Daily Archives: October 16, 2014

Wife earns 35K, Hubby 65K, still NO INTRM MAINT to EMPLOYED wife ; Diff betwn Sec 24, 25 explained ! Bombay HC !

Quoting the Hon. Bombay HC "……for considering the application for interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is decided upon affidavits of the parties alone, the Court cannot and would not consider the precise income, standard of living, conduct of the parties, other properties and other circumstances of the case. The amount that would have to be granted for the maintenance of the wife would be for her support and necessary expenses of the proceedings. That amount would be granted if she does not have income sufficient for her support and necessary expenses of the proceedings. The ambit for grant of interim maintenance under Section 24 is, therefore, far narrower than the ambit under Section 25. It is the distinction between the two sections which is required to be understood for the Court to grant the maintenance amounts thereunder……."

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. This is a free service provided by Vinayak (pen name). Vinayak is a member of SIF – Save Indian Family movement. SIF as a concept is committed to fighting FALSE dowry cases and elder abuse. SIF supports gender equality and a fair treatment of law abiding Indian men. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.

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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
Writ Petition No.6686 of 2009

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Ritula Singh Petitioner
vs.
Lt.Col. Rajeshwar Singh Respondent

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Ms.Sumangala with Ms.Veena Goud for Petitioner.
Mr.G.S. Hegde for Respondent.
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CORAM : SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.

DATED : 26th February, 2010 ORAL ORDER :

1.Rule, returnable forthwith.

2.The parties are wife and husband. They have been married since 22.10.1986. The wife has filed a Divorce Petition in the Family Court in 2008. She has applied for interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for herself and her 2 daughters admittedly born on 13.10.1988 and 4.1.1991. Her Advocate argued that the daughters are 19 years and 17 years old respectively which is arithmetically incorrect. The daughters are 21 years and 19 years, respectively.

3. The interim maintenance application would have to be considered for the Petitioner-wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and for her children under Section 20(2) and (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956. The learned Judge has considered the application on behalf of three of them. The wife has been refused the interim maintenance. The children have been granted interim maintenance of Rs.3,000/- each. They attend college and are dependent children though they have attained majority.

4.The wife has not been granted any interim maintenance. She has challenged that part of the order. The Petitioner-wife is a teacher. She earns Rs.35,000/-. The interim maintenance has to be granted under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which runs thus:-

24. Maintenance, pendente lite and expenses of proceedings.- Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the Court to be reasonable.

Under that section, the Court has to see whether the Petitioner-wife earns any independent income sufficient for her support and the expenses ig of the proceedings. Rs. 35,000/- can be taken to be sufficient for the support of the Petitioner pending the Petition.

5.The Petition has reached the stage of the cross- examination of the Petitioner-wife who has filed the Petition. She has instead taken out the application for enhanced amendment of the Petition to claim maintenance on the ground that the husband s income has been enhanced under the 6th Pay Commission Report. The husband is a Military Officer. He used to earn Rs. 35,000/-. He now earns Rs.65,000/-. The wife has been refused the interim maintenance on the ground that she has independent income sufficient to maintain herself. Because the husband starts earning additional amount, she cannot be taken not to have income sufficient to maintain herself ipso facto. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

6.This rule of law applies to interim applications. That is because extensive evidence relating to all the assets and properties of the husband as also his income from all sources cannot be looked into in an application for interim maintenance.

7.The wife would be entitled to alimony, depending upon the income of the husband and his assets and properties at the final hearing of the Petition for divorce when the permanent alimony ig and maintenance would be considered under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which runs thus:-

25. Permanent alimony and maintenance.- (1) Any Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent s own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the Court to be just, and any such payment maybe secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent.

Consequently, for determination of the permanent alimony and maintenance, the Petitioner s other income and other properties as also the Respondent s income and other properties as also conduct of the parties and other circumstances would be seen by the Court upon the entire evidence led in that behalf. ig It is at that time that the wife s equal right to the property of the husband would be adjudicated upon. It is at that time that the status the parties enjoyed whilst their marriage continued would also be seen from the evidence which is led.

8.It may be mentioned that the Petitioner being a wife of 22 years before the Petition came to be filed would certainly be entitled to an equal share in the assets and propitiates of the husband as also in the amount of alimony upon the law of equality of spouses laid down since 1979 in the case of Dinesh Gijubhai Mehta vs. Smt.Usha Dinesh Mehta, AIR 1979 Bombay 173 DB. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

9.However, since the Petitioner has income sufficient for her maintenance that principle of equality would essentially apply at the final hearing after the entire evidence is recorded which would be soon hereafter, the insistence upon being given interim maintenance and applying for enhancement thereof is counter productive and a cause for delay of final relief.

