Tag Archives: 498a and 406

Courts can’t force husbands to pay #maintenance as condition for #Anticipatory #BAIL. Supreme Court !

In this case, the wife had filed a #498a , #406 cocktail on the husband. The husband and his parents approach the HC for #Anticipatory #bail. The HC initially sends the parties to #mediation. The mediation fails. then the HC imposes a #condition that the husband shall pay Rs 300,000 arrears and also pay Rs 12,500 p.m. as monthly maintenance as a condition for the bail.

The husband approaches the Hon Supreme court in appeal. The Hon Supreme court clearly states that courts CANNOT impose such conditions for payment of maintenance as part of the bail proceedings

The Apex court clarifies that ‘….It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all….” The Apex court goes on to state that the conditions cannot be onerous and frustrate the very purpose of the bail “…While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to bail under section 438 of the Code. ….”

The court very clearly states that “…. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/-for past maintenance and a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife and child. …”

We hope this classic case helps harassed husbands who are seeking AB in 498a, 406 cases !!

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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 344 OF 2009

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 637 of 2008)

Munish Bhasin & Ors. … Appellants

Versus

State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

J.M. PANCHAL, J.

  1. Leave granted. The complainant (wife of first appellant) to whom notice was ordered on 25.01.2008 is impleaded as second respondent.
  2. Heard Counsel.

  3. The appellant (accused no. 1) assails the condition imposed by the High Court requiring him to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- as maintenance to his wife and child while granting anticipatory bail to him and his parents with reference to the complaint filed by his wife for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

  4. The marriage of the appellant was solemnized with Ms. Renuka on December 05, 2004. She has filed a complaint in November 2006, against the appellant and his parents for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code on the grounds that after marriage she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty for bringing less dowry and that her stri-dhan entrusted to them has been dishonestly misappropriated by them. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  5. Apprehending arrest, the appellant and his parents moved High Court of Delhi for anticipatory bail. The application came up for consideration before a Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 22.02.2007. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor accepted notice and submitted that the matter was essentially a matrimonial dispute and therefore the parties should be referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Cell of the Delhi High Court. The Learned Judge agreed with the suggestion made by the Additional Public Prosecutor and directed the parties to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Cell of the Delhi High Court on March 02, 2007. The case was ordered to be listed on 10.05.2007. The Learned Judge further directed that in the event of arrest of the appellant and his parents, before the next date of hearing, they shall be released on bail on their furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer/ Arresting Officer concerned, subject however, to the condition that the appellant and his parents shall surrender their passports to the Investigating Officer and shall file affidavits in the Court that they would not leave the country without prior permission of the Court.

  6. From the records, it appears that the conciliation proceedings failed and therefore the bail application was taken up for hearing on merits. On representation made by the wife of the appellant, the counsel of the appellant was directed to produce appellant’s salary slip. Accordingly, the salary slip of the appellant was produced before the Court which indicated that the appellant was drawing gross salary of Rs.41,598/- and after deductions of advance tax etc., his net salary was Rs.33,000/-. The Learned Single Judge of the High Court took the notice of the fact that the appellant had the duty to maintain his wife and the child and therefore as a condition for grant of anticipatory bail, directed the appellant, by the order dated 07.08.2007 to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance to his wife and child. The Learned Single Judge also directed to pay arrears at the rate of Rs. 12,500/- per month from August 2005, that is Rs. 3,00,000/- within six months. The imposition of these conditions for grant of anticipatory bail is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal.

  7. From the perusal of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 438, it is evident that when the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under subsection (1) to release an accused alleged to have committed non-bailable offence, the Court may include such conditions in such direction in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including (i) a condition that a person shall make himself available for interrogation by police officer as and when required, (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer, (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court and (iv) such other conditions as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. Sub-section (3) of Section 437, inter alia, provides that when a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1), the Court shall impose the following conditions-(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, (b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and (c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence. The Court may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary.

