Daily Archives: December 15, 2015

Parents of absconding NRI get discharged due to insufficient evidence against them !! Delhi HC

Good case for NRI sons where wife has NOT lived with parents and there is insufficient evidence against parents. Hope you can use this to save your parents !! Yes 15 Lakhs has been paid at the time of bail, but that may depend / vary case to case. some may NOT even pursue a bail so vigorously

* woman has taken rs 15 lakhs at the time of bail , However 498a case continues !!
* NRI husband accused in 498a etc (from Nigeria) is NOT traceable
* Insufficient evidence against parents. So police do not file CS on parents
* However Magistrate takes cognizance and refuses to disharge parents
* Elders move HC and HC discharges them, approx 6 years after the FIR !!

* In a way the husband also seems to have dragged the mail 498a case all along !!

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CRL.REV.P. 66/2015

Date of Reserve: 02.12.2015
Date of decision: 09.12.2015

ANIL KUMAR & ANR. ….. PETITIONERS
Through: Mr.Randhir Jain, Mr.Dhananjai Jain and Mr.Bhoop Singh, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT DELHI ….. RESPONDENT
Through: Ms. Rajni Gupta, APP. ASI Davender, P.S. Dabri
Mr. Naresh Kumar, Advocate for the respondent No.2.

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

ASHUTOSH KUMAR , J.

1. The petitioners, who are the parents in law of the complainant Vandana Jain, have challenged the order dated 09.01.2015 whereby the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Courts-02, Dwarka Courts, Delhi has refused to discharge them with respect to offence under Section 498A of the IPC in connection with FIR No.55/11 (P.S.Dabri).

2. The complainant Vandana Jain had lodged an FIR alleging that she got married to one Nitin Jain, son of the petitioners on 03.03.2009 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals at Delhi. At the time of marriage, tall claims were made by the accused persons regarding their financial strength and status in society but those claims were shortly found to be false. It was alleged that after the marriage, the accused persons insinuated the complainant of bringing insufficient dowry and she was asked to hand over all the personal jewellery. The husband of the complainant was working at Nigeria. The petitioner No.1 was alleged to have behaved in a strange fashion and occasionally displayed abusive behavior as against the complainant. Petitioner No.2, the mother-in-law of the complainant taunted her for bringing less dowry and asked her to deposit all her jewellery with the in-laws. The complainant has alleged of being assaulted physically by her husband in an inebriated condition. When the complainant visited Nigeria, she was made to stay in a flat which was shared by the relatives of her husband. The husband and his relatives were in the habit of consuming liquor and watching pornographic films. Her protest regarding the same was met with physical and mental torture. On deterioration of her health, she came back to India. After coming back from Nigeria, she was ill treated in her matrimonial home and was made to do all house hold work. After sometime, the husband of the complainant left for Nigeria, never to come back. The complainant has alleged that such acts of torture and harassment made her extremely depressed and she had to undergo treatment for the same in a hospital at Delhi. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that a complaint was given to the CAW Cell in which the complainant had stated that she had been residing with her parents for the last six months. Before the CAW Cell, the complainant did not appear on several dates and did not produce the list of dowry articles. The CAW Cell kept the matter pending for about two years and the FIR was registered only on 12.02.2011.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the police, after investigation submitted a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sending up the husband of the complainant only for trial and with respect to the petitioners it was stated that there were no sufficient materials to put them on trial.

5. Despite this, the Court of the learned Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioners under Sections 498A/406 and 34 of the IPC by order dated 13.09.2013.

6. The aforesaid order dated 13.09.2013 was never challenged before any Court of law.

7. An application for discharge by the petitioners was rejected by the Court below vide order dated 09.01.2015. Hence the present petition.