10.The distinction between the law laid down under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is distinct and clear. It is so because of the specific circumstances that the Court would require to see at the time of each of these applications. It may be clarified that for considering the application for interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is decided upon affidavits of the parties alone, the Court cannot and would not consider the precise income, standard of living, conduct of the parties, other properties and other circumstances of the case. The amount that would have to be granted for the maintenance of the wife would be for her support and necessary expenses of the proceedings. That amount would be granted if she does not have income sufficient for her support and necessary expenses of the proceedings. The ambit for grant of interim maintenance under Section 24 is, therefore, far narrower than the ambit under Section 25. It is the distinction between the two sections which is required to be understood for the Court to grant the maintenance amounts thereunder.

11.Under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act as aforesaid, the entire evidence relating to the income, properties of both the parties and their conduct and circumstances would be and can be seen. That is because the evidence is led in that behalf at the time of final hearing.

12.Consequently, the impugned order not granting any maintenance pending the Petition to a wife who earns Rs.35,000/- per month cannot be faulted. Of course, she would be entitled to permanent alimony and maintenance from the date of the Petition itself on the merits of her case which would be adjudicated upon on completely different parameters which can be seen from the evidence that she would lead. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

13.The Advocate on behalf of the husband states that the Petition is adjourned to 17th April 2009 for her cross-examination and the Respondent would go on with the hearing on that day.

14.The Advocate for the wife states that she has applied for amendment of the Petition to claim an enhanced amount of maintenance consequent upon the enhancement of the salary of the Respondent. Such amendment would certainly be allowed by the Family Court as the wife would be ultimately granted any such amount upon she proving the additional income for grant of additional maintenance amount at the final hearing of the Petition on merits. In view of the aforesaid statement of the Advocate of the husband, I am sure, the husband would not, as he cannot, needlessly oppose such amendment. The case of both the parties would then be considered on merits and the sooner it is considered the better for both.

15.Under the aforesaid circumstances taken together, the order of maintenance is not required to be interfered with.

16.The Writ Petition is dismissed and Rule is discharged except for the clarification that the parties shall proceed with the Petition as allowed to be amended by the learned Judge of the Family Court on 17.4.2010 and thereafter from day to day as fixed by the learned Judge.

17.No order as to costs.

(SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.)

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Vinayak
Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn’t given up, Male, activist

Though wife filed DV in 2008 it takes till 2010 to even decide who can prosecute break of protecn ordr !! Hon Bom HC “…Family Court / such Court, which passed (original) order, not only entitled but obliged to try offence of breach …” !!

IF a family court or civil court passed protection orders under DV act, the same family court would have rights under sec 31(2) of DV act to prosecute breach of orders

To quote the Hon HC "………If a breach is made of the order, which is an offence under the DV Act, the Court which passed the order is required to try it under Section 31(2) cited above. Since an order under the DV Act would normally be passed by the Magistrate upon the main application made before a Magistrate under Section 12 of the DV Act, Section 31(2) requires the offence of breach of the protection order or an interim order to be tried by the Magistrate who passed the order. Consequently, if the Magistrate does not pass such an order but a Civil or a Criminal Court, or the Family Court in a Family Court proceeding passes an order under the aforesaid sections of the DV Act as a protection order or an interim protection order such Court, which passed the order, would be not only entitled but obliged to try the offence of breach of its own order.

7. Consequently, the words Magistrate who had passed the order in Section 31(2) must be read as Magistrate or a Civil or Criminal Court or a Family Court who had passed the order . This applies to any legal proceeding which was pending before that Court, an application under the aforesaid sections is made before that Court and a protection order or an interim protection is passed by that Court…..…………"

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. This is a free service provided by Vinayak (pen name). Vinayak is a member of SIF – Save Indian Family movement. SIF as a concept is committed to fighting FALSE dowry cases and elder abuse. SIF supports gender equality and a fair treatment of law abiding Indian men. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.

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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE

Writ Petition No.5252 of 2009

Mrs.Pramodini Vijay Fernandes .. .. Petitioner
v/s.
Mr.Vijay Fernandes .. .. Respondent

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Mr.R.N. Sanghavi for Petitioner.
Mr.Abhijit Sarwate i/by Mrs.Kokila Kalra for Respondent.
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CORAM : SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J

Date of reserving the order : 9th February, 2010
Date of pronouncing the order : 17th February, 2010

ORDER :

1.Rule, returnable forthwith.

2.The parties are wife and husband. The Petitioner (wife) has filed a Petition for divorce against the Respondent (husband) under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The Petitioner has taken out a Petition for the protection of herself and her child under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). An order came to be passed under the DV Act on 19.7.2008. That order is stated to have been breached. The Petitioner took out an application under Section 31 of the DV Act upon violation of the order. The Family Court rejected the application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to pass any order under Section 31 of the DV Act. The Court also refrained from exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Section 31 of the DV Act lays down penalty for breach of protection of the order by the Petitioner. Section 31 of the DV Act runs thus:-

31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent : (1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.

(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had passed the order, the breach of which has been alleged to have been caused by the accused.

(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may also frame charges under section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may be, if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions.

