Daily Archives: February 4, 2017

Courts can’t impose onerous & unreasonable conditions (huge cash deposit) before bail !! Madras HC

in this case the lower courts ordered deposit of Rs 15000 by village labour (daily wage earners) and the HON MADRAS HC after considering various HC and SC cases decided that such onerous conditions cannot be imposed. the cases quoted by the HC are very important and strike at the very root of lower courts imposing such onerous conditions

This case should help husbands who are seeking AB in 498a, 406 cases filed by wife

The cases referred to should also make good reading

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Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court

Date: 05-02-2015

Coram
The Hon?ble Mr.Justice S.Vaidyanathan

Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.19196 of 2014
& Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.19197 of 2014
&
M.P(MD)No.1 of 2014 in
Crl.OP.(MD)No.19196 of 2014

1.Amaldoss
2.Kannan
3.Meganathan
4.Saminathan
5.Santhana Raju            .. Petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.
19196 of 2014
1.Mathialagan
2.Tamilalagan
3.Karunanithi
4.Tamilarasan
5.Kalaiyarasan            .. Petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.
19197 of 2014

Versus

State,
Rep. by the Inspector of Police,
Patteeswaram Police Station,
Thanjavur District.                        .. Respondent

in both petitions Prayer These Criminal Original Petitions are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying to set aside the second condition imposed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur in his order, dated 14.10.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.3779 and 3827 of 2014.

!For Petitioners : Mr.M.Karunanithi ^For Respondents : Mr.P.Kandasamy Government Advocate (Crl. Side) for R1 Mr.B.Jameel Arasu for Intervenor :COMMON ORDER By order, dated 14.10.2014 in Crl.M.P.Nos.3779 and 3827 of 2014, while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners herein, the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, apart from other conditions, imposed a condition, directing the petitioners to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000/- each before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam.

  1. Aggrieved by the said condition, the petitioners have come forward with the present petitions, seeking to set aside the same.
  2. The learned counsel for the appearing for petitioner would submit that the petitioners are agricultural coolies and they find difficulty even to eke out their day-to-day livelihood and hence, they are unable to comply with the condition imposed by the Court below in respect of making deposit of Rs.15,000/- before the learned Magistrate. He would contend that the learned Judge is not having jurisdiction to impose such condition and in fact there is no statutory provision nor any judicial pronouncement empowering the learned Judge to impose condition for depositing of money upon a person at the time of granting bail to him. Therefore, he contended that condition imposed by the Court below is onerous and it tantamounts to abuse of the process of the Court. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon decisions of this Court, in ?Alluvdin versus Inspector of Police, Vandhavasi Police Station?(2001 Crl.L.J.2672); ?N.Sasikala versus Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Madras?(1997 Crl.L.J.2120) and also of the Hon?ble Supreme Court reported in ?Ramathal & others versus Inspector of Police and another? (2009 Crl.L.J.2271).

  3. On the other, the learned Government Advocate (Crl.side) would contend that in cases where there would be no possibility of granting anticipatory bail, if the Court comes to the conclusion on facts and satisfied that the person is entitled to anticipatory bail on certain terms and conditions, the same should be not ordinarily interfered with by this Court.

  4. Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the provisions as to ?Bail and Bonds?.

  5. Section 437 of Cr.P.C. empowers the authority of law to impose any condition while granting bail to any person accused of, which reads as under: “437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. 1[(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non- bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but- (i) Such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) Such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non- bailable and cognizable offence: Provided that the court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that the shall comply with such directions as may be given by the court.] (2) If it appears to such officer or court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, 2[the accused shall, subject to the provisions of section 446A and pending such inquiry, be released on bail], or, at the discretion of such officer or court on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided. (3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chatter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1) the court may impose any condition which the court considers necessary- (a) In order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or (b) In order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) Otherwise in the interests of justice. (4) An officer or a court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1), or sub- section (2), shall record in writing his or its 3[reasons or special reasons] for so doing. (5) Any court which has released a person on bail under sub-section (1), or sub- section (2), may, if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that such person be arrested and commit him to Custody. (6) If, any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non bailable offence is not Concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for – taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. (7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non bailable offence and before Judgment is delivered the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.”

  6. Sub-Section 2 of Section 438 envisages conditions which can be imposed while granting anticipatory bail, which as under: “438 (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub- section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including – (i) A condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer and when required; (ii) A condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly,- make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer, (iii) A condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the court; (iv) Such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted -under that section.”

  7. Section 440, 441 and 445 of Cr.P.C. are also relevant and they are extracted as under: ?440. Amount of bond and reduction thereof. (1) The amount of every bond executed under this chapter shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive. (2) The High Court or Court of Session may direct that the bail required by a police officer or Magistrate be reduced. ?441. Bond of accused and sureties. (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police officer or Court, as the case may be. (2) Where any condition is imposed for the release of any person on bail, the bond shall also contain that condition. (3) If the case so requires, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge. (4) For the purpose of determining whether the sureties are fit or sufficient, the Court may accept affidavits in proof of the facts contained therein relating to the sufficiency or fitness of the sureties, or, if it considers necessary, may either hold an inquiry itself or cause an inquiry to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to the Court, as to such sufficiency or fitness. ?445. Deposit instead of recognizance. When any person is required by any Court or officer to execute a bond with or without sureties, such Court or officer may, except in the case of a bond for good behaviour, permit him to deposit a sum of money or Government promissory notes to such amount as the Court of officer may if in lieu of executing such bond. ?

  8. A careful consideration of the provisions of Sections 437(3) and 438(2) Criminal Procedure Code shows that conditions which can be imposed are primarily with a view to ensure availability of the accused during investigation, enquiry or trial and his non-interference with the course of justice. Other conditions which Court may think fit can also be imposed but idea should be to ensure his presence as and when required and his non- interference with the investigation, enquiry or trial.

  9. Section 440 Cr.P.C. denotes that the amount of every bond executed shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive. Section 441 Cr.P.C. reads that before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person. Section 441 does not speak about deposit of any cash security. Only in certain contingencies, where the accused is unable to secure sureties for his release, he is permitted to deposit a sum of money or Government promissory Note as the Court may fix in lieu of executing such bond, under Section 445, Cr.P.C.

  10. Keeping in view of the above, the issue for consideration is whether the Court below can insist for deposit of money as a condition for grant of bail to the petitioners?

  11. In fact, this issue is no longer res integra as in catena of decisions, various High Courts as well as the Hon?ble Supreme Court have consistently held that imposing condition of depositing money is excessively onerous and unreasonable and such condition may even amount to denial of bail itself.

  12. In ?Sreenivasulu Reddy versus State of Tamil Nadu? reported in (2002) 10 SCC 653, wherein, this Court granted anticipatory bail to the accused on condition to deposit total Rs.50 crores apart from other conditions, which was also complied with by the accused, however aggrieved by imposition of such condition, the accused preferred appeal before the Hon?ble Apex Court. While dealing with the same, the Hon?ble Supreme Court had emphasized that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 438(2) of the Cr.PC, the Court ought only to impose such conditions/terms for enlarging an accused on bail as would ensure that the accused does not abscond. In para 6, it has been held as under: ?6. Having considered the rival submissions and the provisions of Section 438 Cr. PC, we are of the considered opinion that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr. PC, must bear in mind and be satisfied that the accused will not abscond or otherwise misuse liberty and this can be ascertained from several factors like conduct of the accused in the past, his assets in the country and so on. But, while granting such anticipatory bail, though the Court may impose such conditions as it thinks fit, but the object of putting conditions should be to avoid the possibility of the person hampering investigation. The discretion of the Court while putting conditions should be an exercise of judicial discretion. ?.

