of the complainant. The husband of the complainant had died on 21.4.2010 in a road accident. The complaint was filed against the mother-in-law, father- in-law, three married sisters-in-law and their husbands. It has been filed 13 years after the marriage and three years after the death of the husband. The petitioners have pleaded that false allegations had been levelled and they had never claimed custody of the minor children and the married sisters-in-law along with their husbands were residing separately and the petition has been filed only to harass them. The complainant was seeking maintenance and a separate residence as well as damages and a restraint order against any domestic violence. The complainant as per her allegations had left the matrimonial home on 1.11.2012. It was pleaded that she had been denied a right in the property.
  3. The trial Magistrate issued notice to the respondents heard both the sides on the application claiming interim maintenance as well as interim order qua residence in the shared household. The trial Court recorded a finding that the respondent had failed to show that her husband had any right in the house, the property was in the name of the mother-in-law and relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in ‘S.R.Batra and another versus Smt. Taruna Batra 2007(1) DMC 1(SC)’ interim maintenance and relief of residence was denied. The case was thereafter fixed for the presence of the remaining respondents.
  4. I have heard the counsel for the parties and have perused the documents placed on record.
  5. Counsel for the petitioners have vehemently contended that the petitioners are the close relatives of the husband and were living separately and there was no single instance of domestic violence and the complaint had been filed three years after the death. It was urged that the trial Magistrate without even ascertaining the correctness of the allegations and without ascertaining whether all of them were living together, had issued notice. It was urged that no specific instance has been given in the complaint and vague allegations of taunts and beatings and wild allegations that the brothers-in-law and father-in-law pressurized her to maintain relations with them have been levelled. It was urged that the complainant and her husband were living in Chandigarh and petitioners No. 1 to 6 are living in different districts of Haryana, the sisters-in-law were living with her husbands in separate residence and the proceedings were only an abuse of the process of law. Reliance was placed upon Suo Motu versus Ushaben Kishorbhai Mistry 2016(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 421, Om Parkash Syngal and others versus Aditi Garg 2016(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 12, Chandrawati Devi and others versus State of Bihar and another 2014(4) ECrC 53, Inderjit Singh Grewal versus State of Punjab and another 2011(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1, Ashish Dixit and others versus State of U.P. and another 2013(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 340, Devanand Baliram Wankhade and others versus State of Maharashtra and others 2015 All MR (Crl.) 3618, Anoop and others versus Vani Shree 2015(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 989, Smt. Geeta and others versus State of U.P. and another 2014(5) R.C.R. (Criminal) 577 and Nandan Singh Manrai versus State and others 2011(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 271.
  6. The submission on the other hand was that the remedy was available and the petitioners could approach the Magistrate and when a specific remedy is provided, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not maintainable. It was also urged that the provisions of the Act provide for a remedy under the civil law and the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could not have been resorted to.
  7. A Division bench of the Gujrat High Court was faced with a similar objection. The Division Bench in ‘Suo Motu versus Ushaben Kishorbhai Mistry 2016(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 421’ examined the provisions of the Act and the judgments referred before it concluded as under:-
    • “27. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, the following conclusions:
    • (i) The provisions of the Act provide for remedial measures for civil rights of women but the machinery provided is through criminal court.
    • (ii) Initiation of proceedings under Section 12 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 of the Act would begin only when the Magistrate has passed any judicial order including of issuance of notice for hearing.
    • (iii) Any person affected by any proceedings under the Act, prior to initiation of proceedings under Section 12 of the Act may prefer Special Criminal Application under Article 226 of the Constitution if as per him, the proceedings are beyond the scope and ambit of the Act or without any authority in law. But this Court, while entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution may decline entertainment of the petition by way of self-imposed restriction in exercise of the judicial powers or may decline entertainment of the petition in exercise of its sound judicial discretion.
    • (iv) Once proceedings are initiated under Section 12 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 either independently or jointly on account of any judicial order passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of notice, such proceedings shall be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure coupled with the power of the Court under Section 28(2) to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under sub-section (2) of Section 23of the Act.
    • (v) Once the applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure has started on account of any judicial order passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of notice either under Section 12 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 of the Act independently or jointly, remedial measures to the aggrieved person as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be said as available. But the higher forum under the Code of Criminal Procedure, may be the Court of Session or the High Court, may decline entertainment of such proceedings considering the facts and circumstances of the case and as per the settled principles of law and in accordance with law.
    • (vi) The aforesaid remedial measures provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure would also include the powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, but the Court may, in a given case, decline entertainment of the petition when there is express remedy provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure or no case is made out to prevent the abuse of process of any Court, or no case is made out to secure the ends of justice.”
    • This Court in ‘Om Parkash Syngal and others versus Aditi Garg reported in 2016(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 12 had held that the violence committed by a person while living in the shared household can only constitute domestic violence and other acts of violence when one is living separate may be punishable under the different provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the other penal laws but cannot be covered under the Domestic Violence Act.
  8. In Chandrawati Devi’s case (supra), the complainant had never lived with the brother-in-law and the mother-in-law and had claimed a share in the property and money of the deceased husband. It was held that the matter could not be decided in a complaint filed under the Domestic Violence Act and the matter could be taken up in a partition suit and the proceedings were quashed. The issue of maintainability was also decided therein and it was held that the extra ordinary remedy and the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be invoked when it was to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to secure justice.
  9. In the present complaint, the complainant had implead the in-laws and the distant relatives. The trial Court had summoned all the respondents without even waiting for the report of the Protection Officer. The trial Court should have applied its mind and should have examined the contents of the complaint before issuing notice to the distant relatives who were residing separately. There was no averment in the complaint that they had at any point of time lived together. The complaint had been filed three years after the death of the husband of the complainant. No specific instance of domestic violence had been mentioned. As regards the share in the property there is a civil remedy and can not be gone into in these proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. There is also the bar of limitation in the present fact situation. I have no hesitation in holding that continuation of the proceedings under the Act against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of law.
  10. Therefore, the petition is allowed and the aforementioned complaint as well as the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed.