(Emphasis supplied)

3.Section 31, therefore, lays down the specific procedure to be followed giving jurisdiction to the Magistrate who had passed the order to punish for breach of any protection order which is specified to be an offence committed by the party breaching the order under the DV Act. That offence is punishable as mentioned in the section. The orders under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may be passed by a Magistrate or by a Civil or Criminal Court under Section 26 of the DV Act where a proceeding was initiated before such Court. Section 26 of the DV Act runs thus:-

26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings:- (1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.

(3) In case, any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.

Consequently, therefore, though initial application is required to be made before a Magistrate for obtaining orders and reliefs under Section 12 of the DV Act, if a legal proceeding is already filed in a Civil or a Criminal Court affecting the aggrieved person and the Respondent, relief under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 could be granted by such Civil or Criminal Court.

4. The Family Court follows the procedure laid down in the CPC under Section 10(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Section 10(1) runs thus:

10. Procedure generally.- (1)Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, a Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court.

(emphasis supplied)

5. Family Court is, therefore, a Civil Court. Where a proceeding is initiated in a Family Court, a protection order can be passed by a Family Court.

6.In this case, a divorce proceeding was pending in the Family Court affecting the Petitioner as the aggrieved person and her husband as the Respondent therein. An order came to be passed under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the DV Act by the Family Court as aforesaid on 19.7.2008. The jurisdiction of the Family Court has not been challenged. Breach of the order under the aforesaid sections passed by the Family Court, as an interim protection in any legal proceeding already filed before it, by which certain reliefs are granted, are expected to be honoured and obeyed.

If a breach is made of the order, which is an offence under the DV Act, the Court which passed the order is required to try it under Section 31(2) cited above. Since an order under the DV Act would normally be passed by the Magistrate upon the main application made before a Magistrate under Section 12 of the DV Act, Section 31(2) requires the offence of breach of the protection order or an interim order to be tried by the Magistrate who passed the order. Consequently, if the Magistrate does not pass such an order but a Civil or a Criminal Court, or the Family Court in a Family Court proceeding passes an order under the aforesaid sections of the DV Act as a protection order or an interim protection order such Court, which passed the order, would be not only entitled but obliged to try the offence of breach of its own order.

7. Consequently, the words Magistrate who had passed the order in Section 31(2) must be read as Magistrate or a Civil or Criminal Court or a Family Court who had passed the order . This applies to any legal proceeding which was pending before that Court, an application under the aforesaid sections is made before that Court and a protection order or an interim protection is passed by that Court.

8.Of course, for trying offence under Section 31(1) of the DV Act, such Court would require to frame charges under Section 31(3) of the DV Act.

9.Mr.Sarwate on behalf of the Respondent contended on behalf of the Respondent that though the Family Court can pass an order under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, it has no jurisdiction to levy any penalty for breach of the order passed by it. This would be to say that the law which grants the relief does not grant the remedy to enforce the relief. Such an interpretation would be to frustrate justice. An interpretation of a legislation, specially a protective legislation as the DV Act, must be such as to enhance justice and not to frustrate it. It would be absurd if the Respondent allowed orders under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 to be passed as interim protection orders and breached them with impunity and impertinence on the ground that Section 31(2) confers jurisdiction only upon a Magistrate to try the offence for breach of a protection order.

10.In the case of Union of India & anr. vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 453 at 457, it has been held that the Customs Tribunal had powers conferred expressly by the Statute and being a judicial body it had all other incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make the express grant of the statutory powers fully effective. The ambit of the limits of its jurisdiction is, therefore, extended to such incidental and ancillary powers as inherent in the Tribunal. This is on the premise that the legislative intent of the power expressly granted in an assigned field of jurisdiction must be efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. Hence it is held that though the powers of the Tribunal are limited and the area of its jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted, implied grant being limited by the express grant. Hence all incidental powers, which would make the grant effective and would be reasonably necessary for that purpose are implicitly taken to be conferred in the Tribunal. This is upon the principle of interpretation set out in that paragraph from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) which runs thus:

"….where an Act confers a jurisdiction,impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. …"

11.Similarly in the case of Shail Kumari Devi & anr. vs. Krishan Bhagwan Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak, AIR 2008 SC 2006, it is held that the Magistrate, who is vested with the jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code for granting maintenance to wives, children and parents, is conferred the power by necessary implication to pass interim orders of maintenance. It is held that he would have such a power in the absence of any express bar or prohibition under that section. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

12.Further, since the Family Court is a Civil Court and has all the powers of a Civil Court, it can pass orders consequent upon disobedience of breach of its order under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC. Further the Family Court like any other Court has the inherent power under Section 151 of the CPC to pass such orders as would be just and equitable, including orders to effectuate its own orders. In this case, the application of the Petitioner herein was specifically made under Section 31 of the DV Act.

13.The Family Court would, therefore, have the jurisdiction under Section 31(2) of the DV Act as the Magistrate which had passed the order of interim protection to frame charges under Section 32(3) of the DV Act and to levy the penalty under Section 32(1) of the DV Act for breach of its interim protection order.

However, the Family Court would also have the jurisdiction to proceed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC for breach and disobedience of its order and injunction.