8. Perused the records and heard the counsel for the parties.

9. The charge sheet which was filed by the police clearly discloses that the husband of the complainant was residing in Nigeria and he could not be traced. The charge sheet also took note of the fact that during the course of investigation, when the petitioners had prayed for bail, the dispute was settled between them and the complainant on deposit of Rs.15 lakhs by the order of the High Court. The complainant had accepted such amount towards settlement of her matrimonial disputes. Initially an amount of Rs.15 lakhs was deposited with the Registrar General of Delhi High Court but on the request of the complainant, the same was released in her favour. The complainant who is present in person admits of her having received the aforesaid amount.

10. With respect to the allegations against the petitioners regarding abusive behavior, insinuation about insufficient dowry and ill treatment, the police, on investigation, found the evidence to be absolutely deficient. Only Nitin Jain, the husband of the complainant was sent up for trial for the offence under Sections 498A/406 of the IPC.

11. Differing with the police report, the learned Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioners under Sections 498A/406 and 34 of the IPC.

12. On the petition of discharge, the learned Court below accepted the submission of the petitioners with respect to offence under Section 406 IPC but rejected the prayer of discharge under Section 498A IPC and fixed a date for framing of the charge.

13. The impugned order refers to Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr, 2008(1) JCC 65 wherein the Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of the charge, the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record and is only to see whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed. The Court is not required to see whether conviction of the accused is possible on such material. Even a strong suspicion can lead the Court to form a presumptive opinion about the materials being sufficient to constitute an offence. In that event, charge must be framed.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the order of refusal to discharge on twin grounds namely (i) the power of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to the facts of this case and

(ii) the materials collected during the course of investigation and the developments which took place, did not make out any case under Section 498A against the petitioners.

15. The submission of the petitioners with respect to the issue of limitation in taking cognizance of the offence within a period of three years is not acceptable for the reason that the date of occurrence is stated to be on or before 15.09.2009 whereas the FIR No.55/11 (P.S.Dabri) was lodged on 12.02.2011. The complaint before the CAW Cell was lodged on 28.01.2010.

16. However, cognizance was taken on 13.09.2013, i.e. after 3 years.

17. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as hereunder:-

“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation.

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court
shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-
section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be-

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for
term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.”

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in
relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined
with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more
severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.”

18. In Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director and Ors, (2014) 2 SCC 62, the Supreme Court deliberated on the question whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant date is the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.

19. A conflict of opinion was seen by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision in Bharat Damodar Kale vs. State of A.P (2003) 8 SCC 559 and in Krishna Pillai vs. T.A.Rajendran, 1990 Supp.SCC

121. In Bharat Damodar Kale (Supra) a two Judge bench of Supreme Court held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date is the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of a process by the Court. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

20. In Krishna Pillai (Supra) a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 held that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

21. Under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, cognizance was barred after one year of the date of commission of the offence.

22. In Sara Mathew (Supra) the controversy was laid at rest and it was held that for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

23. The verdict of the Supreme Court in Bharat Damodar Kale (Supra) was held to be a correct law.

24. Thus the aforesaid contention of the petitioners has got no legs to stand.

25. In order to appreciate the second contention of the petitioners namely insufficiency of the materials for putting the petitioners on trial and peculiar developments which had taken place in the case during the course of investigation, it is necessary to examine the provisions of Sections 239 & 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the case in hand is a warrant case instituted on a police report.

“Section 239 of Cr.P.C. When accused shall be discharged.-

If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it
under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused
as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution
and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate
considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall
discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.

240. Framing of charge.

(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing,
the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter,
which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion,
could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a
charge against the accused.

(2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and
he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or
claims to be tried.”

26. The ambit of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the approach to be adopted by the Court while exercising the powers vested in it under the said provisions was considered by the Supreme Court in Onkar Nath Mishra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr, 2008 (2) SCC 561. In the aforesaid case, it was held that at that stage, even a strong suspicion would justify framing of charges. The aforesaid view was only a reiteration of the view taken by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, 1977(2) SCC 699; State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996 (4) SCC 659 and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, 2000 (6) SCC 338. The view which was common in all the aforesaid decisions that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into and the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. The same view was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Anr., 2013(1) SCC page 476.