 

(ANITA CHAUDHRY)

JUDGE

May 23, 2016

Gurpreet

42yr old wife files DV on 52yr husbnd 8yrs later! Huge maint.& residnce sought ! Kar HC DV quash

A 42 year old wife files DV on a 52 year old husband approx 8 years after separtion. Pertinent to note that she ALREADY has won a maintenance of Rs 1000, p.m. which she wishes to enhance to Rs. 10,000 p.m. !! now. She also wants residence rights in his OWN house etc etc !! Hon KARNATAKA HC quashes the case quoting Sec 468 CrPC

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

DATED THIS THE 8 TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2014

BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.N. PHANEENDRA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.11476/2013

BETWEEN:

1. GURUDEV S/O. HANAMANT GURAV
AGE: 52 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. MALALI VILLAGE, TQ:MUDHOL
DIST: BAGALKOT

2. BASAPPA S/O. HANAMAPPA GURAV
AGE: 54 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. MALALI VILLAGE,
TQ: MUDHOL, DIST: BAGALKOT … PETITIONERS

(BY SRI PAVAN B DODDATTI, ADV.)

AND

JAYASHREE W/O. GURUDEV GURAV
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O.MALALI VILLAGE,
TQ:MUDHOL, DIST: BAGALKOT … RESPONDENT

(BY SRI S C HIREMATH, ADV.)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.P.C. SEEKING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CRL.MISC.NO.110/2013 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE & JMFC COURT, MUDHOL, BY ALLOWING THIS CRIMINAL PETITION. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

O R D E R

Though this petition is posted for admission, with the consent of both the Counsels, the matter is heard o n merits.

2. It is seen from the records that the respondent-Jayashree W/o the first petitioner-Gurudev S/o Hana mant Gurvar lodged a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for several reliefs. That is to say restraining the petitioners from dispossessing from the house and also for awarding Rs.10,000/- per month as maintenance etc. and also claiming Rs.15,000/- towards damages. It is also alleged in the petition that the applicant therein has a right to share the house at Bagalkot with opponent No.1. The op ponents ill-treated and tortured her, thereafter about 8 y ears back by beating his wife and daughter drove her out from the matrimonial house. It is also alleged that since t hen the petitioner is staying in the adjacent house of the opponent and opponent has neglected and even now harassing her under one or other pretext. Therefore, she is comp elled to file petition under Domestic Violence Act.