14.Consequently, the order of the learned Judge, Family Court No.4, Pune, dated 7.5.2009 is set aside. The learned Judge, Family Court No.4, Pune, shall try the application of the Petitioner herein either under Section 31 of the DV Act or under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC for breach of its own order. For that purpose both the parties shall be entitled to file such applications / affidavits as required by both of them. The Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

15.No order as to costs.

(SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.)

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regards

Vinayak
Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn’t given up, Male, activist

married Oct ’06, separated Mar ’07, ablaa gets only 15000/mon, though hubby big biz man !! Don’t ask why should she get a dime !! ???

* Quoting the Honourable court "……..It is common knowledge that husbands who desire to fail and neglect to maintain their wives in consonance with their martial obligation and statutory duty to maintain them create evidence of termination of their services or contracts so soon as the marriage breaks down, parties separate or the wife makes her claim for maintenance….."
* The husband lives in a bungalow, has membership of at least one Club. He lives in affluent circumstances which fact is considered by the learned Judge
* position of the husband in 4 Companies being A.K. Engineering Services, M/s.Mountain Movers, M/s.Ashwini Market and M/s.Saikrupa Distributors.
* Whereas the wife claims that the husband owns each of these Undertakings, the husband claims that he owns none.
* The husband is shown as contract person for M/s.Saikrupa Distributors. He shows as Head of Sales of A.K. Engineering Services.
* He shows the distribution of earth moving machines by him and he is shown concerned with one Ashwini Marketing, who is the authorised dealer of Cummins Diesel Sales & Services.

……. now you know the rest of the story ……….

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. This is a free service provided by Vinayak (pen name). Vinayak is a member of SIF – Save Indian Family movement. SIF as a concept is committed to fighting FALSE dowry cases and elder abuse. SIF supports gender equality and a fair treatment of law abiding Indian men. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.

******************************************************************
CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE

Writ Petition No.5338 of 2009

Anup Avinash Varadpande .. .. Petitioner
v/s.
Anusha Anup Varadpande .. .. Respondent

Mr.U.P. Warunjikar for Petitioner.
Mr.S.S. Punde for Respondent.
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CORAM : SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.

DATED : 11th January, 2010 ORAL ORDER :

1.Heard both sides.

2.Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

3.Upon a matrimonial dispute for interim maintenance prosecuted in the Family Court, the Petitioner-husband has impugned the order of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Pune, dated 31st March 2009, Exhibit-H to the Petition. The order for maintenance is granted upon the Application for interim maintenance made by the Respondent-wife for grant of Rs.60,000/- per month and expenses of Rs.10,000/- for maintenance. The wife has essentially provided the details about the income of the husband from his Internet profile. His Internet profile shows him to be dealing in various capacities in various Firms. The learned Judge has considered the position of the husband in 4 Companies being A.K. Engineering Services, M/s.Mountain Movers, M/s.Ashwini Market and M/s.Saikrupa Distributors. Whereas the wife claims that the husband owns each of these Undertakings, the husband claims that he owns none. The husband is shown as contract person for M/s.Saikrupa Distributors. He shows as Head of Sales of A.K. Engineering Services. He shows the distribution of earth moving machines by him and he is shown concerned with one Ashwini Marketing, who is the authorised dealer of Cummins Diesel Sales & Services. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

4.The husband is a businessman. He deals in various capacities. The husband has refuted the claim shown in his Internet profile. He has shown the names of his father, mother and brother instead in several of these Undertakings in various capacities.

5.He claims that he had a dealership contract with A.K. Engineering Services which was terminated on December 31, 2008. He has produced certificate of registration of 1984 issued on 30.12.1994 in the name of his father as proprietor of A.K. Engineering Services. The husband, therefore, had a contract with his father. That contract is shown to be terminated after the wife sued for interim maintenance. A termination by way of a letter on a Stamp Paper of Rs.100/- simpliciter is produced. The learned Judge has naturally not accepted the termination of the contract of the husband in his own father s Undertaking.

6.It is common knowledge that husbands who desire to fail and neglect to maintain their wives in consonance with their martial obligation and statutory duty to maintain them create evidence of termination of their services or contracts so soon as the marriage breaks down, parties separate or the wife makes her claim for maintenance. Production of a mere letter or order of termination of service or resignation from service cannot be relied upon or considered by the Court in the absence of proof of execution of such a document and genuineness and bona fides of its creator. There is no reason for an otherwise qualified and physically capable husband to have to be dismissed or terminated from service or to resign his job or discontinue his career. In this case, it is not surprising that the firm from which his dealership contract is terminated is shown, under an unregistered partnership deed (the kind of which that can be fabricated at any time) to belong essentially to his father and brother and the place of business of the partnership is shown to belong to his mother as shall be seen presently. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

7.Mr.Warunjikar argued that the Internet profiles need not be taken as a guide to conclude the husband s income. He is merely shown against the products of the various Undertakings. He owns none of the products himself. The only document showing his true financial position is the income tax returns which has been wrongly rejected by the learned Judge and hence interference by this Court is required.