27. The materials/evidence for framing of charge under Section 498A, as contended by the petitioners, is required to be analysed keeping in mind the aforementioned principles enunciated by the Supreme Court.

28. The FIR clearly makes out a case of the husband of the complainant not treating her well. The complainant went to Nigeria, only to find that her husband was in the habit of drinking alcohol and watching pornographic films. The house in which the complainant was kept was shared by other relatives of the husband. There is no mention of the petitioners having gone to Nigeria to stay with their son or with the complainant. The averments made in the FIR further disclose that the tall claims of the family of the petitioners was found to be false during the period when the complainant had the opportunity to stay in the matrimonial family. Though it is stated that she was insinuated and taunted for bringing less dowry and was made to do household work as if she was a maid servant of the house, but no specific instance of such acts of cruelty have been listed by the complainant. A vague and general allegation has been raised that she was not treated well in her matrimonial home when she came back from Nigeria. The FIR also refers to the assessment of the complainant that the petitioners did not want her to come back to India.

29. Apart from this, admittedly, the complainant accepted Rs.15 lakhs towards settlement of her matrimonial dues. The husband of the complainant who is the son of the petitioners is untraceable.

30. A protracted investigation in the matter also did not yield any definitive finding regarding the guilt of the petitioners. The petitioners were not sent up for trial.

31. The Court below, while quoting from Onkar Nath Mishra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr (Supra) did not refer to the facts which led it to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of materials which constitute the offence under Section 498A of the IPC as against the petitioners.

32. Thus for the aforementioned reasons, the order dated 09.01.2015 is not sustainable and is set aside.

33. The petitioners stand discharged.

34. The petition is allowed.

Crl.M.A.1671/2015

1. In view of the petition having been allowed, this application has become infructuous.

2. This application is disposed of accordingly.

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J

DECEMBER 09, 2015

k

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE with necessary Emphasis, Re formatting
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40lakhs for defamation quash. Wid all ransom can send rockets 2 moon& really develop India! Alas!

The Husband seems to have fought back well and filed a lot of counter cases. As far as I recall this husband had gone up to HC to get a DP 3 complaint registered on the wife…. However he has paid up probably due to other pressures best know to him. We respect all those who take efforts to fight against such false cases

Key excerpts :

“….As per the settlement, petitioners agreed to pay an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- as full and final settlement. Out of which Rs.35,00,000/- has been already been paid and Rs.5,00,000/- is to be paid today in the Court….”

“…6. It is pertinent to mention here that case FIR No. 232/2009 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC registered at PS- Roop Nagar against the petitioners has already been quashed in Crl. M.C. 4091/2015….”

“….10. Keeping in view the settlement arrived at between the parties, statement of respondent no.2, ld. APP for the State and the settled legal position FIR No.126/2013 registered at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for the offence punishable under Section 507 IPC read with Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed against the petitioners subject to clearance of the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-…”

Also refer earlier / related case at : http://bit.ly/1MeS9mF

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: 10th December, 2015

CRL.M.C. 4092/2015

SAMEER SAXENA & ORS. ….. Petitioners
Represented by: Mr. Rohit K. Nagpal and Ms. Anamika Tomar, Advs.

versus

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR ….. Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Hirein Sharma, APP for the State with SI Harendra Singh, PS-Roop Nagar.
Mr. Rajan Chowdhury, Adv. for R2.