3. In the petition it is not specified as to what is the nature of harassment that has been given by the pet itioners herein. The learned counsel for the petitioners st renuously contended that the petition is barred by limitatio n. The petition is filed alleging the incident taken plac e about 8 years back. Therefore, he contends that the petiti on under Domestic Violence Act is liable to be quashed.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent – wife submits that, she has filed a suit for partiti on and separate possession and the said suit was decreed i n respect of landed property and now she is residing in the house situated adjacent to the house of the petitio ners herein. It is also submitted that the first petiti oner filed a petition for divorce and the same is pending. There fore, the petition under Domestic Violence Act is maintainabl e before the trial Court. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice the order passed by this Court in a similar matter in Crl.P.No.2419/2009 on 05.04.2013 and submits that t he said order passed by this court is applicable to th e facts and circumstances of this case. For the purpose of bet ter understanding whether the said order passed by this Court is applicable to the present case or not, it is jus t and necessary to look into the orders passed in that ca se.

“In the said case also, the wife alleged that she lived with her
husband in the matrimonial home up to November 2004 and she was
pregnant by then. She was treated cruelly by the petitioner and his
parents during that time. The wife left the matrimonial home as she
could not tolerate the torture of her husband and she was compelled
to eat certain substance in order to abort pregnancy. Making such
allegations she filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The Trial Court has taken
cognizance of an offence which has taken place in the year 2005 and
issued summons to the petitioners. The learned judge of this Court
has observed the cause of action in the said case was 4 years prior
to the filing of the complaint. Under Section 468 of Cr.P.C., the
complaint could have been filed within one year. If the allegations
made in the complaint are proved, the punishment is one year. On
these grounds, this Court allowed the petition under Section 485 of
Cr.P.C. and quashed the entire proceedings.”

6. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the Divorce petition, an amount of Rs.1,000/- has already been awarded. It is admitted fact that the respondent has claimed maintenance in the divorce petition filed by her husband. She can workout her remedy so far as maintenance in the said Divorce Petition.

7. With these observations, I am of the opinion that, this petition under Domestic Violence Act is liable to be quashed which was filed after lapse of 8 years. In view of the same and in view of the observations made by this Court in similar matters noted above, the petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. deserves to be allowed.

Hence, I Pass the following order:

Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed. Consequently, the complaint filed by the respondent herein in Crl.Misc.110/2003 before the P rl.Civil Judge and JMFC, Mudhol is hereby quashed. Further th e respondent is at liberty to agitate all these grou nds in the Divorce Petition.

(SD/-)

JUDGE

Rms

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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How India is becoming land of fake DV. Case used 2 settle property dispute. Hon Madras HC dismisses DV case

How India is becoming land of fake DV. Case used 2 settle property dispute. Hon Madras HC dismisses DV case

* A woman files a DV on brother in law. claims beating etc etc
* she Wants residence order to live in brother in law’s house (there is some fight saying it belonged to the husband’s father )
* Magistrate court grants DV case in favour of the woman !!
* Case goes on appeal and finally reaches HC.
* Hon Madras HC notices that the husband (the younger brother) is the one behind the case and it is a property dispute
* Hon Madras HC appreciates the facts and dismisses the case

Hon HC orders :

“…In view of the above discussion, I have to hold that absolutely, there is no evidence that there was domestic violence caused by the respondents. Whether the husband of the petitioner has got any undivided share in the property in question or not is a matter to be resolved only by the competent Civil Court and a Criminal Court cannot venture to resolve the same. The admission made by the husband of the petitioner, who has been examined as PW-4, that he is behind the filing of the case by the petitioner and that he has been looking after the case, by accompanying the petitioner to Court for all hearings, would go to show that he has made an attempt to abuse the process of Court by taking a short cut method, instead of travelling through the appropriate route to reach the Civil Court for their dispute resolved. In fact, he is the actual litigant, but hiding under the veil of his wife. Thus, I have no hesitation to hold that this case instituted before the Criminal Court is a clear abuse of process of Court, which cannot be appreciated….”

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 01.07.2015

CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU

CRL.RC.(MD)Nos.532 of 2013
and 212 of 2015

R.Vinayagam : Petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013
M.Prema : Petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015

Vs.

1.M.Prema
R.Suseela
: Respondents Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013

1.R.Vinayagam

2.R.Suseela : Respondents in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015

COMMON PRAYER

Petitions are filed under Section 397 r/w 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records relating to the order dated 13.02.2013 made in Crl.A.No.62 of 2011, on the file of the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, modifying the Judgment dated 10.10.2011 made in STC.No.624 of 2010, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Thanjavur and set aside the same.