8.Relating to various vehicles shown in the Internet profile against his own photographs, the husband has produced certain RTO registration of the vehicles. One is shown to stand in the name of his mother and father. The other vehicle is in the name of M/s.Mountain Movers. An unregistered Deed of Partnership on a stamp paper of Rs.100/- dated 27.11.1998 of the Firm M/s.Mountain Movers at Gulbarga, shows the husband s father Avinash and his brother Mohan as the main partners. If that is to be accepted, the Internet profile is intendedly deceptive and even dishonestly made.

9.The learned Judge has accepted the internet profile. The husband has relied upon his income-tax returns showing an annual income of about Rs.2 Lakhs which is rightly rejected as not representing his true financial status and income by the learned Judge in view of his association with as many as 4 Companies. The husband has not produced the same before this Court.

10.The husband has produced before this Court the income- tax returns of his mother Ashwini instead. She is also shown to receive profits from Ashwini Marketing as well as rent from A.K. Engineering Services, which form a part of the Internet profile of the husband himself. It is, therefore, seen that these are family concerns where the husband ig is legitimately financially interested. The income-tax returns of the mother shows the loan taken by her from the husband who is her son. Placing reliance upon such family Undertakings and upon rejection of the husband s claim that he has washed his hands off each of his Undertakings, including dealership agreement, contrary to the information given out by him in his Internet profile, the learned Judge has rejected his contention but granted interim maintenance of only Rs.15,000/-.

11.The husband lives in a bungalow, has membership of at least one Club. He lives in affluent circumstances which fact is considered by the learned Judge. The bungalow is a family property. Though the husband has not produced the documents of purchase by the mother, he claims, upon the record of rights, that his mother is the owner.

12.The learned Judge has also considered some paltry income that the wife earns from her service as a primary school teacher in Symbiosis Primary school on temporary basis, earning Rs.5,000/- per month as reflected as in the salary slip shown by her. Mr.Warunjikar has contended that it is erroneous to consider the net income of the wife after deduction of her provident fund, etc., and that the learned Judge should have considered her gross income. The wife secured this job in 2008. The parties married on 14.10.2006. They admittedly separated in March 2007. The wife is seen to have taken the temporary job out of a constraint to earn her living. It may be mentioned that a paltry income earned by the wife, specially after separation or upon the neglect of the husband to maintain the wife, cannot be termed as her income . It is merely an amount received upon the constraint to serve to make ends meet. Such amount can hardly be considered for determining sufficiency of income. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

13.What is contemplated to be income in any provision for grant of interim maintenance, be that under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, Section 20(1)(d) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or any other similar legislation is that the wife, of her own volition, and upon her educational or professional qualifications, pursues a settled career either by way of service or profession or business in which she derives her own independent, separate income or otherwise earns income by way of investments, rents, profits or the like from any settled source of income. The sufficiency or otherwise of such income is required to be seen and calculated to grant or reject her claim of maintenance.

14.It wold be unjust and unreasonable to disallow a woman her claim to maintenance when it is seen that she did not pursue a career or be in service during the subsistence and continuation of her marriage and had taken up a job or service only when the parties separated.

15.This phenomenon can be appreciated from another angle also. A wife, who is in service is entitled and often required, to give up her service after marriage. She is equally entitled to give up her service after the parties separate. She is entitled to make a claim for maintenance thereafter. Of course, the bona fides of such a claim would have to be seen from the facts of each case. In normal circumstances, upon such a claim being made, the husband would be obliged and bound to maintain her. In such a case, her maintenance amount would be determined based only upon the income of her husband.

16.Hence if a wife is constrained to earn in a service taken up by her to make ends meet or to survive with dignity pending the actual receipt of maintenance from her husband after following the usually labourious legal process, in our judicial system wrought with the consummate delays, igshe cannot be penalised for the legitimate means of earning her modest and honest livelihood. Earnings of a primary school teacher who has been neglected and failed to be maintained by a businessman husband cannot even be justified to be deducted from an amount deemed fit and reasonable to be paid to her as maintenance from the income of the husband. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

17.Nevertheless, the learned Judge has considered her net income of Rs.5,000/- from her salary certificate and granted the amount of maintenance of only Rs.15,000/- per month.

18.The order is not perverse. The Writ Petition is rejected. Rule is discharged accordingly.

(SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.)

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Vinayak
Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn’t given up, Male, activist

if ALL allgeations @ hubby’s home wife CANNOT file case at her place ! 498a NOT continuing offense. Bombay HC

Notes
****************
* Ablaa files 498a on JUST SIX people in hubby’s house !!
* "….that from the perusal of FIR, it would reveal that even according to the complainant the entire instances have taken place within the jurisdiction of the court at Nashik …." (i.e.) husband’s city
* wife says "……complainant (wife) was required to stay with her parents as a consequence of ill treatment on account of demand of dowry!!!, .." so the court at Sahada (wife’s place) had jurisdiction
* Hon. HC says "….Taking the allegation in the FIR at its face value, it cannot be said that there is even a whisper of any instance regarding the ill treatment within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Sahada…...."
* Hon. HC analyses other important cases where the supreme court has said that 498a is NOT a continuing offence !!
* The Hon HC says "….It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in clear terms had held that the offence under Section 498-A is not a continuing offence. Merely because the complainant has left the matrimonial house on account of the ill treatment by her husband and resides with her parents, cannot be a ground to bestow the court at the place where the parents reside, a jurisdiction to entertain the complaint..…"
* Hon. HC transfers case to Husband’s place !!!