  13. In ?Sandeep Jain v. State of Delhi? reported in (2000) 2 SCC 66, wherein, a direction of the Metropolitan Magistrate, to deposit Rs. 2 lacs apart from furnishing of a bond of Rs. 50,000 with two solvent sureties as a condition precedent for bail, was held to be unreasonable. In ?Sheikh Ayub v. State of M.P.? (2004) 13 SCC 457, wherein, the Supreme Court deleted the direction to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-, which was the amount allegedly misappropriated by the accused.

  14. In ?Shyam Singh v. State? reported in (2006) 9 SCC 169, wherein, the Hon?ble Supreme Court, has held in para 4 as under : ?4. We are unable to appreciate even the first order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate imposing the onerous condition that an accused at the FIR stage should pay a huge sum of Rs 2 lakhs to be set at liberty. If he had paid it is a different matter. But the fact that he was not able to pay that amount and in default thereof he is to languish in jail for more than 10 months now, is sufficient indication that he was unable to make up the amount. Can he be detained in custody endlessly for his inability to pay the amount in the range of Rs 2 lakhs? If the cheques issued by his surety were dishonoured, the Court could perhaps have taken it as a ground to suggest to the payee of the cheques to resort to the legal remedies provided by law. Similarly if the Court was dissatisfied with the conduct of the surety as for his failure to raise funds for honouring the cheques issued by him, the Court could have directed the appellant to substitute him with another surety. But to keep him in prison for such a long period, that too in a case where bail would normally be granted for the offences alleged, is not only hard but improper. It must be remembered that the Court has not even come to the conclusion that the allegations made in the FIR are true. That can be decided only when the trial concludes, if the case is charge-sheeted by the police.?

  15. In ?Keshab Narayan versus State of Bihar? reported in AIR 1985 SC 1666, the Hon?ble Supreme Court held that the condition to furnish cash security with sureties for the likesum appears to be excessively onerous and such conditions may virtually amount to denial of bail itself.

  16. In ?Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 81, the Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under in para 3: ?3. Now, one reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice to the poor by keeping them for long years in pre-trial detention is our highly unsatisfactory bail system. It suffers from a property oriented approach which seems to proceed on the erroneous assumption that risk of monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice. The Code of Criminal Procedure, even after its re-enactment, continues to adopt the same antiquated approach as the earlier Code enacted towards the end of the last century and where an accused is to be released on his personal bond, it insists that the bond should contain a monetary obligation requiring the accused to pay a sum of money in case he fails to appear at the trial. Moreover, as if this were not sufficient deterrent to the poor, the courts mechanically and as a matter of course insist that the accused should produce sureties who will stand bail for him and these sureties must again establish their solvency to be able to pay up the amount of the bail in case the accused fails to appear to answer the charge. This system of bails operates very harshly against the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take advantage of it by getting themselves released on bail. The poor find it difficult to furnish bail even without sureties because very often the amount of the bail fixed by the courts is so unrealistically excessive that in a majority of cases the poor are unable to satisfy the police or the Magistrate about their solvency for the amount of the bail and where the bail is with sureties, as is usually the case, it becomes an almost impossible task for the poor to find persons sufficiently solvent to stand as sureties. The result is that either they are fleeced by the police and revenue officials or by touts and professional sureties and sometimes they have even to incur debts for securing their release or, being unable to obtain release, they have to remain in jail until such time as the court is able to take up their cases for trial, leading to grave consequences, namely, (1) though presumed innocent, they are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, (2) they are prevented from contributing to the preparation of their defence, and (3) they lose their job, if they have one, and are deprived of an opportunity to work to support themselves and their family members with the result that the burden of their detention almost invariably falls heavily on the innocent members of the family. It is here that the poor find our legal and judicial system oppressive and heavily weighted against them and a feeling of frustration and despair occurs upon them as they find that they are helplessly in a position of inequality with the non-poor. The Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat under the chairmanship of one of us, Mr Justice Bhagwati, emphasised this glaring inequality in the following words: ?The bail system, as we see it administered in the criminal courts today, is extremely unsatisfactory and needs drastic change. In the first place it is virtually impossible to translate risk of non-appearance by the accused into precise monetary terms and even its basic premise that risk of financial loss is necessary to prevent the accused from fleeing is of doubtful validity. There are several considerations which deter an accused from running away from justice and risk of financial loss is only one of them and that too not a major one. The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in the United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D.C. Bail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases. Moreover, the bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail. This discrimination arises even if the amount of the bail is fixed by the Magistrate is not high, for a large majority of those who are brought before the courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would find it difficult to furnish bail even in a small amount.?

  17. In ?Mahesh Chandra versus State of U.P.? reported in (2006) 6 SCC 196, wherein, while remitting the matter for fresh consideration, the Hon?ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court of U.P., in and by which, as a condition for grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court has recorded the undertaking of the petitioners to pay to the victim daughter-in-law a sum of Rs. 2000 per month and failure to do so would result in vacation of the order granting bail. The Hon?ble Supreme Court observed that the parties cannot be made liable to deposit Rs.2000 per month for the maintenance for the victim and while deciding a bail application, it is not the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide civil disputes as between the parties.

  18. Therefore, the practice of imposing condition for depositing of money for granting the bail has been deprecated by the High Courts and the Hon?ble Supreme Court. Of course, while granting the bail, the Court of law is entitled to put certain conditions at its discretion, however, it should not be ignored that such conditions must be reasonable and judicious and should not be arbitrary. In fact, no provision in Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates cash deposit as a condition precedent for grant of bail, but may permit the person to deposit a sum of money in lieu of executing a bond and giving surety of one or two persons. It is needless to state that granting or denying the bail depending upon the circumstances of each case, is within the exclusive discretion of the Court of law or authority, however, such discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily. Once the court comes to the conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the case that a person is entitled to the benefit of bail, then no condition other than those enumerated in Section 437(3) or 438(2) can be imposed. Imposition of such unreasonable condition is not only beyond the purview of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure but also beyond the powers of the court. Discretion does not mean that it has no arena or boundary. No Court having howsoever absolute power can traverse beyond the arena carved out for it. Even absolute discretion does not admit element of arbitrariness or whimsicality or capriciousness.

  19. Having regard to the above, this Court is of the view that the condition imposed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur in his order, dated 14.10.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.3779 and 3827 of 2014, while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners, to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000/-, is onerous and unreasonable and hence, it is set aside.

Accordingly, these Criminal Original Petitions are allowed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous petition is closed.

Suk                            05-02-2015
Index: Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
S.VAIDYANATHAN, J.

Suk

When a PARAMOUR sought maintenance from his mistress & was denied by AP HC!