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

1. By way of the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioners seek directions thereby quashing of FIR No.126/2013 registered at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for the offence punishable under Section 507 IPC read with Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against them.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the aforesaid case and case FIR No. 232/2009 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC at the same police station was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2, namely, Ms. Pooja Saxena against petitioners. And case FIR Nos. 109/2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 379/380/466/467/471/120-B/34 IPC and 13/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 467/468/471/474/477/120-B IPC were registered against respondent no. 2 / complainant at PS-Subzi Mandi on the complaint of the petitioner no.1. Thereafter, both the parties have settled their disputes vide settlement dated 27.01.2015 and consequent thereto, marriage between petitioner no.1 and respondent no. 2 has been dissolved vide decree of divorce dated 31.08.2015. As per the settlement, petitioners agreed to pay an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- as full and final settlement. Out of which Rs.35,00,000/- has been already been paid and Rs.5,00,000/- is to be paid today in the Court. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

3. Ld. Counsel further submits that FIRs mentioned above registered against the complainant / respondent no. 2 have already been quashed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court today itself. Thus, since the parties have inter se settled their disputes, respondent no. 2 is no more interested to pursue the case further against the petitioners.

4. Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court alongwith her counsel named above. For her identification she has produced Voter Identity Card being no. NCR1488527 issued by Election Commission of India. Original seen and returned. Ld. Counsel on instructions does not dispute whatever stated by the counsel for the petitioners and submits that all the cases mentioned above have been settled inter se between the parties and consequent thereto marriage between petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 2 has been dissolved vide decree of divorce dated 31.08.2015. He further submits that as per the settlement, an amount of Rs.35,00,000/- has already been paid and remaining amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is to be paid today in the Court. However, since the DDs of the said amount have become staled, same have been returned to the petitioner no.1, who is personally present in the Court. The said petitioner has undertaken to hand over a cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- to the respondent no. 2 during the course of the day. Ld. Counsel submits that since the matter has been settled between the parties and the petitioner is agreed to pay an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- today itself by way of cheque, respondent no. 2 has no objection, if the present petition is allowed subject to realization of the cheque.

5. On the other hand, ld. Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that after investigation, police has filed the chargesheet. However, the charges are yet to be framed. He further submits that the present matter is a matrimonial one and since the respondent No.2 has settled all the disputes with the petitioners and does not wish to pursue the case further against them, no purpose would be served if the petitioners are directed to face trial. Therefore, the State has no objection, if the present petition is allowed.

6. It is pertinent to mention here that case FIR No. 232/2009 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC registered at PS- Roop Nagar against the petitioners has already been quashed in Crl. M.C. 4091/2015.

7. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58. ….However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly
relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled
all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that
such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may
within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on
the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be
defeated.”

8. While recognizing the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, the aforesaid dictum has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in
giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting
the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on
either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed
merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved
their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as
to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the
victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this
prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there
is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction
are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter
case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the
parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that
the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482
of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those
cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still
on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or
the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On
the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or
after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC
is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction
is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in
acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

9. Both the parties who are present in the Court today, approbate the aforesaid settlement dated 27.01.2015 and undertake to remain bound by the same.

10. Keeping in view the settlement arrived at between the parties, statement of respondent no.2, ld. APP for the State and the settled legal position FIR No.126/2013 registered at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for the offence punishable under Section 507 IPC read with Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed against the petitioners subject to clearance of the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

11. Needless to state that if the said cheque is not clear, respondent no. 2 will be at liberty to approach the Court.

12. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed with no order as to costs.

SURESH KAIT (JUDGE)

DECEMBER 10, 2015

jg
***************** related 498a quash *****************

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: 10th December, 2015

CRL.M.C. 4091/2015

SAMEER SAXENA & ORS.                      ….. Petitioners
Represented by: Mr. Rohit K. Nagpal and Ms. Anamika Tomar, Advs.

versus

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR                   ….. Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Hirein Sharma, APP for the State with SI Harendra Singh, PS-Roop Nagar.
Mr. Rajan Chowdhury, Adv. for R2.