Reserved – on 22.06.2015
Pronounced – on 01.07.2015

In Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013
For Petitioner : Mr.G.R.Swaminathan For Mr.T.Antony Arul Raj
For Respondent No.1 : Mr.N.Balakrishnan

In Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015
For Petitioner : Mr.N.Balakrishnan
For Respondent No.1 : Mr.G.R.Swaminathan For Mr.T.Antony Arul Raj

COMMON ORDER

The petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015 is the wife of one Mr.R.Muruganantham. The petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013, Mr.R.Vinayagam, [the first respondent in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015], is the brother of the said Mr.R.Muruganantham. The second respondent in both the Criminal Revision Cases Mrs.R.Suseela is the mother of the petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013 and the mother-in-law of the petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015. For the sake of convenience, in this order, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the order of the Trial Court.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-

The father of the first respondent – Mr.Raju Udayar is no more. Mr.Raju Udayar has left behind two sons, viz., Mr.R.Vinayagam, the petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.532 of 2013 and Mr.R.Muruganantham, the husband of the petitioner in Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015. Mrs.Prema is happily living with her husband – Mr.R.Muruganantham. The marriage between them was celebrated on 09.09.2007. It is alleged that at the time of marriage, a sum of Rs.45,000/- for the purpose of purchasing a Motorcycle and a sum of Rs.15,000/- for the purpose of purchasing household articles was presented to the bridegroom and the bride by her father. The said amount was actually paid to the first respondent. After the marriage, it is alleged that the petitioner and her husband were residing along with the first respondent – Mr.R.Vinayagam and the second respondent – Mrs.Suseela, at the house, bearing Door No.51, Vellalar Street, Vallam, Thanjavur. According to the petitioner, the said house is the ancestral property of her husband and the first respondent – Mr.R.Vinayagam and the same remains undivided. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

2.1. It is her further case that the said property was purchased by Mr.Raju Udayar, but, till his death, no sale deed was obtained from the vendors. Mr.Raju Udayar died in the year 1971. According to the petitioner, at that time, the husband of the petitioner – Mr.R.Muruganantham was a minor. Since the first respondent – Mr.R.Vinayagam was the head of the family, the sale deed was obtained in his name on behalf of the joint family. That is how, the petitioner, her husband and the respondents were residing in the said house.

2.2. While so, on 27.02.2010, the respondents, viz., the brother-in-law and mother-in-law of the petitioner, harassed the petitioner demanding more amount from her father. They attempted to manhandle her. It is her further case that out of fear, she rushed into a room in the house and bolted the same from outside. But, the first respondent broke open the door, entered into the room, attacked her and pushed her out of the house. The electricity connection to the said room was also disconnected. He also abused her pointing out that she is a physically challenged woman. Thus, according to the petitioner, the respondents caused domestic violence to her. The first respondent has also misappropriated a sum of Rs.45,000/- given at the time of marriage for the purpose of purchasing the Motorcycle, as he did not purchase any Motorcycle for her husband. With the above allegation, the petitioner made a complaint before the Protection Officer, at Thanjavur, under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, [for brevity, “the Act”]. The Protection Officer held an enquiry and finally submitted a report before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Thanjavur, alleging that there was domestic violence caused to the petitioner by the respondents and recommending for an order for shared household in the said house and also for monetary relief.

2.3. On appearance before the learned Judicial Magistrate, the respondents filed an appropriate counter, wherein it was contended that there was no such violence caused at all by them. It was further contended that the house in question was purchased exclusively by the first respondent, in which the husband of the petitioner has got no share at all. It was further contended that there was no shared house as defined in the Act. It was also contended that a sum of Rs.45,000/- was never paid to the first respondent at the time of marriage for the purpose of purchasing a Motorcycle for the husband of the petitioner at all. It was also contended that the entire proceedings before the Trial Court was not maintainable, since the issue raised therein would fall outside the purview of the Act. It was further contended that since there was no love-lost between the respondents and the husband of the petitioner, her husband had instigated the petitioner to initiate this proceedings, which, according to the respondents, is a clear abuse of process of law and the Court. Therefore, according to the respondents, the claim made by the petitioner should be rejected.