  8. It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all. The conditions which can be imposed by the Court while granting anticipatory bail are enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 438 and subsection (3) of Section 437 of the Code. Normally, conditions can be imposed (i) to secure the presence of the accused before the investigating officer or before the Court, (ii) to prevent him from fleeing the course of justice, (iii) to prevent him from tampering with the evidence or to prevent him from inducing or intimidating the witnesses so as to dissuade them from disclosing the facts before the police or Court or (iv) restricting the movements of the accused in a particular area or locality or to maintain law and order etc. To subject an accused to any other condition would be beyond jurisdiction of the power conferred on Court under section 438 of the Code. While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to bail under section 438 of the Code. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/-for past maintenance and a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife and child. The case of the appellant is that his wife Renuka is employed and receiving a handsome salary and therefore is not entitled to maintenance. Normally, the question of grant of maintenance should be left to be decided by the competent Court in an appropriate proceedings where the parties can adduce evidence in support of their respective case, after which liability of husband to pay maintenance could be determined and appropriate order would be passed directing the husband to pay amount of maintenance to his wife. The record of the instant case indicates that the wife of the appellant has already approached appropriate Court for grant of maintenance and therefore the High Court should have refrained from granting maintenance to the wife and child of the appellant while exercising powers under section 438 of the Code. The condition imposed by the High court directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as maintenance to his wife and child is onerous, unwarranted and is liable to be set aside.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The direction contained in order dated August 07, 2007 rendered by Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Bail Application No. 423 of 2007 requiring the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance (both past and future) to his wife and child is hereby deleted. Rest of the directions contained in the said order are maintained. It is however clarified that any amount received by the wife of the appellant pursuant to the order of the High Court need not be refunded by her to the appellant and will be adjusted subject to the result of application for maintenance filed by wife of the appellant under Section 125 of the Code before the appropriate Court.

  10. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.

…………………………J. [R.V. Raveendran]

…………………………J. [J.M. Panchal]

New Delhi;

February 20, 2009.


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This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.


CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting


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PostGrad Techie wife from top IT firm takes ONLY 8 lakhs 2 quash 498a 406 & w/draw CrPC125. Fate of Indian men

Post Grad Techie wife from top firm takes ONLY 8 lakhs to quash 498a 406 & withdraw CrPC125. Fate of men in India.

How Indian men pay day in and day out. How Indian men are made to pay in courts, whether they are right or wrong. How a man who won divorce on grounds of cruelty still pays to quash 498a and withdraw Sec 125 case !!

This appeal arises from order dated 17.12.2014 in Case No.206/2011, by the Family Court No.1, Jaipur granting divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act pursuant to an application by respondent (in this case , i.e.) Husband, on grounds of cruelty.

Key notes

  • respondent is a B.Tech in Software employed in Tata Consultancy Services and has even been on deputation to the Office of his employer in Paris.
  • They were married on 16.02.2010 at the age of approximately 22 years. Today they are approximately 28 years of age.
  • Husband has won divorce on grounds of cruelty
  • Wife has filed 498a, 406 and is also holding the CrPC 125 gun
    ……. She takes ONLY 8 lakhs to quash the criminal cases !!! ……….

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR

ORDER
D.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.107/2015

Rashmi Sharma W/o Ashwini Sharma D/o Shri Mohan Lal
Sharma, By Caste Brahmin, Age about 27 years, Presently
residing at Baroda Mev, Laxmangarh, Distt. Alwar
(Rajasthan). ….Appellant-Non-Applicant

Versus

Ashwini Sharma S/o Shri Hari Shankar Sharma, By Caste
Brahmin, age About 27 years, R/o House No.430A, Katewa
Nagar, New Sanganer Road, Tehsil & Distt. Jaipur. …Respondent-Applicant

DATE: 20.09.2016

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. NAVIN SINHA
HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR VYAS

Mr. Sudesh Bansal &
Mr. Aatish Jain, for the appellant.
Mr. Rakesh Chandel on behalf of
Mr. Poonam Chand Bhandari, for the respondent.


The present appeal arises from order dated 17.12.2014 in Case No.206/2011, by the Family Court No.1, Jaipur granting divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) pursuant to an application presented by the respondent on grounds of cruelty.