A paramour who lived-in with a woman when he was already legally married to another with three other children, tries to file a restitution (RCR – sec 9 HMA) on her !! She seems to have filed a 498a cocktail in response !!. The 498a is quashed because she is NOT the legally wedded wife of that guy. Then this Paramour goes on to file Sec 125 against that woman !!! (yes !) and the lower court seems to have admitted the case. So the wife goes for quashing the case

and the Hon AP HC appreciates the facts and orders “…….When the husband is not entitled to claim maintenance even from his legally wedded wife by pressing into service Section 125 Cr.P.C., the question of claiming maintenance by a paramour from a kept mistress or a husband from his second wife is unimaginable. Allowing a paramour to claim maintenance from his kept mistress or concubine under Section 125 Cr.PC., certainly would amount to making mockery of the provisions of Cr.P.C. If this type of petitions are allowed, the very purpose of Section 125 Cr.PC will be defeated or frustrated.

  1. From a perusal of the record, it is manifest that the first respondent instituted the proceedings against the petitioner with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance against her. When the statute itself does not entitle a husband to claim maintenance, petition under Section 125 Cr.PC is not maintainable. ….”

Well.. court cases are stranger than fiction !!

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Andhra High Court

Smt.Malleshwaramma, … vs G.S.Srinivasulu, … on 15 July, 2016

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY

CRIMINAL PETITION No.6481 OF 2010

15-7-2016

Smt.Malleshwaramma, D/o.K.Venkataiah ..PETITIONER

G.S.Srinivasulu, S/o.Satyanarayana And another …RESPONDENTS

Counsel for Petitioner  :Sri C.M.R.Velu

Counsel for Respondent No.1:Ms.G.Sudha
Counsel for Respondent No.2:Public Prosecutor

HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred
1.      AIR 1988 SC 644
2.      (2005) 3 SCC 636
3.      2006(2) ALD (Crl.) 493 (AP)
4.      (2014) 1 SCC 188
5.      Keynote address on Legal Education in Social Context delivered at National Law University, Jodhpur on October 12, 2005.
6.      III (2015) DMC 705 (MP)
7.      1982 CRI.L.J. 1022
8.      (2011) 12 SCC 189
9.      Mohabhai Ali Khan v Mohd. Ibrahim Khan, (1928-29) 56 IA 201: AIR 1929 PC 135
10.     (2002) 3 SCC 533
11.     1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
12.     (2009) 3 SCC 78
13.     (1976) 3 SCC 736
14.     (2007) 12 SCC 1

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY

CRIMINAL PETITION No.6481 of 2010

ORDER:

  1. This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings in M.C. No.7 of 2010 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Shadnagar.
  2. The facts leading to filing of the present criminal petition are as follows: The first respondent herein filed M.C. No.7 of 2010 claiming maintenance of Rs.8,000/- per month from the petitioner alleging that she is his legally wedded wife and the first respondent is unable to maintain himself due to ill health. It is the case of the first respondent that his marriage was solemnized with petitioner on 27.10.1994 at Yadagirigutta as per the customs prevailing in their community. Immediately after the marriage, the petitioner joined with him to lead conjugal life and they were blessed with a daughter by name Srilatha. The petitioner left the matrimonial home of the first respondent along with her daughter at the instigation of her parents. Prior to the marriage, the first respondent helped the petitioner to prosecute her studies and get job in Health department. The first respondent filed O.P. No.72 of 2006 for restitution of conjugal rights on the file of the court of Senior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar and the same was allowed on 14.11.2007. Basing on the complaint of the petitioner, the Station House Officer, Atchampet Police Station, Mahabubnagar District registered a case in Crime No.30 of 2007 for the offences under Section 498A, 506 and 509 IPC against the first respondent. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is three fold: (1) the petitioner is not the legally wedded wife of the first respondent; (2) a husband is not entitled to claim maintenance from his wife under Section 125 Cr.PC; and (3) the proceedings against the petitioner are nothing short of abuse of process of law; therefore it is a fit case to quash the proceedings by exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC. Per contra, learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that under Section 125 Cr.P.C., first respondent is entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner, who is his legally wedded wife. She further submitted that the order passed in O.P. No.72 of 2016 clinchingly establishes that the petitioner is legally wedded wife of the first respondent.

  4. To substantiate the argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the following decisions: (i) Smt.Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v Anantral Shivaram Adhav , wherein the Honble Apex Court held as follows: 8. We, therefore, hold that the marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the Code. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. (ii) Savitaben Somabhai Bhatia v State of Gujarat , wherein the Honble Apex Court held as follows: 15. .. The marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is therefore not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the Code or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short the ‘Marriage Act’). : (iii) Buddepu Khogayya v Buddepu Kamalu , wherein this court held as follows: 7. Therefore, the averment itself clearly indicates that there is legally wedded wife to the first respondent by the date of marriage of the petitioner. Hence, she cannot be treated as wife as per the provisions of Section 125 Cr.PC and therefore, she is not entitled for any maintenance.

  5. The learned counsel for the first respondent, while submitting that strict proof of marital relationship is not necessary in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., relied upon the following decisions: (i) Badshah v Urmila Badshah Godse , wherein the Honble Apex Court held as follows: 13.3. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision (Section 125 Cr.PC), the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve social justice which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.  4. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasized that the courts have to adopt different approaches in social justice adjudication, which is also known as social context adjudication as mere adversarial approach may special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. Madhava Menon describes it eloquently: It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that social context judging is essentially the application of equality jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and the Supreme Court in myriad situations presented before courts where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the Judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. This result is achieved by what we call social context judging or social justice adjudication . (ii) Roshan Singh Nepali v Meena Nepali , wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed as follows: 4. In a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code, the Court is expected to pass appropriate order after being prima facie satisfied about the relation status of the parties. (iii) Aijaz Ahmad Lalri v Smt.Shahjehan Begum , wherein Allahabad High Court held as follows: The proceedings under Section 125, Cr.PC may be akin to civil proceedings, but one important distinction between the two cannot be overlooked, namely, the object behind the enactment of maintenance provisions in the Cr.PC. The crux of the matter always is whether the party claiming maintenance has the means or not. The law of pleading in civil cases may be more strict, but it may not be so when the matter of public policy and its objective are involved. Apart from that, the powers under Section 482 Cr.PC are exercised to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any law and when the clear finding of fact is that the opposite parties have no means to maintain themselves, the Court will not exercise any such inherent powers in favour of the applicant on account of any defect in pleadings. (iv) Pyla Mutyalamma v Pyla Suri Demudu , wherein the Honble Apex Court held at Para No.1 as follows: Under the law, a second wife whose marriage is void on account of survival of the previous marriage of her husband with a living wife is not a legally wedded wife and she is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.PC for the sole reason that law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy . But, the law also presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a man and woman have cohabited continuously for a long number of years and when the man and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.

  6. From the above case law the following principles can be deduced. (1) If a man and woman lived together for such a long time as wife and husband, the wife is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., notwithstanding establishment of marriage as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act; (2) A man who marries second time by concealing the subsistence of his valid marriage with another woman cannot escape from payment of maintenance to the second wife under Section 125 Cr.PC; 3) A woman who marries a man knowing fully well about subsistence of his valid marriage with another woman is not entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.PC. (4) While dealing with the petitions filed under Section 125 Cr.PC prima facie proof of relationship is sufficient to award maintenance.