2.4. Before the Trial Court, on the side of the petitioner, four witnesses were examined. PW-1 is the petitioner, who has spoken, inter alia, that a sum of Rs.45,000/- was paid at the time of marriage to the first respondent on behalf of her husband, which the first respondent has embezzled and that the house in question is an ancestral property, over which her husband has an undivided share. PW-2, Mr.Arumugaamy, is the Village Administrative Officer, Vallam North Village. He has stated that the Chitta for the property comprising Survey No.448/11, originally stood in the name of Mr.Raju Udayar, the father of the first respondent and his brother. He has further deposed that after the demise of Mr.Raju Udayar, his legal heirs are residing in the said house. PW-3, Mr.Tamilarasan, claims to be a close relative of the first respondent and his brother. According to him, in the house in question, the first respondent and his brother Mr.R.Muruganantham were residing. He has further stated that the said house was originally purchased only by the father of the first respondent and in the negotiation, for the purchase of the house, according to PW-3, he participated. He has further stated that at the time of marriage between the petitioner and her husband, a sum of Rs.40,000/- was given as dowry for the purpose of purchasing the Motorcycle. PW-4 is the husband of the petitioner. He has stated about the marriage between him and the petitioner and that a sum of Rs.40,000/- paid at the time of marriage for the purpose of purchasing the Motorcycle, which the first respondent has embezzled. He has further stated that the house in question was purchased by his father, in which he has got undivided share. Thus, he has duly supported the claim made by the petitioner.

2.5. Having considered all the above, the Trial Court, by order dated 10.10.2011, directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs.40,000/- to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The Trial Court further directed that the respondents, shall not, in any manner, disturb the petitioner from living in the house in question and she shall not be removed from possession. The Trial Court further directed that the respondents shall not cause any domestic violence to the petitioner, her children and her husband. Lastly, the Trial Court directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/- towards cost of the proceedings. Challenging the same, the respondents filed C.A.No.62 of 2011. The learned First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, by Judgment dated 13.02.2013, allowed the appeal in part, thereby setting aside the directions for payment of Rs.40,000/- as monetary relief and the cost of Rs.2,000/-, as ordered by the Trial Court. However, the Lower Appellate Court confirmed the direction of the Trial Court, directing the respondents not to disturb the possession of the petitioner, her husband and their children to live in the house in question and also confirmed the direction not to cause any domestic violence to the petitioner, her husband and her children. As against the order of the Lower Appellate Court, setting aside the payment of monetary relief of Rs.40,000/- and the cost of Rs.2,000/-, the petitioner – Mrs.Prema has come up with Crl.RC.[MD].No.212 of 2015 and challenging the other directions granted by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court, the first respondent before the Trial Court – Mr.R.Vinayagam has come up with Crl.RC[MD].No.532 of 2013.

3. Since these Criminal Revision Cases arise out of a single proceedings, I have heard them together and dispose of the same by this Common Order.

4. I have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the records carefully.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is clear evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 that a sum of Rs.45,000/- was paid at the time of marriage for the purpose of purchasing the Motorcycle and the same was embezzled by the first respondent. Thus, the learned counsel would submit that the Lower Appellate Court was not right in setting aside the monetary relief granted by the Trial Court. The learned counsel would further submit that there was no reason to set aside the order for cost, as directed by the Trial Court. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the order of the Lower Appellate Court setting aside the directions of the Trial Court to pay a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards monetary relief and to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/- as cost to the petitioner needs to be interfered with. The learned counsel would further submit that so far as the house in question is concerned, it has been clearly established by the evidences of PW-1 and PW-4, more particularly, from the evidence of PW-2 that the house in question was owned by the father- in-law of the petitioner, in which the first respondent and the husband of the petitioner have got an undivided share. The learned counsel would further submit that this factual finding has been arrived at by the two Courts below, which does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. Therefore, according to him, the Criminal Revision Case filed by the first respondent Mr.R.Vinayagam deserves to be dismissed.