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

1. By way of the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioners seek directions thereby quashing of FIR No.232/2009 registered at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against them.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the aforesaid case and case FIR No. 126/2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 507 IPC & Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 at the same police station was registered on the complaint of respondent No.2, namely, Ms. Pooja Saxena against petitioners. And case FIR Nos. 109/2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 379/380/466/467/471/120-B/34 IPC and 13/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 467/468/471/474/477/120-B IPC were registered against respondent no. 2 / complainant at PS-Subzi Mandi on the complaint of the petitioner no.1. Thereafter, both the parties have settled their disputes vide settlement dated 27.01.2015 and consequent thereto, marriage between petitioner no.1 and respondent no. 2 has been dissolved vide decree of divorce dated 31.08.2015. As per the settlement, petitioners agreed to pay an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- as full and final settlement. Out of which Rs.35,00,000/- has been already been paid and Rs.5,00,000/- is to be paid today in the Court.

3. Ld. Counsel further submits that FIRs mentioned above registered against the complainant / respondent no. 2 have already been quashed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court today itself. Thus, since the parties have inter se settled their disputes, respondent no. 2 is no more interested to pursue the case further against the petitioners.

4. Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court alongwith her counsel named above. For her identification she has produced Voter Identity Card being no. NCR1488527 issued by Election Commission of India. Original seen and returned. Ld. Counsel on instructions does not dispute whatever stated by the counsel for the petitioners and submits that all the cases mentioned above have been settled inter se between the parties and consequent thereto marriage between petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 2 has been dissolved vide decree of divorce dated 31.08.2015. He further submits that as per the settlement, an amount of Rs.35,00,000/- has already been paid and remaining amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is to be paid today in the Court. However, since the DDs of the said amount have become staled, same have been returned to the petitioner no.1, who is personally present in the Court. The said petitioner has undertaken to hand over a cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- to the respondent no. 2 during the course of the day. Ld. Counsel submits that since the matter has been settled between the parties and the petitioner is agreed to pay an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- today itself by way of cheque, respondent no. 2 has no objection, if the present petition is allowed subject to realization of the cheque.

5. On the other hand, ld. Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that after investigation, police has filed the chargesheet. However, the charges are yet to be framed. He further submits that the present matter is a matrimonial one and since the respondent No.2 has settled all the disputes with the petitioners and does not wish to pursue the case further against them, no purpose would be served if the petitioners are directed to face trial. Therefore, the State has no objection, if the present petition is allowed.

6. It is pertinent to mention here that case FIR No. 126/2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 507 IPC & Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 registered at PS-Roop Nagar against the petitioners has already been quashed in Crl. M.C. 4092/2015.

7. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the Apex Court has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

“58. ….However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly
relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled
all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that
such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may
within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on
the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be
defeated.”

8. While recognizing the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, the aforesaid dictum has been affirmed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in
giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting
the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on
either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed
merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved
their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as
to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the
victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this
prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there
is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction
are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter
case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the
parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that
the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482
of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those
cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still
on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or
the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On
the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or
after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC
is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction
is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in
acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

9. In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58, wherein the Supreme Court in respect of the matrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine
settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are
on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable,
if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied
that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any
pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice,
Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power
of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent
times. They institution of marriage occupies an important place and
it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every
effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to
enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the
parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes
amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of
law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the
courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary
jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482
should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the
Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing
the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or
that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be
quashed….”

10. Both the parties who are present in the Court today, approbate the aforesaid settlement dated 27.01.2015 and undertake to remain bound by the same.

11. Since the subject matter of this FIR is essentially matrimonial, which now stands mutually and amicably settled between the parties and the complainant is no longer interested in supporting the prosecution because of which, its chances of success in the matter are now greatly diminished. Therefore, in view of the law discussed above, in the facts and circumstances as noted above, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

12. Consequently, FIR No.232/2009 registered at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed against the petitioners subject to clearance of the cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-.

13. Needless to state that if the said cheque is not clear, respondent no. 2 will be at liberty to approach the Court.

14. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed with no order as to costs.

SURESH KAIT (JUDGE)

DECEMBER 10, 2015

jg

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This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
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