  7. Let me consider the facts of the case on hand in the light of the above legal principles. Establishment of prima facie relationship of wife and husband is sine qua non to file petition under Section 125 Cr.PC. If the parties to the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., are Hindus, the claimant has to establish that the marriage with the first respondent is legally valid and their marriage is not hit by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

  8. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the first respondent is entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner by filing petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C or not. As per the averments made in the petition (M.C.), the marriage of the first respondent was performed with the petitioner on 27.10.1994 at Yadagirigutta as per the customs prevailing in their community. Basing on the petition averments, one can safely come to a conclusion that the petitioner is the only legally wedded wife of the first respondent. The first respondent filed O.P. No.72 of 2006 on the file of the court of Senior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar against the petitioner under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rites and the same was allowed on 14.11.2007. The first respondent is placing much reliance on the order in the O.P. to establish that the petitioner is his legally wedded wife. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not contest the O.P.; therefore, the court passed the ex parte order. Basing on the complaint lodged by the petitioner, the Station House Officer, Atchampet Police Station registered a case in Crime No.30 of 2007 against the first respondent for the offences under Sections 498A, 506 and 509 IPC. The first respondent obtained anticipatory bail in Crl.P. No.6818 of 2007 on 18.11.2007. For better appreciation of the rival contentions, it is not out of place to extract paragraph No.2 of Crl.P.No.6818 of 2007. 2. As per the said report, the petitioner herein was married and was having three children. He developed contact with her in the year 1994 when she was working at Government Civil Hospital, Perur. They together lived for 10 years at Shadnagar, Mahaboobnagar District and they were blessed with a daughter aged 11 years. It is said that suspecting her character and making wild allegations, he used to abuse her and threaten her saying that he will kill her and her daughter. He also used to abuse on Telephone the staff working in the hospital.

  9. A reading of the above paragraph clearly shows that the first respondent has taken a specific stand that he developed intimacy with the petitioner in the year 1994. If the contents of this criminal petition are taken into consideration, the first respondent did not marry the petitioner. The first respondent also filed Crl.P.No.2745 of 2007 seeking to quash the criminal proceedings against him in Crime No.30 of 2007 on the file of the Station House Officer, Atchampet Police Station. This court, vide order dated 20.7.2007, allowed the criminal petition and quashed the criminal proceedings against the first respondent in Crime No.30 of 2007 for the offence under Section 498A IPC. The relevant observations in the order read as follows: Even if the entire allegations in the complaint are taken as true and correct, they do not go to show that the de facto complainant is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner. At best, it would go to show that the de facto complainant was kept mistress. It is also stated that the petitioner was having wife and three children. The petitioner was harassing her after making her as his second wife. He was suspecting the conduct of the de facto complainant and was abusing her in vulgar language and he also threatened to kill her and her child. Therefore, the allegations do not show prima facie case of the offences under Sections 506 and 509 IPC. Hence, question of quashing the proceedings does not arise. Prima facie Section 498A IPC has no application. Hence, the proceedings are liable to be quashed.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  10. This court made an observation that the petitioner is only kept mistress of the first respondent basing on the stand taken by the first respondent in Crl.P. No.2745 of 2007.

  11. Before filing M.C. No.7 of 2010, the first respondent has taken specific stand that he developed intimacy with petitioner in the year 1994 which resulted in the birth of Srilatha. The fact remains that the petitioner was having legally wedded wife before developing contacts with petitioner in 1994. Even as per the case of the first respondent, he was blessed with three children through his first wife. In order to constitute a valid marriage, neither of the partiesif they are Hindusshall have a spouse living at the time of marriage in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

  12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles enunciated in the decisions cited supra, I am unable to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent that the petitioner is the legally wedded wife of the first respondent.

  13. Even assuming, but not admitting, that the first respondent is husband of the petitioner, the point to be determined in this case is, whether a husband is entitled to claim maintenance from wife by filing petition under Section 125 Cr.PC. It is not out of place to extract hereunder the relevant portion of Section 125 Cr.PC.

  14. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents: (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct.

  15. The object of Section 125 Cr.PC is to wipe off the tears of destitute wife, hapless legitimate or illegitimate children and parents. The Parliament in its wisdom incorporated Section 125 Cr.PC to achieve the above social object. There is a social and legal obligation on the part of a man to look after the welfare of his wife, legitimate and illegitimate minor children and parents. There is no ambiguity in the language employed in Section 125 Cr.PC.

  16. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the court shall not substitute or omit any of the words used in the statute unless there is ambiguity in it. The court has to interpret the words used in a statute in the context and the purpose for which it is used. In interpreting a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of interpretation is the literal construction. All that the Court has to see, at the very outset, is what the provision says. If the provision is unambiguous and if, from the provision, the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.

  17. In Padma Sundara Rao v State of T.N. , the Honble Apex Court in paragraph No.12 (relevant portion) observed as follows: It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

  18. It appears, the Parliament, in its wisdom, intentionally not included the words husband or spouse after the words his wife and preceding the words unable to maintain in clause (a) of Sub- section (1) of Section 125 Cr.PC; therefore, a husband is not entitled to file application under Section 125 Cr.PC claiming maintenance from the wife. My view is supported by Section 24 of HM Act, which reads as follows: 24 Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the first respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the first respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable: Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the wife or the husband, as the case may be.

  19. A perusal of Section 24 of H.M. Act makes it clear that not only the wife but also the husband is entitled to claim maintenance on showing that he has no independent source of income. However, the husband will have to satisfy the court that either due to physical or mental disability he is handicapped to earn and support his livelihood.

  20. After reading Section 24 of H.M. Act and Section 125 Cr.P.C., the court can safely arrive at a conclusion that under Section 125 Cr.P.C., husband is not entitled to claim maintenance from his wife. When the husband is not entitled to claim maintenance even from his legally wedded wife by pressing into service Section 125 Cr.P.C., the question of claiming maintenance by a paramour from a kept mistress or a husband from his second wife is unimaginable. Allowing a paramour to claim maintenance from his kept mistress or concubine under Section 125 Cr.PC., certainly would amount to making mockery of the provisions of Cr.P.C. If this type of petitions are allowed, the very purpose of Section 125 Cr.PC will be defeated or frustrated.

  21. From a perusal of the record, it is manifest that the first respondent instituted the proceedings against the petitioner with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance against her. When the statute itself does not entitle a husband to claim maintenance, petition under Section 125 Cr.PC is not maintainable. (i) In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , the Honble Supreme Court held at clause (7) of paragraph No.102 as follows: (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (ii) In V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat , the Honble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.23 as follows: 23. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure saves the inherent power of the court. It serves a salutary purpose viz. a person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a number of years although no case has been made out against him. (iii) In State of Karnataka v L.Muniswamy , the Supreme Court observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., entitles the High Court to quash proceedings when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. (iv) A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal , after examining the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, observed that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking the inherent powers of the Court.

  22. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the considered view that continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would certainly amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, it is a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in order to secure ends of justice. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  23. In the result, the criminal petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings in M.C.No.7 of 2010 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Shadnagar. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this criminal petition, shall stand closed.