6. The learned counsel for the first respondent – Mr.R.Vinayagam, would submit that this is a clear case of abuse of process of law as well as the Court. According to him, the dispute raised, in this case, is purely civil in nature, which needs to be adjudicated upon only by a Civil Court. He would further submit that so far as the direction for payment of Rs.40,000/- is concerned, according to the evidences of PW-1 and PW-4, a sum of Rs.45,000/- was actually paid, whereas, according to the evidence of PW-3, a sum of Rs.40,000/- alone was paid. He would further submit that absolutely, there is no evidence worth believing either oral or documentary. It was because of this reason, according to the learned counsel, the Lower Appellate Court set aside the direction of the Trial Court to pay a sum of Rs.40,000/-. The learned counsel would further submit that since the entire case is a clear abuse of process of law as well as the Court, the cost of Rs.2,000/-, ordered by the Trial Court was rightly set aside by the Lower Appellate Courrt, which does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. So far as the house in question is concerned, the learned counsel would submit that absolutely, there is no evidence to show that the house was owned by late Raju Udayar. He would further submit that as per Section 17(1) of the Act, the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

7. Here, in this case, according to the learned counsel, even according to the evidences available, there is no domestic violence caused by the husband. When the husband and the wife are residing happily, the question of violence at the hands of someone else would not arise. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the order of the Lower Court directing the respondents not to disturb the alleged possession of the petitioner and not to cause any violence is not sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside.

8. I have considered the above submissions.

9. Let me, at the first, take up the issue relating to the jurisdiction. So far as the direction for shared household is concerned, it is the claim made by the petitioner that the property in question was purchased by her father-in-law, in which the petitioner, her husband and the respondents were living. But, admittedly, the sale deed stands in the name of the first respondent. The husband of the petitioner has not made any claim so far by filing any civil suit for partition. It is crystal clear from the evidences available that as of now, there is no love-lost between the husband of the petitioner and the respondents. When there is a dispute relating to the claim for share in the house, it would be appropriate for her husband to file a civil suit for necessary relief. Instead of doing so, it is obvious that he has used his wife to initiate the present proceedings, as though there was domestic violence at the hands of the respondents, as defined in the Act. Absolutely, there is no acceptable evidence to prove that there was any domestic violence at the hands of the respondents. For granting any relief under the Act in favour of the petitioner, essentially, it should be proved that there was domestic violence, as defined in the Act. But, in the case on hand, except the fact that there was dispute regarding the share in the property, which, according to the husband of the petitioner, is an ancestral property, absolutely, there is no evidence worth considering that there was domestic violence caused by the respondents. If once this Court comes to the conclusion that there is no violence in terms of the Act, the entire order passed by the Courts below granting relief to the petitioner has to be set aside.

10. The learned counsel for the respondents, in order to substantiate his contention that the claim made by the petitioner is liable to be rejected, has relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R.Batra and another Vs. Taruna Batra, reported in 2007 3 SCC 169, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made an elaborate discussion on this aspect and held in Paragraph Nos.26 to 30, as follows:-

“26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that
wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that
property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the
husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g.
with the husband?s father, husband?s paternal grandparents, his
maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces,
etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the
respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband?s relatives
will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in
all these houses of her husband?s relatives merely because she had
stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past.
Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.

27. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to
absurdity should not be accepted.

28. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied
upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given
an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for
alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and
not against the husband?s (sic) in-laws or other relatives.

29. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is
only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household,
and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or
taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint
family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in
the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on
rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband
Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of Appellant 2,
mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ?shared household?.

30. No doubt, the definition of ?shared household? in Section 2(s)
of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result
of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is
sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society. [Emphasis
supplied].

11. In Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel Vs. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, reported in 2008 4 SCC 649, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by relying on S.R.Batra’s case has held in Paragraph Nos.27 to 30 as follows:-

27. The Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour
of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also
thereunder acquires a right of residence. The right of residence is a
higher right. The said right as per the legislation extends to joint
properties in which the husband has a share.

28. Interpreting the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act this
Court in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra6 held that even a wife could not
claim a right of residence in the property belonging to her mother-in-
law, stating: (SCC p. 173, paras 17-19) ?17. There is no such law in
India like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case,
the rights which may be available under any law can only be as
against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law.

18. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt
Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence,
Smt Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house.

19. Appellant 2, the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra has stated
that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a
joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement.?

29. Reliance placed by Mr Goel on V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy is
wholly misplaced. The question which arose for consideration therein
was the nature of the right a widow acquires in the property of which
she had been in possession in lieu of maintenance. Interpreting sub-
section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act this Court held
that the term ?possessed? should receive a wide meaning. It is in
this context this Court noticed the authorities from Shastric Hindu
Law whereupon our attention has been drawn: (SCC pp. 108-09, para 10)
?10. ? Similar observations have been made by the learned author at
p.528 of the book which may be extracted thus:

?According to both the schools, the lawfully wedded wife acquires
from the moment of her marriage a right to the property belonging to
the husband at the time and also to any property that may
subsequently be acquired by him, so that she becomes a co-owner of
the husband, though her right is not coequal to that of the husband,
but a subordinate one, owing to her disability founded on her status
of perpetual or lifelong tutelage or dependence.