Learned counsel for the parties jointly submit that the appellant is a Postgraduate and the respondent is a B.Tech in Software employed in Tata Consultancy Services and has even been on deputation to the Office of his employer in Paris. They were married on 16.02.2010 at the age of approximately 22 years. Today they are approximately 28 years of age. As adults they have realised their incompatibility of companionship with each other. They have therefore taken a matured decision as adults to part ways respectfully without rancour or ill-will against each other and for that reason the appellant is not interested in pursuing the appeal for reasons recorded hereinafter.

The respondent has agreed to pay and the appellant has agreed to accept a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rs. Eight lacs) only in full and final settlement as one time permanent alimony to be paid to the appellant under Section 25 of the Act. This amount shall be paid by the respondent to the appellant within a period of four weeks from today by way of a Demand Draft in the name of the appellant. Since this undertaking has been given in course of this proceeding leading to a consent order, non-compliance of the undertaking may have its ramifications and consequences for the respondent. The appellant agrees that she has no other civil or financial claims against the respondent and shall not raise any such claims hereinafter.

Counsel for the appellant further submits that she undertakes not to pursue Criminal Case No.23/281/2011 registered pursuant to FIR No.72/2011, dated 15.04.2011, Police Station Baroda Mev, District Alwar, presently pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Laxmangarh, Alwar under Sections 498A and 406 IPC and she has no objection if it is quashed. Likewise the appellant further agrees to withdraw the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. unconditionally bearing No.1073/2013 registered originally before the Family Court, Alwar, now transferred to the Court of the concerned A.D.J., Laxmangarh and in which no orders for payment of any kind has been passed till today. Counsel for the parties are further agreed that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it shall be treated as a ‘no fault divorce’ and the findings shall not be taken to have been affirmed.

We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties.

Both of them were married at a young age and are still in their youth with their whole life ahead of them. If as matured adults they have taken a conscious decision with regard to their incompatibility as human beings and have decided to part ways with respect to start their lives afresh, it becomes the duty of the Court to facilitate the same rather than to go by technicalities of the law.

While the appeal is disposed in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties with regard to payment of one time permanent alimony with no further claims against each other, the withdrawal of the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by the appellant, we consider the present a fit case to invoke our inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing Criminal Case No.23/281/2011 under Sections 498A and 406 IPC pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Laxmangarh. In (2003) 4 SCC 675, B.S. Joshi And Others Vs. State of Haryana And Another, dealing with quashing of a complaint under Section 498A, 323 and 406 IPC declined by the High Court for the reason that it was not compoundable, in view of the subsequent developments when the parties to the matrimonial dispute had settled their differences and agreed for mutual divorce, it was observed as follows:- “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in [5] DBCMA 107/2015 RASHMI SHARMA Vs. ASHWINI SHARMA view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts. 14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper- technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code.”

The criminal proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Laxmangarh are therefore quashed.

The present appeal is disposed in terms of the consent and mutual settlement arrived at between the parties.

(VIJAY KUMAR VYAS),J.
(NAVIN SINHA),C.J.
/KKC/

Extremely wild & disgusting allegations on foster sister. 498a quashed & bail granted @ SC. 406 survives

Extremely wild & disgusting allegations on foster sister. 498a quashed as 498a can be filed only on relatives and a foster sister is NOT a relative. Bail and exemption from appearance also granted to the foster sister by SC. However part of the case, the 406 portion survives