T.SUNIL CHOWDARY, J

July 15, 2016.


*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.


CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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Courts can’t force husbands to pay #maintenance as condition for #Anticipatory #BAIL. Supreme Court !

In this case, the wife had filed a #498a , #406 cocktail on the husband. The husband and his parents approach the HC for #Anticipatory #bail. The HC initially sends the parties to #mediation. The mediation fails. then the HC imposes a #condition that the husband shall pay Rs 300,000 arrears and also pay Rs 12,500 p.m. as monthly maintenance as a condition for the bail.

The husband approaches the Hon Supreme court in appeal. The Hon Supreme court clearly states that courts CANNOT impose such conditions for payment of maintenance as part of the bail proceedings

The Apex court clarifies that ‘….It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all….” The Apex court goes on to state that the conditions cannot be onerous and frustrate the very purpose of the bail “…While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to bail under section 438 of the Code. ….”

The court very clearly states that “…. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/-for past maintenance and a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife and child. …”

We hope this classic case helps harassed husbands who are seeking AB in 498a, 406 cases !!

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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 344 OF 2009

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 637 of 2008)

Munish Bhasin & Ors. … Appellants

Versus

State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

J.M. PANCHAL, J.

  1. Leave granted. The complainant (wife of first appellant) to whom notice was ordered on 25.01.2008 is impleaded as second respondent.
  2. Heard Counsel.

  3. The appellant (accused no. 1) assails the condition imposed by the High Court requiring him to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- as maintenance to his wife and child while granting anticipatory bail to him and his parents with reference to the complaint filed by his wife for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

  4. The marriage of the appellant was solemnized with Ms. Renuka on December 05, 2004. She has filed a complaint in November 2006, against the appellant and his parents for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code on the grounds that after marriage she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty for bringing less dowry and that her stri-dhan entrusted to them has been dishonestly misappropriated by them. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  5. Apprehending arrest, the appellant and his parents moved High Court of Delhi for anticipatory bail. The application came up for consideration before a Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 22.02.2007. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor accepted notice and submitted that the matter was essentially a matrimonial dispute and therefore the parties should be referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Cell of the Delhi High Court. The Learned Judge agreed with the suggestion made by the Additional Public Prosecutor and directed the parties to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Cell of the Delhi High Court on March 02, 2007. The case was ordered to be listed on 10.05.2007. The Learned Judge further directed that in the event of arrest of the appellant and his parents, before the next date of hearing, they shall be released on bail on their furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer/ Arresting Officer concerned, subject however, to the condition that the appellant and his parents shall surrender their passports to the Investigating Officer and shall file affidavits in the Court that they would not leave the country without prior permission of the Court.

  6. From the records, it appears that the conciliation proceedings failed and therefore the bail application was taken up for hearing on merits. On representation made by the wife of the appellant, the counsel of the appellant was directed to produce appellant’s salary slip. Accordingly, the salary slip of the appellant was produced before the Court which indicated that the appellant was drawing gross salary of Rs.41,598/- and after deductions of advance tax etc., his net salary was Rs.33,000/-. The Learned Single Judge of the High Court took the notice of the fact that the appellant had the duty to maintain his wife and the child and therefore as a condition for grant of anticipatory bail, directed the appellant, by the order dated 07.08.2007 to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance to his wife and child. The Learned Single Judge also directed to pay arrears at the rate of Rs. 12,500/- per month from August 2005, that is Rs. 3,00,000/- within six months. The imposition of these conditions for grant of anticipatory bail is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal.

  7. From the perusal of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 438, it is evident that when the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under subsection (1) to release an accused alleged to have committed non-bailable offence, the Court may include such conditions in such direction in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including (i) a condition that a person shall make himself available for interrogation by police officer as and when required, (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer, (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court and (iv) such other conditions as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. Sub-section (3) of Section 437, inter alia, provides that when a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1), the Court shall impose the following conditions-(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, (b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and (c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence. The Court may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary.

  8. It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all. The conditions which can be imposed by the Court while granting anticipatory bail are enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 438 and subsection (3) of Section 437 of the Code. Normally, conditions can be imposed (i) to secure the presence of the accused before the investigating officer or before the Court, (ii) to prevent him from fleeing the course of justice, (iii) to prevent him from tampering with the evidence or to prevent him from inducing or intimidating the witnesses so as to dissuade them from disclosing the facts before the police or Court or (iv) restricting the movements of the accused in a particular area or locality or to maintain law and order etc. To subject an accused to any other condition would be beyond jurisdiction of the power conferred on Court under section 438 of the Code. While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to bail under section 438 of the Code. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/-for past maintenance and a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife and child. The case of the appellant is that his wife Renuka is employed and receiving a handsome salary and therefore is not entitled to maintenance. Normally, the question of grant of maintenance should be left to be decided by the competent Court in an appropriate proceedings where the parties can adduce evidence in support of their respective case, after which liability of husband to pay maintenance could be determined and appropriate order would be passed directing the husband to pay amount of maintenance to his wife. The record of the instant case indicates that the wife of the appellant has already approached appropriate Court for grant of maintenance and therefore the High Court should have refrained from granting maintenance to the wife and child of the appellant while exercising powers under section 438 of the Code. The condition imposed by the High court directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as maintenance to his wife and child is onerous, unwarranted and is liable to be set aside.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

  9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The direction contained in order dated August 07, 2007 rendered by Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Bail Application No. 423 of 2007 requiring the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance (both past and future) to his wife and child is hereby deleted. Rest of the directions contained in the said order are maintained. It is however clarified that any amount received by the wife of the appellant pursuant to the order of the High Court need not be refunded by her to the appellant and will be adjusted subject to the result of application for maintenance filed by wife of the appellant under Section 125 of the Code before the appropriate Court.

  10. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.

…………………………J. [R.V. Raveendran]

…………………………J. [J.M. Panchal]

New Delhi;

February 20, 2009.


*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.


CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting


Hon JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA quashes #fake498a against NRI husband. Guj HC #498aQuash

In this case, wife files #498a case on her #NRI_Husband. Three incidents are alleged, one of which is on on Feb 2014 while the husband has left India on 04th june 2013 !! He seems to have taken employment and is living in Bahrain (Middle East). The Mother in law is projected as a cruel woman but the allegations against her are vague in nature.

The Hon Judge orders as follows “….I have no hesitation worth the name in quashing the proceedings of the Criminal Case referred to above so far as the mother-in-law is concerned. As such, there are no allegations which constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Whatever allegations have been levelled are quite vague and general. So far as the husband is concerned, I take notice of the fact that from June 2013 he is in Bahrain. It seems that he has taken up employment in Bahrain. As usual, it appears that the first informant could not adjust herself at her matrimonial home on account of the disputes which could be termed as mundane matters. In the result, this application is allowed. The FIR being CR-II No.44 of 2014 registered with the Jalalpore Police Station, District Navsari, as well as the proceedings of the Criminal Case No.3757 of 2014 pending in the Court of the learned JMFC, Navsari, are hereby quashed. …”

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R/CR.MA/12027/2015 ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 12027 of 2015

===============

PARESHBHAI PRAVINBHAI PATEL & 1….Applicant(s)

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT & 1….Respondent(s)

================

Appearance:
MR ZUBIN F BHARDA, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 – 2
DS AFF.NOT FILED (R) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS NISHA THAKORE, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 02/02/2017

ORAL ORDER

The respondent no.2 although served with the notice issued by this Court, yet has chosen not to remain present either in person or through an advocate and oppose this application.