*****************************disclaimer**********************************
This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. This is a free service provided by Vinayak (pen name). Vinayak is a member of SIF – Save Indian Family movement. SIF as a concept is committed to fighting FALSE dowry cases and elder abuse. SIF supports gender equality and a fair treatment of law abiding Indian men. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.

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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2768 OF 2008

1. Shekhar Shivdas Mahire ]
age 30 years, Occ : Service, ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ]

2. Shivdas Dharmaji Mahire ]
age 57 years, Occ: Agri. ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ]

3 Smt. Lilabai Shivdas Mahire ]
age 50, Occ: Household ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ]

4 Rekhabai Shivdas Mahire ]
Age 58 years, Occ: Household ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ]

5. Sarika Shivdas Mahire ]
age 26 years, Occ : Agri. ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ]

6 Sangeeta Sarnath Salve ]
age 29 years, Occ: Household ]
r/o. Shriramnagar, Panchak Jail Road ]
Plot No. 18, Nashik ] ..Applicants

versus

1. Sou. Sarikabai Shekhar Mahire ]
an adult, Occ : Service, ]
At present r/o. Panchasheel Colony ]
Dasharath Nagar, Dodasicha Road ]
Opp: Forest Office, Sahada ]
District Nashik ]

2. State of Maharashtra ]..Respondents

Mr. A. P. Mundargi – amicus curiae appointed by the Court.
Mr. Vivek Salunkhe i/b. Mr. P. B. Shah for Applicants.
Ms. Rita K. Joshi for Respondent No. 1.
Mr. P. S. Hingorani – APP for Respondent No. 2 – State.
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CORAM : B. R. GAVAI, J.

DATED : APRIL 13, 2010.

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard by consent.

2. The applicants have filed the present application for quashing and setting aside CR. No. 126/2006 registered with Sahada Police Station and charge sheet No. 9 of 2007 filed in RCC No. 14/2007 pending before the learned J.M.F.C. Sahada. The applicants have in the alternative prayed for transfer of proceedings to the learned J.M.F.C. Nashik Road, Nashik.

3. An FIR was filed at the instance of the respondent No. 1 alleging therein that the applicants had physically and mentally ill treated her on account of unlawful demand of dowry and thereby committed an offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. It appears that on completion of investigation the charge sheet came to be filed before the learned J.M.F.C.

In the said proceedings, an application came to be filed by the present applicants for transfer of the proceedings to the Court of J.M.F.C. at Nashik. The said application came to be rejected on the ground that the learned J.M.F.C. has no powers to transfer the proceedings. Subsequently the present application has been filed.

4. Mr. Salunkhe, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants submits that from the perusal of FIR, it would reveal that even according to the complainant the entire instances have taken place within the jurisdiction of the court at Nashik and therefore it is only the court at Nashik which will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. He further submits that nothing has taken place at Sahada, so as to invest the court at Sahada with the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The learned counsel relies on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Manish Ratan & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. [(2007)1 Supreme Court Cases 262].

5. Ms. Joshi the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 submits that the respondent no. 1 – complainant was required to stay in her parents house as her husband had himself taken her there. It is therefore submitted that since the complainant was required to stay with her parents as a consequence of ill treatment on account of demand of dowry, the court at Sahada had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

6. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 relied on the judgments in the cases of (1) Syed Khaja Mohiuddin vs. State of A.P. [I(2006)DMC 32], (2) Smt. Suman Upadhyay and others vs. State of U.P. and others [1999 Cri.L.J. 4657], (3) Vijai Ratan Sharma and others vs. State of U.P and another [1988 Cri.L.J. 1581], (4) Bina Dey and others vs. Pratibha Dey (Baidya) 2003 Cri. L.J. 3618] and (5) Dharmendra Kumar @ Dharmendra Kumar Vedi & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. [II (2009)DMC 779].

7. Looking into the important question as to whether the court at the place where the complainant – wife resides will have a jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not, Mr. Ashok Mundargi the learned senior counsel was requested to assist the court in the matter and act as amicus curiae. Mr. Mundargi graciously agreed to do so. I must place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Mundargi, the learned senior counsel.