A woman married into a rich family filed 498a 406 on husband and some foster relatives. One such foster sister runs for a 498a quash and bail, which the Hon SC grants. However the 406 case (allegations on taking away Jewellery etc) survive. The Hon HC also orders “…We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be tried for offence under Section 498A, IPC. However, we desist from quashing the FIR altogether in view of the allegations made under Section 406, IPC with the protection that we have granted to the appellant. ….” . In the earlier para the Hon SC provides the following protections, namely “.. 10. There can be no doubt that the allegations made are extremely wild and disgusting. However, how far those allegations can be used to meet the requirements for the offence under Section 406, IPC is a moot question. For obvious reasons, we will not go into that exercise. Whatever the form in which the allegations under Section 406, IPC are made, the fact of the matter is that there is an FIR and the Court concerned has taken cognizance thereof. Under these circumstances, we would only protect the interest of the appellant by directing that she would not be required to attend the proceedings unless specifically directed by the Court to do so and that too in the case of extreme necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be taken against her. She shall be granted bail by the Court trying the case if it decides to try the offence by framing the charge. We expect the Court to be careful while considering the framing of charge…..”


Supreme Court of India

Vijeta Gajra vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 7 July, 2010

Author: V Sirpurkar

Bench: V.S. Sirpurkar, Cyriac Joseph

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1182-1184             OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) 6091-6093 of 2009)