By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicants – original accused nos.1 and 2 seek to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the FIR being CR-II No.44 of 2014 registered with the Jalalpore Police Station, District Navsari, for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 504 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The applicants before me are none other than the husband and the mother-in-law of the respondent no.2 – first informant.

It appears from the materials on record that the respondent no.2 got married to the applicant no.1 on 10th December 2012. It is alleged in the FIR that the husband is addicted to liquor. The husband used to pick up quarrel on petty issues and harass the first informant.

In the FIR, there is a reference of three specific incidents. Let me start with the incident of 15th February 2013. It is alleged that on that day, the applicant no.1 came home heavily drunk and started beating the first informant. According to the first informant, she left the matrimonial home. While at her parental home, she realized that she had conceived. On 28th September 2013, the first informant gave birth to a baby girl at the Civil Hospital, Navsari. It is alleged that no one from the family of the husband came to inquire about the health of the first informant or to have a look at the new born baby. The third incident is dated 26th February 2014. It is alleged that on that particular day, the applicant no.1 called up the first informant on her mobile and told her that if she would get Rs.1 lac from her parents he would come on the next day and take her back to the matrimonial home. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

As usual, the mother-in-law has also been projected as a very cruel woman.

Mr.Bharda, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, submitted that even if the entire case of the first informant is accepted or believed to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute an offence of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code are spelt out. He submitted that the FIR is false for the simple reason that on 26th February 2014, the applicant no.1 was not in India and was in Bahrain (Middle East). The learned counsel pointed out that the applicant no.1 left India on 4th June 2013. This itself goes to show that the FIR was concocted by levelling false allegations. He submitted that there is no case worth the name so far as the mother-in-law is concerned.

On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Ms.Thakore, the learned APP appearing for the State. The learned APP would submit that the plain reading of the FIR prima facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence. The learned APP would submit that the police should be permitted to complete the investigation so far as the applicant no.1 is concerned. She pointed out that charge-sheet has been filed so far as the mother-in-law is concerned, and in the said charge-sheet, the applicant no.1 has been shown as an absconder. She prays that this application be rejected. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the FIR so far as the applicant no.1 is concerned, should be quashed and the proceedings of the Criminal Case No.3757 of 2014 pending in the Court of the learned JMFC, Navsari, so far as the applicant no.2 is concerned, should be quashed. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick

I have no hesitation worth the name in quashing the proceedings of the Criminal Case referred to above so far as the mother-in-law is concerned. As such, there are no allegations which constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Whatever allegations have been levelled are quite vague and general. So far as the husband is concerned, I take notice of the fact that from June 2013 he is in Bahrain. It seems that he has taken up employment in Bahrain. As usual, it appears that the first informant could not adjust herself at her matrimonial home on account of the disputes which could be termed as mundane matters.

In the result, this application is allowed. The FIR being CR-II No.44 of 2014 registered with the Jalalpore Police Station, District Navsari, as well as the proceedings of the Criminal Case No.3757 of 2014 pending in the Court of the learned JMFC, Navsari, are hereby quashed. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.

(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)

MOIN


*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.


CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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Don’t convert BAIL 2 recovery proceedings & civil case 2 criminal case! Excellent Delhi HC Anticipatory

An elderly couple approach the Delhi HC seeking bail. Their son’s failed SECOND marriage is the cause of their misery. The young couple have met in London and married, stayed and separated in Dubai but the daughter in law has filed 498a etc on the elderly in-laws. The daughter in law has alleged gifts worth crores of rupees without much proof. The lower court has tried to make bail concomitant with recovery of money / promised settlement etc !! The Hon Delhi HC sees thru the entire matrix, appreciates that the elders have had little or NO role in the lives of the couple. The Hon orders that “…Since allegations in the complaint are to the effect that jewellery and gifts worth crores were given by the parents and relatives of the complainant, instant case would require a prior investigation by the investigating officer before petitioners are made to account for the gifts, whether at all the family of the complainant had the means to shower gifts of such magnitude…..” The court also reiterates that “…Case is thus made to admit petitioners to anticipatory bail. While so directing, I am conscious of the failed compromise talks before the learned Additional Sessions Judge but I cannot ignore the fact that proceedings for bail cannot be converted into recovery proceedings. ….” and thus grants bail to the elders !!

Please note that this case is from 2007 !! yes approx 9.5 years ago !! the court has in many places says that the case against the elders is unwarranted ! the Hon court refers to multiple decisions where 498a has been misused including Sushil Kumr sharma case !!

Still in 2017 there seems to be NO let up to the number of false cases and ways to milk men !!

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Delhi High Court

Smt. Surjit Kaur Chopra vs State And Anr. [Along With Bail … on 21 August, 2007

Author: P Nandrajog

Bench: P Nandrajog

JUDGMENT Pradeep Nandrajog, J.

FIR No.6/2007 dated 3.1.2007 under Section 498A/406 IPC PS Hazrat Nizamuddin.