Taking the court through various provisions of Sections 126, 182, 183, 179, the learned senior counsel submits that wherever the legislature intended that the court other than the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed will have a jurisdiction to enquire into the said offence, the legislature has so specifically provided. He submits that in so far as offence under Section 498-A is concerned, it has not been provided by the legislature that it will be enquired into at any other place other than where the offence has taken place. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. [(2004)8 SCC 100], the learned counsel submits that offence under Section 498-A is not a continuous offence. The courts at the place at which the complainant resides i.e. her parents’ place will have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The learned counsel further submits that in so far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997)5 SCC 30] is concerned, in the said case there was an allegation that the demand of dowry and assault on her had taken place at her parents place and therefore in the peculiar facts, it was held that the place where the complainant was residing will have jurisdiction.

8. From the perusal of the FIR, it would reveal that the entire allegations in the FIR is regarding ill treatment by the accused persons at her matrimonial home at Nashik. The only averment in the complaint on which the learned counsel for the complainant relies so as to bestow the court at Sahada with jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, is to the effect that she used to inform her father on telephone regarding the ill treatment and on other occasions whenever she used to go to Sahada she used to inform regarding demand of dowry to her parents. Taking the allegation in the FIR at its face value, it cannot be said that there is even a whisper of any instance regarding the ill treatment within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Sahada.

9. Section 177 of the Cr.P.C. provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Sections 176, 181, 182 and 183 provide for enquiry into the offence by a court through or into whose territorial jurisdiction the offence has taken place. The perusal of the aforesaid provisions would reveal that any offence is ordinarily required to be enquired into or tried by the court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However certain exceptions have been carved out by the legislation itself. Wherever the legislature has intended that the offence enquired into or tried by any other court other than the court in whose local jurisdiction offence was committed, it has specifically provided for the same.

The Apex Court in the case of Y. Ibrahim (cited supra) has observed thus :

"11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier,the husband of the complainant went to the place where the complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied."

The Apex Court has observed further:

"19. When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to Respondent No. 2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

10. In the case of Manish Ratan (cited supra), the Apex Court has held that the offence under Section 498-A cannot be held to be continuing one only because the complainant was forced to leave her matrimonial home. In the said case the Apex Court has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, wherein the Apex Court observed as follows:

"16. Yet again in Ramesh v. State of T.N., Abraham Ajith was followed by this Court stating: (SCC pp. 512-13, paras 11-12):

"11. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.

12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy."

The said cases are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case."

It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in clear terms had held that the offence under Section 498-A is not a continuing offence. Merely because the complainant has left the matrimonial house on account of the ill treatment by her husband and resides with her parents, cannot be a ground to bestow the court at the place where the parents reside, a jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

11. In so far as reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sayed Khaja Mohiuddin (cited supra) is concerned, the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case has observed that on account of harassment if the wife is forced to go either to her parent’s place or a friend’s place, there is nothing in law which prohibits the wife to initiate criminal action at a place where she is forced to live as a consequence of being subjected to cruelty. Taking recourse to Section 126 of the Cr.P.C. the learned Judge has observed that the woman who is subjected to cruelty can file a complaint or lodge an F.I.R. at a place where the husband resides or the relative resides, at a place where she resides or at a place where both of them last resided. The learned Judge has further observed that the choice of choosing the court is certainly with the married woman and the husband or relatives, who are accused of committing an offence under Section 498-A of IPC cannot choose the forum of their choice. However, it can clearly be seen that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on Section 126 of the Cr.P.C. was totally out of context. Section 126 gives a choice to the wife to file the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. for maintenance at any of the place mentioned in Section 126. Relying on the provisions of Section 126 which deal with the jurisdiction for proceedings under Section 125 also for an offence under Section 498-A, in my view would be providing something which has not been provided by the legislature. It further appears that the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has not noticed the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Ibrahim Ajith and Ramesh vs. State of T.N., which were prior to the judgment of the learned Single Judge. In that view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; https://vinayak.wordpress.com/ ; http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

12. In so far as the judgment of the learned Judge of Allahabad High Court in the case of Suman Upadhyay (cited supra) is concerned, in the said case in the complaint it was specifically alleged that the ill treatment was committed at several places, therefore, the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court took a view that the complaint could be filed at any of the places where the alleged ill treatment had taken place.

13. In so far as the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in case of Vijai Ratan Sharma and others (cited supra) and judgment of the learned Single Judge of Gauhati High Court in the case of Binay Dey & ors. vs. Pratibha Dey (Baidya) (cited supra) are concerned, both these judgments are delivered prior to the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Ibrahim Ajith, Ramesh v. State of T.N., Manish Ratan, and therefore will have to be held to be impliedly over ruled.

14. In so far as judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in the case Dharmendra Kumar @ Dharmendra Kumar Vedi & Ors. (cited supra) is concerned, in the said case in the complaint it was alleged that the demand of dowry was made to her father where her father resided and on non fulfillment of demand she and her father was assaulted. In this factual background it was held that part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court where her parents resided and the court at such a place had a jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

15. In the present case as already discussed herein above, there are no allegations of any ill treatment at the place where the parents of the complainant resided. The entire allegations pertain to the matrimonial home of the complainant i.e. Nashik. In that view of the matter, the proceedings before the court at JMFC, Sahada are not tenable. However, I find that inspite of quashing the proceedings, it would be in the interest of justice to transfer the proceedings from the court of JMFC Sahada to the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik. The application is therefore allowed by directing the proceedings being CR. No. 126/2006 registered with Sahada Police Station and charge sheet No. 9 of 2007 filed in RCC No. 14/2007 pending before the learned J.M.F.C. Sahada to be transferred to the court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik, who shall allot the same to the court of competent jurisdiction at Nashik. It is needless to state that the proceedings shall stand transferred from the present stage along with the evidence, if any, recorded.