Vijeta Gajra                                  … Appellant

Versus

State of NCT Of Delhi                  … Respondent

JUDGMENT

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

  1. 1. Leave granted.
  2. The appellant herein challenges the order passed by the High Court whereby the petition filed by her was dismissed. The said petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the FIR No. 138/08 dated 07.08.2008 for offences under Section 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code in the Chitranjan Park Police Station.
  3. This FIR was lodged by one Gunjan Sujanani, wife of one Rohit Sujanani. It is a long document wherein the complainant Gunjan Sujanani stated about her marriage with Rohit on 08.07.2003 and he being a resident of Nigeria. It was claimed that before the marriage, Rohit had introduced Gunjan to one Mr. Sham and Mrs. Lavina Daswani as his foster parents and also said that he had two foster sisters, namely, Vijeta Daswani (Vijeta Gajra-the appellant herein) who is a resident of Indore, Madhya Pradesh and the other being one Ms. Ritika Daswani, who resided with her mother in London. There are allegations made about the demand of dowry against the husband as also Mrs. Lavina Daswani. The demand included diamond neckless for Vijeta Daswani/Gajra. There was reference to subsequent behaviour of troubling the complainant on account of the dowry demands. The First Information Report also made some allegations regarding the relations of her husband Rohit Sujanani with Mrs. Lavina Daswani and Vijeta Daswani/Gajra, the present appellant. It was then contended that in December, 2003, when the complainant had gone to Sierra Leone, Vijeta Dasawani/Gajra took away her diamond encrusted heavy gold pendant and chain and earring set on the pretext that she wanted to wear them once and she would keep them at a safe place in her father’s house. The complainant also stated that she did not return these ornaments. Further, it was stated that in May, 2004, Mr. Rohit Sujanani and Mrs. Lavina Daswani insisted that the complainant should keep her jewellery in London and claimed that she was slapped by her husband on her refusal. It was further claimed that in November, 2004, the present appellant, Vijeta Gajra got married during which the complainant had to beg for her ornaments for attending the marriage. There was a reference in the FIR to the misbehaviour on the part of Mrs. Lavina Daswani towards her and again the name of the present appellant figured therein. At this time, the complainant claimed that she was pregnant for the first time and yet she was given physical and mental ill treatment because of which she had a mis-carriage. There is a reference to the sexual behaviour of her husband with reference to a pornographic website. It was claimed that the complainant delivered a baby on 08.03.2007. Then there is reference to the appellant visiting and staying with the complainant’s parents for three days and the allegation that her husband was having sexual relations with Vijeta Gajra, the appellant herein and Mrs.Lavina Daswani. There was a reference that during her stay the appellant was wearing the diamond encrusted pendant and gold chain and earring set which she had taken (practically stolen) in Sierra Leone.
  4. In the last part of this lengthy FIR, there was a reference to the demand of two crores of rupees having been made by Vijeta and her mother over the phone to the complainant as a cost of peace and marital happiness. There was a reference to a telephonic conversation with Mrs. Lavina Daswani in this regard. There was a further reference to an ugly scene on account of arguments. However, there was also a reference to the presence of the brother of the complainant on account of which further ugly scenes were avoided. It was complained that, thereafter, the complainant and her parents tried to contact Rohit Sujanani and the Daswanis who were avoiding them and not returning jewellery which was with Vijeta Gajra, Lavina Daswani and Rohit Sujanani.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com.
  5. This complaint dated 15.04.2008 seems to have been registered as an FIR. It seems that on the basis of this FIR, the appellant was sent a summons under Section 160, Cr. P.C. and she moved the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for grant of anticipatory bail. In that application, she had made a reference to the summons asking her to appear on 05.06.2008. It was claimed in the application that the complainant’s husband Rohit Sujanani was an employee of appellant’s father who has business in Sierra Leone and that he was employed on contract basis for the period of three years in 1994. It was claimed in that application that the appellant had met the complainant last in 2007. It was also stated that the allegations made in the FIR were concocted, false and baseless and she had no connection whatsoever with the family of the complainant or her parents. She complained that her own marriage was being tried to be destroyed by wild allegations. There was a reference made in this application by the appellant for quashing the summons arising out of the complaint dated 15.04.2008 and also to a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2153 of 2008. The High Court had passed the order disposing it of since the State’s Counsel had agreed to provide copy of the complaint and had further stated that in the event the FIR was registered, the applicant would be informed of this fact and no coercive action would be taken against her till then. In her application there was a statement that she did not even belong to the family of the complainant, her husband or any of their relatives and that all the allegations were palpably false. It was then stated that the writ petition was filed which came to be disposed of by the High Court. It seems that the complainant sought the direction to implead herself in the writ petition-cum-Section 482 Cr.P.C application filed by the appellant.
  6. Following are the prayers in the said writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482, Cr.P.C.: “a) Quash the FIR NO. 138/2008 dated 07.08.2008 under Sections 498A/406, IPC at Police Station Chitranjan Park registered against the petitioner;  b) Direct the police not to take any coercive action against the petitioner in respect of the above  said complaint:  c) Pass such other and further orders which may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” It is on this backdrop that we have to see as to whether it would be expedient to continue the criminal prosecution against the appellant.
  7. Shri U.U. Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that in U. Suvetha v. State By Inspector of Police & Anr. [(2009) 6 SCC 757], it was specifically held that in order to be covered under Section 498A, IPC one has to be a `relative’ of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption. He pointed out that the present appellant was not in any manner a `relative’ as referred to in Section 498A, IPC and, therefore, there is no question of any allegation against her in respect of the ill-treatment of the complainant. The Court in this case examined the ingredients of Section 498A, IPC and noting the specific language of the Section and the Explanation thereof came to the conclusion that the word `relative’ would not include a paramour or concubine or so. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word `relative’ and further relying on R. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advance Law Lexicon, Volume 4, 3rd Edition, the Court went on to hold that Section 498A, IPC being a penal provision would deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT [(2007) 7 SCC 162]. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma & Anr. v. State of M.P. [(2007) 15 SCC 369]. After quoting from various decisions of this Court, it was held that reference to the word `relative’ in Section 498A, IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage.
  8. Relying heavily on this, Shri Lalit contended that there is no question of any trial of the appellant for the offence under Section 498A, IPC. The argument is undoubtedly correct, though opposed by the Learned Counsel appearing for the State. We are of the opinion that there will be no question of her prosecution under Section 498A, IPC. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, also did not seriously dispute this proposition. Therefore, we hold that the FIR insofar as it concerned Section 498A, IPC, would be of no consequence and the appellant shall not be tried for the offence under Section 498A, IPC.
  9. That leaves us with the allegation under Section 406, IPC for the offence of criminal breach of trust as there are allegations in respect of the jewellery. We desist from saying anything at this juncture. We also desist from going into the correctness or otherwise of these allegations as they will have to be proved by evidence. Shri Lalit pointed out that on the face of it the allegations are wild and baseless as the appellant herself comes from a wealthy background and is a married lady having settled down in Indore and is also mother of a child. He pointed that the FIR is calculated to destroy her marital life with the wildest possible allegations and, therefore, we should quash the entire FIR as not being bona fide and actuated by malice.
  10. There can be no doubt that the allegations made are extremely wild and disgusting. However, how far those allegations can be used to meet the requirements for the offence under Section 406, IPC is a moot question. For obvious reasons, we will not go into that exercise. Whatever the form in which the allegations under Section 406, IPC are made, the fact of the matter is that there is an FIR and the Court concerned has taken cognizance thereof. Under these circumstances, we would only protect the interest of the appellant by directing that she would not be required to attend the proceedings unless specifically directed by the Court to do so and that too in the case of extreme necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be taken against her. She shall be granted bail by the Court trying the case if it decides to try the offence by framing the charge. We expect the Court to be careful while considering the framing of charge.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com
  11. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be tried for offence under Section 498A, IPC. However, we desist from quashing the FIR altogether in view of the allegations made under Section 406, IPC with the protection that we have granted to the appellant. With these observations, the appeals are disposed of.