  1. Vide Bail Application No. 1711/2007, Smt. Surjit Kaur Chopra seeks anticipatory bail. Vide Bail Application No. 1716/2007, Sh. Harbhajan Singh Chopra seeks anticipatory bail. The 2 applicants are the mother-in-law and father-in-law respectively of the complainant, Arti.
  2. At the outset, I must refer my displeasure at the manner in which Bail Application No. 1711/2007 has been drafted by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
  3. The same is a verbatim copy of Bail Application No. 1716/2007.
  4. Use of computers does not mean that learned members of the Bar would not apply their mind. Human beings cannot become computers and start operating themselves by clicking a mouse.
  5. Little realizing that in Bail Application No. 1716/2007 reference to the applicant was made as father of the husband of the complainant i.e. as father-in-law of the complainant, even Smt. Surjit Kaur Chopra has been referred to as father of the husband of the complainant i.e. father-in-law of the complainant.
  6. In the instant case, the misdescription may be trivial. But in large number of cases I notice that the misdescription is not trivial, more so, when disputes relate to complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. In said cases description of the accused with reference to the role assigned becomes relevant. Precious judicial time is wasted in identifying who is being referred to and in what context reference is being made pertaining to persons accused of offence and who have filed quashing petitions challenging the summoning order.
  7. It is hoped and expected that learned members of the Bar would justify them being referred to as ‘learned Counsel’. Their being learned must be reflected in their pleadings.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick.
  8. Referring to the facts, why else would a father-in-law and mother-in-law be seeking bail? Of course, when their daughter-in-law has filed a complaint resulting in registration of FIR under Section 498A/406/34 IPC. This has happened in the instant case.
  9. Since issue of anticipatory bail has to be decided, reference to the FIR becomes necessary.
  10. Touching upon the salient features of the FIR, complainant Arti, stated that she met Jitender Singh Chopra, son of the applicants in London in July 2004 through common friends. She states that the two met a number of times and around 3rd week of September 2004 decided to get married in Dubai on 30.9.2004. She stated that she and Jitender Singh Chopra came to Delhi and got engaged. That at the time of engagement presents worth Rs. 15 lakhs were gifted by her parents to the in-laws and relatives of Jitender. That her in-laws gave her jewellery worth Rs. 40 lakhs. That at the asking of her prospective mother-in-law, for relatives who were not present at the engagement, her mother sent additional gifts worth Rs. 5 lakhs. That marriage between the complainant and Jitender was solemnized at Dubai on 27.10.2004 as per Hindu rites and customs. At the time of marriage her mother, relatives and friends gave gifts worth Rs. 70 lakhs. Her in-laws gifted her jewellery worth Rs. 90 lakhs. Next day her mother-in-law took away the jewellery for safe keeping. She and her husband came to Delhi on 3.11.2004 and stayed at the farm house of the in-laws. The couple celebrated their first Deepawali. On said function her relatives gave gifts worth Rs. 40 lakhs to her husband. That her mother and her relatives gave her ancestral jewellery worth Rs. 1.75 lakhs at said function. That her in-laws gave her expensive gifts and jewellery worth Rs. 80 lakhs. That when they were at Delhi her brother-in-law tried to force himself upon her. That she was disgraced by the family of her in-laws who stated that they expected that she would bring a Mercedes car in her dowry. That when the couple left for their honeymoon her husband compelled her to drink excessively as also to indulge in vulgar sexual acts. That since it was her second marriage she did not speak to anyone. That on 18.1.2005 she and her husband went back to Dubai. For said trip her husband demanded Rs. 25 lakhs from her mother. Her mother arranged Rs. 5 lakhs and gave the same to her husband. That her husband demanded more money. Her mother paid Rs. 15 lakhs. That she came back to Delhi on 29.12.2005 and in spite of requests to hand over her jewellery, none was being returned to her. That her father-in-law wanted her parents to transfer ownership rights of 2 floors of their house in name of her husband. That her mother-in-law had retained her jewellery.
  11. According to the petitioners the marriage at Dubai was financed by the petitioners. Entire stay of the family of the bride was paid for by the petitioners. That after the wedding, the newly wed came to Delhi to celebrate their first Deepawali and went back to Dubai in February 2005. They took on rent a villa and resided separately from the petitioners. That the couple separated due to temperamental differences. That their son sought divorce in London due to irreconcilable differences. That the FIR was a counter blast to the divorce petition filed by their son.
  12. Before dealing with the rival submissions on the issue whether petitioners should be granted anticipatory bail or not, it has to be noted that petitioners as also their second son i.e. the brother-in-law of the complainant sought anticipatory bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Attempts were made to compromise the matter and in full and final satisfaction of all claims of the complainant not only the FIR be withdrawn but the couple could agree for an amicable settlement. Order dated 29.3.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge records that a settlement was arrived at pursuant whereto complainant would be paid Rs. 4 crores in cash and a flat at DLF Gurgaon worth Rs. 60 lacs would be transferred in her name. Thereafter, the talks broke down inasmuch as offer was reduced to Rs. 2 crores.
  13. Petitioners when charged with attempting to wriggle out of an agreed settlement explained that their younger son was briefing the counsel and he was receiving instructions from the husband of the complainant for the reason any payment under the settlement had to be financed by the husband of the complainant. That unfortunately, their son i.e. husband of the complainant could not firm up his mind and for said reason settlement failed.
  14. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior Counsel for the applicants urged that proceedings for grant of anticipatory bail cannot be converted into a recovery proceedings. Learned senior Counsel urged that the anxiety of the Court to try and effect a settlement between the warring couple may be a laudable act but is alien to the exercise of jurisdiction while deciding an application seeking grant of anticipatory bail. Learned senior Counsel urged that the well known parameters viz. gravity of the offence, seriousness of the allegations constituting the offence, possibility of the accused absconding or threatening witnesses of the prosecution, inherent probabilities, for and against the accused are some of the factors which have to be considered by the Court while deciding an application for grant of anticipatory bail.
  15. Expanding the argument, learned senior Counsel submitted that documents annexed as Annexure-C to the petitions conclusively establish that the petitioners paid the entire bill at Dubai when marriage took place. Drawing attention to Annexure-D, learned senior Counsel urged that the same evidences that the newly married couple set up separate residence in Dubai. As regards the petitioners, learned senior Counsel urged that they were residents of Delhi. Their son was settled abroad. Except for participating in the joyous occasion of the marriage of their son and showering their blessings and gifts upon the newly wed as also to finance the marriage, the two had no role to play in the matrimonial life of the couple. Learned senior Counsel further urged that allegations in the FIR are alien to the social norms of the society from which complainant, her family and the petitioners come from. Learned senior Counsel explained that main items are gifted to the couple at the time of their marriage. Thereafter, as and when festive occasions occur, small gifts are exchanged. Learned senior Counsel urged that it was unbelievable that at the time of Deepawali celebrations after the couple got married, complainant’s family members would gift to their daughter and her in-laws, gifts worth Rs. 1.75 crores. Learned senior Counsel further submitted that the allegations of dowry demand are against the husband i.e. the son of the petitioners. Allegations of mental and physical cruelty are against the husband save and except a vague allegation that on one occasion father-in-law threw a plate at the complainant and abused her as a bitch. Learned senior Counsel stated that the two allegations pertaining to dowry demand against the father-in-law viz. that he expected his daughter-in-law to bring a Mercedes car and a demand for ownership rights of 2 floors in her parent’s house at Sunder Nagar are false. Learned senior Counsel submitted that the gravement of the allegation against the mother-in-law is that she retained the jewellery of the complainant.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick.
  16. Learned senior Counsel urged that in view of the fact that the complainant and her husband had set up their matrimonial house at Dubai, a residence separate from that of the petitioners, considering the social background of the family of the complainant as also the petitioners it was unbelievable that the complainant would have handed over her jewellery to her mother-in-law.
  17. Fulcrum of opposition by learned Counsel for the complainant centered around the orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge regarding a settlement between the parties from which petitioners back tracked. Learned Counsel submitted that the said settlement evidenced the acknowledgment by the petitioners that the complainant had to be recompensed. Learned Counsel submitted that the jewellery articles of the complainant have yet to be recovered. Counsel submitted that the complainants have started dissipating their assets. Thus, counsel urged that no case is made out to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