16. At this stage, the learned counsel for the complainant – respondent no.1 prays for stay of the order passed by this court for a period of ten weeks. The said prayer is vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the applicants.

17. However, taking into consideration that there was an interim order operating for a considerable length of time, I am inclined to stay the order for a period of eight weeks from today. Order accordingly.

18. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.

ig (B. R. GAVAI, J.)

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Vinayak
Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn’t given up, Male, activist

False 498a on DUBAI NRI aftr woman’s affair wid socialmedia friend ! court JUST warns her !! WHY NO JAIL ??


News from Dinamalar Tamil News paper

Mangalore India :

  • Dharanam, daughter of Sheikh Noor Mohammad Gulzar of Bikarnakatte, Mangalore, Karnataka, married Engineer Mr. Rizwan Ali Sheikh of Bajpe, Mangalore, in 2007.
  • Rizawan took his wife to Dubai as he was employed there
  • Jobless and sitting at home in the midst of all comforts, Dharanam developed illicit relations thru the net / social media
  • Rizawan came to know of this and questioned his wife
  • Dharanam accepted the truth and agreed to divorce Rizwan
  • However on returning to India, Dharanam filed a false 498a on her husband and his relatives !! claiming that they have CUT HER THALI (sacred mangalsuthra) and thrown her out of the house !!
  • On inquiry, Rizwan Ali [the husband ] showed a CD of his wife’s escapades on the net !! (I do NOT know how he managed to record them !!!! , but he’s been a smart engineer )
  • Caught red handed, the case was decreed in favour of the husband
  • Then the Honourable court just WARNED the ablaa naari and told her NOT to misuse 498a !!
  • Of course this case will be considered as just a SMALL portion of the statistics as this wife was NOT arrested or punished !!
  • However this is a good lesson to all husbands that you need CD proofs of your wife’s escapades and should be prepared for that well before marriage

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original news in Tamil from Dinamalar.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

பொய்யான வரதட்சணை புகார் : பெண்ணுக்கு கோர்ட் கண்டிப்பு

மங்களூரு: வரதட்சணை கேட்டதாக, பொய் புகார் கொடுத்த, பெண்ணைக் கண்டித்த நிதிமன்றம், வழக்கை தள்ளுபடி செய்தது. மங்களூரு, பிக்கர்னகட்டேவை சேர்ந்த

ஷேக் நூர் முஹம்மது-குல்ஸர் மகள் தாரானம். இவருக்கும், பாஜ்பேவை சேர்ந்த, இன்ஜினியர் ரிஸ்வான் அலி ஷேக்கிற்கும், கடந்த 2007 நவ., 21ல், திருமணம் நடந்தது. ரிஸ்வான், மனைவியை, துபாய்க்கு அழைத்து சென்று விட்டார். துபாயில், ரிஸ்வான் பணிக்கு சென்ற பின், வீட்டில் தனியாக இருந்த தாரானத்துக்கு, சமூக வலைதளம் மூலம், ஒருவருடன் பழக்கம் ஏற்பட்டது. இதையறிந்த ரிஸ்வான், மனைவியிடம் கேட்டார். உண்மையை ஒப்புக் கொண்ட பெண், விவாகரத்து பெற்று கொள்வதாக கூறினார். ஒரு மாதத்துக்கு பின், தாரானம், பாஜ்பே காவல் நிலையத்தில், தன் தாலியை அறுத்து, வீட்டை விட்டு வெளியேற்றியதாக, கணவர் மற்றும் அவரது குடும்பத்தினர் மீது வரதட்சணை புகார் கொடுத்தார். மங்களூரு நீதிமன்றத்தில் வழக்கு விசாரணை நடந்தது. புகாரில் உண்மையில்லை என, ரிஸ்வான் சார்பில் கோர்ட்டில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது. மேலும், சமூக வலைதளத்தில், தாரானம் உரையாடலை, ‘சிடி’யாக பதிவு செய்து கோர்ட்டில் சமர்ப்பித்தார். இதையடுத்து, ரிஸ்வான் உட்பட, ஏழு பேர் மீது தொடரப்பட்ட வழக்கை தள்ளுபடி செய்த நீதிமன்றம், வரதட்சணை கொடுமை புகாரை தவறாக பயன்படுத்தக் கூடாது என்று தாரானத்தை எச்சரித்தது.

http: // www. dinamalar.com / news_detail.asp?i d=109310

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regards

Vinayak
Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn’t given up, Male, activist