[V.S. Sirpurkar] ………………………….J.

[Cyriac Joseph] …………………………..J.

New Delhi;

July 8, 2010.

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This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.


CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting


498a, 15yrs after separation & 11 yrs divorce notice barred by LIMITATION !! Delhi HC

498A 406 approx 15yrs after separation & 11yrs after divorce petition barred by limitation : Delhi HC

She seems to have done this after her appeal against husbands divorce decree is dismissed by the high court Hon Justice Shiv Narain DHINGRA ji appreciated the wife’s tactics and quashes the case as it is barred by limitation

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Delhi High Court

Sudhir Kapur & Ors. vs State & Anr. on 10 August, 2010

Author: Shiv Narayan Dhingra

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Reserve: August 02, 2010

Date of Order: 10th August, 2010

+ Crl. M.C. No. 799/2009

10.08.2010

SUDHIR KAPUR & ORS. ….. Petitioner

Through: Mr.Sanjeev K. Grover, Advocate

versus

STATE & ANR. ….. Respondent

Through: Mr. O.P. Saxena, APP

Mr. Pawan Narang & Mr. Puskal Advs. for R-2

JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

JUDGMENT

1. Present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 540/07, registered against the petitioner at P.S. Defence Colony, under Section 498- A/406/34 IPC

2. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent had taken place on 4th March, 1984. The parties started living separate from each other in 1992. The petitioner filed a divorce petition against the respondent in 1996. The present FIR was lodged against the petitioner by wife under Section 498A/406 IPC after about 15 years of living separate from her husband and after about 11 years of filing the divorce petition.

3. It is argued by counsel for the respondent/wife that offence under Section 406 IPC was also involved and the dowry articles etc. of the wife were not given back. This averment has no substance. The wife had all opportunities right from 1992 onwards to demand back her articles, if any, lying with the husband. The very fact that wife did not demand any article from the husband after 1992 till lodging of FIR shows that there was no entrustment of property by wife to the husband or to his relatives. After husband had filed divorce petition, she had again opportunity to make an application before the concerned court under Hindu Marriage Act for the return of dowry articles, Istridhan, if any, under section 27 of the Act. Had there been any article lying with the husband, she would have moved the application. She did not initiate any such move, nor did she serve any notice on her husband or in laws for return of any of her articles lying with them. It is only when her appeal against the decree of divorce was dismissed by the High Court, and she preferred an SLP, she thought of lodging of an FIR also.

4. Under Section 468 of Cr. P.C., the cognizance of an offence where the maximum sentence of imprisonment is up to 3 years, can be taken within 3 years. Under Section 498A/406 IPC maximum sentence is up to three years imprisonment. Thus the cognizance of the offences against petitioner cannot be taken by the Court. The FIR lodged against the husband in respect of offences committed under Section 498A/406 IPC in 1992 or prior to that, is barred by limitation. I, therefore, allow the present petition and hereby quash FIR No. 540/2007, P.S. Defence Colony, New Delhi, registered under Sections 498A/406/34IPC. The petition stands allowed.

AUGUST 10, 2010

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.

acm

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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