  18. It is not in dispute that the instant marriage was the second marriage of both parties. Thus, both would be presumed to be aware of not only their matrimonial obligations but even the matrimonial laws. Judicial authorities are replete with a caution by the Courts that the unfortunate tendency to rope in all family members of the in-laws is a growing trend which has two side effects. Firstly, innocent persons suffer the trauma of a criminal prosecution and secondly, even the accused get acquitted for the reason, false implication of innocent persons is followed by presentation of fabricated evidence before the Court. So inextricably interwoven is truth with lies that truth cannot be segregated from lies resulting in benefit of doubt being given even to the accused persons.
  19. More often than not, pertaining to dowry, Courts are faced with a dilemma inasmuch as tax avoidance is the norm in India. Huge volume of black money in circulation finds expression in ostentatious marriages. But when called upon to prove that the family had enough assets to justify the stated gifts gifted at the time of marriage, family members of the girl side have no answers. They cannot establish the means to justify their capacity to shower gifts worth crores.
  20. In the instant case, before the in-laws of the complainant can be called upon to account for the gifts given by the parents of the girl, the parents of the girl would have to establish their means and their capacity to gift items worth Rs. 3 crores to their daughter and her in-laws.
  21. As noted above, gravement of the allegations are directed principally against the husband. No doubt, there is reference against the petitioners pertaining to dowry demand and retention of jewellery, but, as noted above, allegations of dowry demand are against the father-in-law and not against the mother-in-law. Vice versa, allegations pertaining to retention of the jewellery of the complainant is against the mother-in-law and not the father-in-law. Thus, if at all, father-in-law may be answerable to a charge under Section 498A IPC. If at all, mother-in-law may be answerable for a charge under Section 406 IPC.
  22. Qua the mother-in-law a circumstance which stands out is that her son and her daughter-in-law had a separate residence at Dubai. The couple was married at Dubai. Whatever may be the jewellery gifted to the complainant at the time of marriage, there is no material on record that when she along with her husband came to India they made a declaration to the Customs Authority that personal jewellery worth crores was being brought by her i.e. the complainant to India. Greater probability would be that either jewellery of the value alleged to be gifted to her by the complainant was not gifted to her, or if gifted, the same was in her custody at Dubai.
  23. . Pertaining to the father-in-law I find that the allegations are general. It is not stated in the complaint that because father-in-law desired that the complainant should bring a Mercedes car he i.e. the father-in-law took vengeance against the complainant. What is stated in the FIR is that the father-in-law commented that he expected that the complainant would bring as part of dowry a Mercedes car.
  24. Prima facie, it is one thing to have a desire and express the same. It is altogether another thing to raise a demand as per the desire.
  25. Allegation of mental cruelty against the father-in-law pertains to an alleged incident when according to the complainant she served cold food to her father-in-law. Prima facie, said allegation of cruelty does not relate to a dowry demand.
  26. . The only other allegation pertaining to transfer of 2 floors in the house of the complainant’s parents at Sunder Nagar is without any particulars i.e. the day or the month when said demand was raised.
  27. In the report published as Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. in para 13 the Hon’ble Supreme Court lamented as under: 13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests o lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.
  28. In para 19 of the report published as Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India the Supreme Court observed as under:  19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to the trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentional provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a license to unscrupulous persons to wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike a the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin’s weapon. If the cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of the investigating agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalized a statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of a watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.
  29. In the decision dated 23.2.2007 in Crl.M.C. No. 7262/2006 Neera Singh v. State and Ors. a learned Single Judge of this Court had pains to note as under: 4. Now-a-days, exorbitant claims are made about the amount spent on marriage and other ceremonies and on dowry and gifts. In some cases claim is made of spending crores of rupees on dowry without disclosing the source of income and how funds flowed. I consider time has come that courts should insist upon disclosing source of such funds and verification of income from tax returns and police should insist upon the compliance of the Rules under Dowry Prohibition Act and should not entertain any complaint, if the rules have not been complied with. Rule 2 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of List of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 reads as under: 2. Rules in Accordance With Which Lists of Presents Are to Be Maintained. – (1) The list of presents which are given at the time of the marriage to the bride shall be maintained by the bride. (2) The list of presents which are given at the time of the marriage to the bridegroom shall be maintained by the bridegroom. (3) Every list of presents referred to in Sub-rule (2)-(a) shall be prepared at the time of the marriage or as soon as possible after the marriage; (b) shall be in writing; (c) shall contain: (i) a brief description of each present; (ii) the approximate value of the present; (iii) the name of the person who has given the present; and (iv) where the person giving the present is related to the bride or bridegroom, a description of such relationship. (d) shall be signed by both the brides and the bridegroom. 5. The Metropolitan Magistrate should take cognizance of the offence under the Act in respect of the offence of giving dowry whenever allegations are made that dowry was given as a consideration of marriage, after demand. Courts should also insist upon compliance with the rules framed under the Act and if rules are not complied with, an adverse inference should be drawn. If huge cash amounts are alleged to be given at the time of marriage which are not accounted anywhere, such cash transactions should be brought to the notice of the Income Tax Department by the Court so that source of income is verified and the person is brought to law. It is only because the Courts are not insisting upon compliance with the relevant provisions of law while entertaining such complaints and action is taken merely on the statements of the complainant, without any verification that a large number of false complaints are pouring in.http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; https://twitter.com/ATMwithDick.
  30. Admittedly, neither complainant nor her family members have complied with Rule 2 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of List of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules 1985.
  31. Since allegations in the complaint are to the effect that jewellery and gifts worth crores were given by the parents and relatives of the complainant, instant case would require a prior investigation by the investigating officer before petitioners are made to account for the gifts, whether at all the family of the complainant had the means to shower gifts of such magnitude.
  32. I note that the husband of the complainant is paying to her a monthly maintenance of Rs. 1 lakh.
  33. Learned Counsel for the State did not urge that the petitioners are not cooperating with the IO.
  34. The special circumstances of the case may be summarized:
    • (a) Marriage is a love marriage and took place at Dubai. There is prima facie evidence that marriage expenses were borne by the in-laws of the complainant.
    • (b) The young couple took up separate residence at Dubai and stayed their after the marriage till they came to India to celebrate their first Deepawali festival. The complainant stayed with her in-laws for about 10 days. The couple departed for their honeymoon.
    • (c) Allegations in the FIR are primarily directed against the husband. Prima facie it appears to be a case of temperamental difference between the husband and the wife.
    • (d) There are no allegations of dowry demand against the mother-in-law. Allegation against her is of retaining the jewellery gifted by her parents as stated by the complainant to be in the value of over Rs. 2 crores. There is no evidence that jewellery of such magnitude was gifted.
    • (e) Allegations of dowry demand against the father-in-law only relate to transfer of ownership rights of 2 floors in a property at Sunder Nagar in the name of the husband of the complainant. The allegation is of a general nature. The time, date and month of demand has not been specified.
    • (f) The couple separated at Dubai. The petitioners did not have a joint residence with the complainant and thus could not be in possession of her jewellery.
  35. Case is thus made to admit petitioners to anticipatory bail. While so directing, I am conscious of the failed compromise talks before the learned Additional Sessions Judge but I cannot ignore the fact that proceedings for bail cannot be converted into recovery proceedings. I find prima facie justification of the petitioners that their younger son was briefing the counsel and was informing the counsel what was being consented to by the son of the petitioners. If the son of the petitioners back tracks from his commitment, petitioners cannot be faulted with.
  36. I additionally note that the complainant is being paid a monthly maintenance of Rs. 1 lakh by her husband.
  37. Petition stands disposed of directing that on the petitioners surrendering their passport to the Investigating Officer and cooperating at the inquiry to be conducted by the Investigating Officer, in the event of the petitioners being arrested by the IO, the petitioners would be released on bail by the IO on the petitioners furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the IO in the above captioned FIR.
  38. Needless to state, the petitioners would join the investigation as and when required by the IO.
  39. Copy of the order be supplied dusty to learned Counsel for the petitioners.


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