This right of the wife to maintenance from her husband is not lost
even if the husband renounces Hinduism.

This right subsists even after the husband?s death although her
husband?s right as distinguished from hers may pass by survivorship
or by succession to sons or even to collaterals; these simply step
into the position of her husband, and she is required by Hindu Law to
live under their guardianship after her husband?s death.? ?

30. The orders passed by the High Court which are impugned before us
are, thus, wholly unsustainable. They suffer from total non-
application of mind”.

12. Keeping the principles stated in the above said Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, let us have a quick look into the Explanation II to Section 3 of the Act, which reads as follows:-

Explanation II.- For the purpose of determining whether any act,
omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes
“domestic violence” under this Section, the over all facts and
circumstances of the case shall be taken into
consideration?

13. This Explanation would make it clear that whether a particular act or omission of the accused amounts to domestic violence or not, is to be tested by taking into account the over all facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the facts placed before this Court would go to show that there has been a dispute regarding the rival claim made by the husband of the petitioner and the first respondent for the house in question. As I have already stated, the petitioner and her husband are living happily and there is no disturbance in the matrimonial life. This dispute, regarding property right, which needs to be resolved before a competent Civil Court, is now given a colour of domestic violence so as to abuse the process of Court.

14. In view of the above discussion, I have to hold that absolutely, there is no evidence that there was domestic violence caused by the respondents. Whether the husband of the petitioner has got any undivided share in the property in question or not is a matter to be resolved only by the competent Civil Court and a Criminal Court cannot venture to resolve the same. The admission made by the husband of the petitioner, who has been examined as PW-4, that he is behind the filing of the case by the petitioner and that he has been looking after the case, by accompanying the petitioner to Court for all hearings, would go to show that he has made an attempt to abuse the process of Court by taking a short cut method, instead of travelling through the appropriate route to reach the Civil Court for their dispute resolved. In fact, he is the actual litigant, but hiding under the veil of his wife. Thus, I have no hesitation to hold that this case instituted before the Criminal Court is a clear abuse of process of Court, which cannot be appreciated.

15. So far as Crl.RC[MD].No.212 of 2015 is concerned, though it is contended by the petitioner that a sum of Rs.45,000/- was paid at the time of marriage for the purpose of purchasing the Motorcycle for her husband, there is no acceptable evidence either oral or documentary to prove the same. The Lower Appellate Court has mainly relied on the contradiction between the evidences of PW-1 and PW-4 and that of the evidence of PW-3, who has stated that a sum of Rs.40,000/- alone was paid. This, in my considered view, would only go to show that the claim made by the petitioner is false and therefore, the Lower Appellate Court was right in setting aside the order of the Lower Court in this regard. So far as the direction for payment of Rs.2,000/- ordered by the Trial Court is concerned, since I have held that the case initiated by the petitioner before the Trial Court itself is a clear abuse of process of law as well as the Court, the order of the Lower Appellate Court setting aside the direction for payment of Rs.2,000/- also needs to be sustained and thus, Crl.RC[MD].No.212 of 2015 filed by the petitioner – Mrs.Prema is liable to be dismissed. While disposing of these Criminal Revision Cases, it may be necessary to impose appropriate cost on Mrs.Prema, for having abused the process of Court. But, taking into consideration the fact that she is a physically challenged woman and also the fact that she does not have sound economic status, I desist from imposing cost.

16. In view of the foregoing discussions, Crl.RC[MD].No.212 of 2015 filed by the petitioner – Mrs.Prema is dismissed and Crl.RC[MD].No.532 of 2013 filed by the petitioner – Mr.R.Vinayagam is allowed and the order of the Trial Court, dated 10.10.2011, made in STC.No.624 of 2010, directing the respondents not to disturb the petitioner from residing in the house bearing Door No.51, Vellalar Street, Vallam, Thanjavur, and not to cause any violence is hereby set aside. In the result, the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Thanjavur, in full shall stand set aside.

To

1.The First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thanjavur.

2.The Judicial Magistrate No.II, Thanjavur.

3.The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.